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ABSTRACT
"GETTING AMERICA TOLD":
THE BLACK PRESS AND ITS DIALOGUE WITH WHITE AMERICA,
1914-1919
by
William G. Jordan 
University of New Hampshire, December, 1996
This dissertation examines the role of African-American 
newspapers as a forum for interracial discourse during World 
War I. The black press addressed itself to white America, 
arguing that African-Americans' participation in the war made 
them worthy of full citizenship, pointing out the similarity 
between the nation's aim of championing democracy in Europe 
and the goal of creating racial justice in America, and 
drawing parallels between atrocities against civilians in 
Europe and the lynching of African Americans in the Southern 
states. Some influential white Americans paid attention to 
these arguments and responded to them. In doing so, they 
sought to use the black press to reach African Americans and 
eliminate "unrest" among them. In fact the Wilson 
administration called a conference of black editors in 
Washington in 1918 precisely for this purpose.
Thus, African Americans used the black press to persuade 
white America to provide racial equality and whites used it to 
understand and try to manipulate the opinions and actions of 
the black population. The response of the black press to 
World War I can only be fully understood in the context of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
this dialogue across America's racial divide. As the Russian 
linguist M. M. Bakhtin postulated, ideology emerges from such 
dialogue because individuals assemble their arguments using 
words taken from other people's utterances and then speak 
those words with the aim of making their own case in a way 
that will persuade those other people. The black press 
developed its approach to World War I by appropriating words 
from mainstream discourse and using them with the aim of 
breaking through to the consciousness of white America.
This study is based on a close reading of four weekly 
newspapers (the Baltimore Afro-American, the Chicago Defender, 
the Cleveland Gazette. and the New York Age) , one national 
monthly (the Crisis) , and a sampling of ten other black 
publications, as well as records from three Federal agencies 
and the personal papers of black journalists and President 
Woodrow Wilson. It also deals with the careers of black 
journalists, including editors W. E. B. Du Bois and James 
Weldon Johnson, and publishers Harry C. Smith, and Robert S. 
Abbott.
xi
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION: DEFENDERS OF THE RACE
Yes, this man was fighting, fighting with words.
He was using words as a weapon, using them as one 
would use a club. Could words be weapons? Well, 
yes for here they were. Then, maybe, perhaps, I 
could use them as a weapon?
--Richard Wright1
Richard Wright's epiphany, after reading H. L. Mencken's 
A Book of Prefaces in 1927, started him on a long and 
successful career of using words to pound away at American 
racism in his famous novels, short stories, and essays. One- 
hundred years earlier, in 1827, two other black men embarked 
on a similar quest when they established the first African 
American newspaper, Freedom's Journal. John B. Russwurm and 
Samuel E. Cornish said they planned to defend free blacks by 
refuting "the calumnies of our enemies . . .  by forceful 
arguments."2 Since that time, African-American writers, 
editors, and publishers, have used black newspapers to defend 
the black people and attack racism.
Richard Wright, Black Boy: A Record of Childhood and 
Youth (New York: Harper and Row, 1937; New York: Harper
Perennial, 1989), 272.
2Quoted in Bella Gross, "Freedom's Journal and the Rights 
of All," Journal of Negro History. 17 (July 1932), 241-86,
esp. 241.
1
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To them, the black press has been a "defender of the 
race," ever ready to counter attacks on African Americans in 
the mainstream "white" press, to make the case for black 
equality and civil rights, or to point out the inhumanity of 
American race relations. As the Chicago Broad Ax put it, 
black newspapers have served African Americans by "constantly 
struggling as best they can to fight their battles for them."3 
Even black readers have seen the black press in this light. 
A reader criticized the California Eagle at a public forum in 
Los Angeles in 1917 because that black weekly had failed to 
respond to a recent attack on African Americans in the Record, 
a local daily. "It was confidently expected that we should be 
on the job every minute and make this fight for the race, " the 
Eagle explained. The Eagle's editorial writer agreed that 
"with such copperhead sheets as the Record, we should ever be 
in a position to hurl these attacks back into their teeth."4
3Chicago Broad Ax. Dec. 18, 1915. For an example of a 
letter-writer who characterized the New York Age as "defender 
of the race." See J. Williams, "Leading Paper of the Race," 
New York Age. Feb. 22, 1917, p. 4. In the Age1 s frequent
letters column "Commending the Age, " most writers complimented 
the newspaper for educating black readers. Some, however, 
commented on its role as representative or defender of the 
race. A North Carolina reader said the Age was pleading the 
race's case "as a consummate diplomat both to the heart and 
the head of this great nation." See ibid.. March l, 1917, p. 
4. Please note that in any quotations of newspapers where I 
have found minor typographical or spelling errors I have 
silently corrected them.
4Without the "united and strong support" of the entire 
black community of Los Angeles, however, the Eagle could 
defend the race only selectively, the editor added by way of 
explaining the paper's failing. California Eagle. Sept. 29, 
1917.
2
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But the idea that the black press could fight for the 
race with words begs some fundamental questions. Just how, 
and in what situations, have African Americans used words in 
their newspapers as weapons--of defense or offense? And how 
effective have they been at it? This dissertation seeks to 
answer these questions in the context of the first World War 
and at the same time to develop insights into the black 
response to that war and its immediate aftermath.
In the years from the outbreak of war in Europe in 1914 
to the emergence of the New Negro in 1919 African Americans 
needed a great deal of defending. A majority could not vote 
and were relegated to segregated and inferior public 
accommodations, and dozens were lynched every year. When 
America went to war, black soldiers served in poorly trained, 
segregated units, usually labor battalions. Meanwhile, the 
mainstream American media during this period not only largely 
excluded black opinions, but reflected and reinforced widely 
held racist assumptions and stereotypes.5 Black journalists
50n the exclusion of African Americans from the 
mainstream media, see Lauren Kessler, The Dissident Press; 
Alternative Journalism in American History (Beverly Hills: 
Sage, 1984), 21-47. On the treatment of blacks in the media, 
see Marian J. Moore, "The Advertising Images of Black 
Americans, 1880-1920 and 1968-1979: A Thematic and
Interpretive Approach," Ph.D. diss., Bowling Green State 
University, 1986; Carolyn Martindale, The White Press and 
Black America (New York: Greenwood Press, 1986), 79-109; Clint 
C. Wilson II and Felix Gutierrez, Race. Multiculturalism. and 
the Media: From Mass to Class Communication. 2d ed. (Thousand 
Oaks, Calif.: Sage, 1995), 152-58; and Roi Ottley, The Lonely 
Warrior: The Life and Times of Robert S. Abbott (Chicago:
3
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waged their battle on behalf of "the race" by printing 
indictments of America's racial practices, monitoring and 
criticizing white media and the statements of white leaders, 
praising messages complimentary to blacks, and condemning 
racist utterances. Sometimes they reprinted and rebutted 
articles, addressing white authors as "you." Most 
importantly, they chose their words and shaped their arguments 
not simply to appeal to black readers, but to resonate with 
white readers as well.
Like contemporary editors and readers, historians of the 
black press have looked upon it as an arena of conflict 
between black and white and have sought to evaluate the 
strategies employed in that conflict and to understand its 
impact on the larger struggle between the races. Beginning 
with I. Garland Penn in 1891, nearly all historians of the 
black press have recognized its role as "champion" of "an 
oppressed people," or as a "fighting press." According to 
Frederick G. Detweiler, Gunnar Myrdal, Vishnu Oak, and others, 
black newspapers have demanded democracy, protested injustice, 
challenged white statements on race, exhibited positive images 
of black people, and sought to perfect American democracy.6
Henry Regnery, 1955), 127-8.
‘I. Garland Penn, The Afro-American Press and_Its Editors 
(Springfield, Mass.: Willey & Co., 1891; New York: Amo Press 
and the New York Times, 1969), 13. Frederick G. Detweiler, 
The Negro Press in the United States (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1922), 131-2, 136, 144, 151-152, 204, 268.
Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma: The. Negro Problem and 
Modem Democracy (New York: Harper & Row, 1944, 1962) , 908,
4
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But the focus of these accounts usually turns quickly to the 
role of the black press within the black community. Some 
examine the way black newspapers fought racism indirectly, by 
creating solidarity within the black community, bolstering 
black self-esteem, promoting militant consciousness, or 
advocating protest.1
Others see a more conservative role, suggesting that the 
press served as a "safety valve," relieving black anger and 
discontent rather than directing it against oppressive 
systems.8 Myrdal defined the black press as an instrument of 
the "Negro upper classes" for spreading conservative values, 
establishing group control and identity, channeling black 
anger, and teaching readers how to think and feel. The black 
press, which Myrdal called "the greatest single power in the 
Negro race," taught American ideals to black readers while
910, 912. Vishnu Oak, The Negro Newspaper (Yellow Springs,
Ohio: Antioch Press, 1948), 20-21, 35-37. See also, Roland E. 
Wolseley, The Black Press. U.S.A. (Ames, Iowa: Iowa State
University Press, 1971), 4; Henry Lewis Suggs, "Preface," in 
The Black Press in the South. 1865-1979 (Westport, Conn.: 
Greenwood Press, 1983), viii, x; Roi Ottley, Lonely Warrior.
128. Benjamin Quarles, Black Abolitionists (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1969), 89. Though she focuses on the
antebellum black press's role within the black community,
Frankie Hutton also argues that it fought for vindication and 
acceptance from white America. See Frankie Hutton, The Early 
Black Press in America. 1827 to 1860 (Westport, Conn. : 
Greenwood Press, 1993), ix.
7Oak, for example, examined the press's impact on black 
opinion, the way it crystallized Negro thought and action 
against oppression and sometimes diffused black anger and 
despair with fiery rhetoric. Oak, Negro Newspaper. 26, 133.
"Suggs, "Preface," x. Myrdal, American Dilemma. 910.
5
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showing how little white America lived up to them. In this 
way, the press fostered discontent and militancy and taught 
blacks to demand full citizenship.9
Of primary interest to many historians of the black press 
has been the way black newspapers act as both a "mirror" of 
black life in America, and an institution that "defines the 
Negro group to the Negroes themselves."10 Some of the most 
provocative work on African-American newspapers has focused 
almost exclusively on this introspective quality. E. Franklin 
Frazier argued that the major function of the black press was 
to provide psychological compensation for the black 
bourgeoisie's inferiority complex by printing white praise of 
blacks and exaggerated accounts of black achievement.11 In
9See Gunner Myrdal, "Chapter 42, The Negro Press" in 
American Dilemma. 908-24. In his biography of Defender 
publisher Robert Abbott, Roi Ottley calls his subject a 
warrior and says that "Negroes looked more and more to their 
own press to fight their news battles, even, indeed, to 
apologize [for] and defend their wrongdoing." Yet Ottley also 
does not elaborate on the way that such battles were fought, 
and his portrait of the Defender emphasizes its role within 
the black community. See Ottley, Lonely Warrior, esp. 128.
10Detweiler, Negro Press in the United States. 204, 31; 
Myrdal, American Dilemma. 911.
“Frazier's wholly negative account gives little credit 
to editors' attacks on racism and oppression because they were 
not, he argued, part of a coherent and consistent oppositional 
ideology which rejected industrial capitalism. Like many 
Marxist scholars, Frazier finds the lack of left wing ideology 
among his subjects to be a dysfunctional adaptation requiring 
some explanation. See E. Franklin Frazier, Black Bourgeoisie 
(New York: Free Press, 1957), chapter 8. For a critique of 
radical historians' search for radical consciousness among the 
working class, see Aileen S. Kraditor, The Radical Persuasion.
1890-1917: Aspects of the i.nt.eJ-JLeg£aal History— and— Lim
Historiography of Three American Radical Organizations (Baton
6
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a more affirmative interpretation, Albert Lee Kreiling shows 
how black newspapers created mythical symbols for mostly urban 
blacks in a secularizing society. The strident protest 
against racial injustice was less important for the way it 
attacked racism than for the psychological and cultural 
service it performed for the blacks who wrote and read them, 
Kreiling argued. After all, Northern black newspapers spent 
more time denouncing racial injustice in the distant South 
than in their own cities, where they could have had greater 
impact. The posture of outrage against Southern atrocities, 
according to Kreiling, was part of a collective ritual that 
replaced traditional, mostly religious, rituals, provided 
meaning and identity, and asserted the independence and 
manhood of the African Americans who participated.“
But while black newspapers undoubtedly served many 
important functions within the black community, they also 
acted as an advance force in the black struggle against white 
racism. Black editors put them together with the knowledge 
that some white Americans would read them. They knew this to
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1981). For a defense 
of radical history, see Robert Westbrook, "Good-bye to All 
That: Aileen Kraditor and Radical History," Radical History 
Review. 28-30 (1984), 69-89.
“Albert Lee Kreiling, "The Making of Racial Identities 
in the Black Press: A Cultural Analysis of Race Journalism in 
Chicago, 1878-1929," Ph.D. diss., University of Illinois, 
1973. For another account that emphasized the black press as 
agent of identity formation, see Martin Dann, ed., The Black 
Press, 1827-1890; The Quest for National Identity (New York: 
G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1971).
7
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be true because of the letters white people wrote them, the 
attacks of white mobs on Southern black newspapers in response 
to militant editorials, the patronage some black newspapers 
received from white-dominated political parties, and the 
criticisms of black newspapers which appeared in white 
newspapers.13 During and shortly after America's involvement 
in World War I, black editors knew white people were reading 
their newspapers because of public comments on the black press 
by three separate governmental agencies, the U.S. Congress, 
Southern officeholders, the state legislature of New York, and 
uncounted white individuals.
Though the actual number of white readers was small, 
their existence influenced the character of the black press in 
important ways. As linguistic and literary theorists have 
argued, writers are often more interested in affecting their 
readers than describing reality. Thus, the process of 
speaking or writing becomes not a matter of simply saying what 
you mean, but of breaking through the "alien conceptual 
horizon of the listener" and making sense in the context of 
his "apperceptive background."14 Indeed, a close reading of
“Another piece of evidence that whites read the black 
press, of which the editors would not have been aware, is that 
some whites saved clippings from black newspapers in their 
private papers. See Suggs, "Preface," viii.
14M. M. Bakhtin, The Dialogic Imagination; Four Essays, 
translated by Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist; edited by 
Michael Holquist (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981), 
282. "Literature may appear to be describing the world, and 
sometimes actually does so, but its real function is 
performative: it uses language within certain conventions in
8
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black newspapers--and especially their editorial pages-- 
suggests that this is just what editors and writers were 
trying to do, to persuade white readers. Fiery rhetoric may 
have functioned as a group ritual or as a safety valve for 
African Americans, but it was also an instrument of protest 
oriented toward white points of view. The promotion of 
conservative values may have been a means of controlling lower 
class blacks, but it also established some common ground 
between the black press and the ruling class of American 
society. Exaggeration of African Americans' accomplishments 
may have boosted the black ego, but it also presented a 
positive image which countered negative white stereotypes.
This view places emphasis on the dialogue inherent in all 
communications. Speakers and writers do not choose neutral 
words from a dictionary and use them in a vacuum, but snatch 
them from the mouths of others and speak them in particular 
historical contexts or language environments. In the process, 
speakers try to make these words their own, to make them serve 
their own intentions. Sometimes they succeed, sometimes they 
fail. As the linguist M. M. Bakhtin has written, "many words
order to bring about certain effects in a reader. It achieves 
something in the saying: it is language as a kind of material 
practice in itself, discourse as social action." See Terry 
Eagleton, Literary Theory: An Introduction (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1983), 118. On speech act
theory, which emphasizes the way language produces effects 
rather than how it transmits information, see J. L. Austin, 
How to Do Things With Words. 2d ed., edited by J. 0. Urmson 
and Marina Sbisa (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975) .
9
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stubbornly resist, others remain alien, sound foreign in the 
mouth of the one who appropriated them and who now speaks 
them."15 Black writers' attempts to appropriate words from 
America's social and political mainstream often succeeded, but 
sometimes failed, leading to the appearance of ambiguity and 
contradiction in black protest ideology and editorial 
policies. Historians attempting to break down black ideology 
into neat dialectical polarities, like accommodation-protest, 
integration-separatism, or nationalism-acculturation, have 
generally failed to account for these ambiguities. By 
contrast, this study views ambiguity and contradiction as a 
natrual byproduct of thinkers' efforts to engage in dialogue. 
This dialogical model sees black ideology in a constant state 
of becoming, a process rather than a product, conditioned by 
the desire not merely to reflect reality or express a coherent 
ideology, but to change the world by influencing others. 
Ideology is shaped by ongoing tensions in dialogues among 
multiple discourses, meanings, and intentions.16
The black press, then, seized terms from mainstream 
American discourses and attempted to make them serve the cause 
of black rights. A "war to make the world safe for democracy" 
could be transformed into a war to make the "south safe for
15Bakhtin, Dialogic Imagination. 293-4.
16For a similar understanding of black ideology, which 
also uses Bakhtin's theories, see Evelyn Brooks Higginbotham,
Righteous Discontent; The Women's Movement in the BJLask
Baptist Church. 1880-1920 (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1993), 16.
10
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the Negroes."11 Mob actions against blacks in the South 
during World War I could be classified as "Southern 
Atrocities" akin to German atrocities against the Belgians or 
Turkish atrocities against the Armenians during the European 
war.18 But some of the words that black journalists took 
from white pens and mouths did not fit the cause of racial 
justice quite as easily. Phrases like loyalty, patriotism, 
and "100 percent Americanism" could be used to bolster black 
claims to citizenship. Yet the self-sacrificing loyalty 
demanded by the national government conflicted with the desire 
of many black leaders to use their cooperation in the war 
effort as a bargaining chip for racial progress.
While attention to dialogue explains much about the black 
press's relations with white America, it does not explain 
everything. For while the black press's attack was limited by 
the words available to it and the adaptability of those words 
to the struggle for equality, it was also limited by the 
looming threat of white coercive power. In the South, black 
newspapers were the object, from time to time, of vicious 
attacks by white mobs. These mobs formed when black 
newspapers went "too far" in their protest rhetoric. Such
17Boston Guardian fragment, circa October 1918, folder 91, 
box 5, William Monroe Trotter Papers, Boston University, Mugar 
Library. Or as the another newspaper put it two years after 
the war, "Let us make America safe for Americans." See "The 
Price of a Life," Chicago Defender. Sept. 4, 1920, p. 12.
18See, for example, Savannah Tribune. Nov. 16, 1916, p. 
4; William A. Byrd, "Things Must Change," Cleveland Gazette. 
June 2, 1917, p. 2.
11
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attacks served to warn others away from making similar 
statements. In the North, coercive pressures were not as 
naked, but played a role in shaping the discourse of black 
newspapers there nonetheless. White advertisers and political 
parties could withhold crucial funds, and during World War I 
the regulatory and legal power of the state could shut down 
black newspapers. During those years of pro-war frenzy, it 
seemed possible, too, that even in the North black newspapers 
might be the victims of vigilante violence.19
Thus, the current study seeks to understand the black 
press during the era of World War I as a frontier between 
black and white in which terms of racial coexistence were 
negotiated and renegotiated through written exchanges that 
were conditioned by the ever-present threat of force.20 This 
understanding of the black press sheds light on African- 
American militancy, the role of the black press in black 
protest and in American life, and, most importantly, the 
African-American response to World War I.
190n violence against the black press, primarily in the 
South, see John Nerone, Violence Against the Press; Policing 
the Public Sphere in U. S. History (New York: Oxford, 1994), 
128-59.
20A theory of how ideology and physical force are used in 
combination to control subordinate groups can be found in 
Antonio Gramsci Selections from the Prison Notebooks edited 
and translated by Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith (New 
York: International Publishers, 1971) . For a model of how to 
apply Gramsci's theories to modem American cultural history, 
which emphasizes the interaction of physical coercion and 
ideological control, see T. J. Jackson, Lears, "The Concept of 
Cultural Hegemony: Problems and Possibilities," American
Historical Review. 90 (June 1985), 567-93
12
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Historians have been deeply divided over how to 
characterize the black response to this war. Some argue that 
militancy was negligible during World War I, that African- 
Americans generally followed the advice of W. E. B. Du Bois to 
"forget our special grievances and close our ranks"-- 
supporting the war and soft-pedaling protest out of a 
combination of "deeply-felt patriotism, " hope that the war 
would accelerate racial progress, and fear that failure to 
comply would lead to brutal persecution.21 In the post-civil 
rights era, historians have been more inclined to emphasize 
the militancy of African Americans whether in opposing the 
war, or using it as an excuse to step up demands for racial 
equality.22 Both sides recognize diversity of opinion among
21The best example of this interpretation is Arthur E. 
Barbeau and Florette Henri, The Unknown Soldiers: Black
American Troops in World War I (Phi1adelphia: Temp1e
University Press, 1974), 10-14; A more nuanced view, which 
mentions "deeply-felt patriotism" can be found in Jane Lang 
Scheiber and Harry N. Scheiber, "The Wilson Administration and 
the Wartime Mobilization of Black Americans, 1917-18," Labor 
History. 10 (Summer 1967), 452. See also, David Kennedy, Over 
Here: The First World War And American Society (New York: 
Oxford, 1980), 279-80. For an account which argues that
blacks followed Du Bois's advice to "close ranks" thinking it 
would win democracy after the war and that the disappointment 
of these expectations led to greater militancy after the war, 
see William M. Tuttle, Jr., Race Riot; Chicago in the Red 
Summer of 1919 (New York: Atheneum, 1970), 216-17.
“For an account which estimates that between 40 and 50 
percent of African Americans opposed the war, see Theodore 
Komweibel, Jr., "Apathy and Dissent: Black America's Negative 
Response to World War I," South Atlantic Quarterly. 80 (Summer 
1981), 322-38. Komweibel and others argue that accounts of 
the war which emphasize black support of the war shortchange 
militancy by relying too heavily on elite sources and ignoring 
the actions of the masses. See, for example, Steven A. Reich, 
"Soldiers of Democracy: Black Texans and the Fight for
13
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blacks, depicting one group as dominant and the other as the 
exception that proves the rule.23 But it has been too easy 
to see black reaction to the war as breaking down simply along 
the lines of the old Booker T. Washington/W. E. B. Du Bois, 
accommodation/protest dichotomy, with Du Bois simply on the 
other side this time.24 Such typologies mask profound
ambivalence not only within the black press but within 
individual leaders, newspapers, and journalists.
Historians who try to sum up the editorial position of 
each black newspaper and plot it on a continuum impose a 
fictitious consistency on these texts and gloss over their 
indeterminacies. Black writers were interested in both
conveying information, (what linguists call the constative
Citizenship, 1917-1921," Journal of American History. 82 
(March 1996), 1478-1504. For an account which sees
significant opposition to the war and traces the division in 
the black community to the old Du Bois/Washington dichotomy, 
see Mark Ellis, "W. E. B. Du Bois and the Formation of Black 
Opinion in World War I: A Commentary on 1 The Damnable
Dilemma, ’" Journal of American History. 81 (March 1995) , 1584- 
90. For an account which argues the war led to militant labor 
organizing among blacks in the Mississippi Delta, see Nan 
Elizabeth Woodruff, "African-American Struggles for 
Citizenship in the Arkansas and Mississippi Deltas in the Age 
of Jim Crow," Radical History Review. 55 (Winter 1993) , 33-51.
23Barbeau and Henri, for example, say that unlike Du Bois, 
"not all black leaders could so totally swallow their 
bitterness. . . .  But most black people went along with Du 
Bois's "Close Ranks position." See Barbeau and Henri, Unknown 
Soldiers. 11-12.
24Mark Ellis makes this point explicitly, saying that "the 
question of whether to agitate for reform during the war 
divided them in ways that perpetuated the long-standing rift 
between Booker T. Washington and W. E. B. Du Bois. See Ellis, 
"W. E. B. Du Bois and the Formation of Black Opinion in World 
War I," 1585.
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aspects of language) and having an impact on an audience. 
They hoped not just to describe reality, but to create, shape, 
or condition it. To understand the black response to the war, 
therefore, the historian needs to go beyond summarizing 
editorial positions and begin to look at the ways authors used 
language.“ Black ambivalence toward the war was not simply 
a product of indecision or imprecise thinking. Rather it 
flowed from their attempts to use language to motivate 
powerful white readers to work on improving race relations in 
America. The consistency of their thinking mattered less than 
the impact of their words. This study seeks to describe the 
circumstances within which black newspapers wrote, reveal the 
rhetorical strategies they used, and evaluate the 
effectiveness of those strategies.
The chapters have been organized chronologically as far 
as possible; since each chapter deals with a different theme, 
however, there is considerable overlap. Chapter 2 provides a 
chronological history of the black press from its beginnings 
in 1827 to the early 20th century, focusing on how it was used 
as a weapon by blacks and how white people launched their own 
counterattacks on it. It also gives background on the origins
“Dominick LaCapra, Rethinking Intellectual History: 
Texts, Contexts, Language (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1983), 30-34. See also, John E. Toews, "Intellectual History 
after the Linguistic Turn: The Autonomy of Meaning and the 
Irreducibility of Experience," American Historical Review. 92 
(October 1987), 879-907, esp. 891-92.
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of the publications used in this study. Chapter 3 looks at 
how black newspapers fought with the white South over the 
practice of lynching. While white Southerners like Thomas 
Dixon and D. W. Griffith tried to convince the rest of America 
that lynching was a necessary means of controlling criminal 
blacks, the black press argued that barbarous Southern 
lynchers made a mockery of American democracy and destroyed 
the nation's claim to be fighting for humanitarian values in 
Europe.
Chapters 4 and 5 focus more directly on the ways black 
newspapers responded to World War I in a time of fluid, 
shifting, circumstances and language. While the African 
American people took advantage of new opportunities in 
American social and political life by, among other things, 
participating in the military and migrating to the North, 
black journalists seized for their own purposes the terms and 
phrases that the nation was using to wage war--words like 
preparedness, self-determination, democracy, and loyalty. 
Chapter 4 looks at how black newspapers sought to 
simultaneously pledge full loyalty to the government while at 
the same time seeking rewards for it. Chapter 5 examines the 
way they tried to transform the war for democracy and human 
rights in Europe into a war for democracy and human rights for 
blacks at home.
Chapter 6 examines the response of white America, 
especially the Federal government, to the black press's
16
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wartime strategies. Although white readers usually rejected 
black arguments for equality, their clear preference for 
censoring black newspapers went generally unrealized. In 
fact, by the summer of 1918, it seemed that black newspapers 
had struck a working balance between making demands and 
pledging loyalty. Though the government had instituted some 
repressive measures and some publications had softened their 
demands for racial justice, high-level Federal officials had 
begun to act on a "Bill of Particulars," a list of fourteen 
demands made by black editors. A few white Southerners had 
begun to form anti-lynching organizations. Most importantly, 
President Wilson, the man who three years earlier had 
implicitly endorsed the racist film, Birth of a Nation, 
condemned lynching in a speech.
Chapter 7 examines the editorial policies of black 
newspapers during the tumultuous year of 1919, when radical 
doctrines were sweeping the land, race riots broke out in 
cities across the country, and government agencies clamped 
down on dissent. Black editorialists spent the year trying to 
control the public image of what many were calling the "New 
Negro," more assertive and angry, proud and politicized than 
Negroes had been before the war. That image was constructed 
with white readers in mind, and it was constructed in a way 
that opposed its good qualities to the negative qualities of 
the white supremacist South.
17
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This study is based on a close reading of five leading 
black publications--the Baltimore Afro-American, the Cleveland 
Gazette, the Chicago Defender, the Crisis, and the New York 
Age--and an unsystematic sampling of 10 others--the Appeal of 
St. Paul and Chicago, the Boston Guardian, the California 
Eagle. the Chicago Broad Ax. the Cleveland Advocate, the 
Indianapolis Freeman, the Messenger (a socialist weekly), the 
Norfolk Journal and Guide of Virginia, the Savannah Tribune of 
Georgia, and the Washington Bee. These journals range from 
the highly influential and well-circulated Crisis magazine to 
the relatively obscure California Eagle. They include the 
Baltimore Afro-American and the Chicago Defender. two 
newspapers which became, between 1915 and 1925, national, 
mass-circulation leaders of the industry. On the other hand, 
the New York Age, one of the leading black weeklies of the 
time, had begun a long decline relative to up-and-coming 
journals like the Defender and the Afro-American. The 
Cleveland Gazette and the Chicago Broad Ax were typical of 
many 19th century black newspapers, run almost single-handedly 
by and reflecting the outlook of their owner-proprietors, 
Harry C. Smith and Julius Taylor.
All but the monthly Crisis and Messenger were published 
weekly and all but the Crisis were controlled exclusively by 
blacks. The Crisis was largely under the control of its black 
editor, W. E. B. Du Bois, but he often had to contend with 
interference from whites in the magazine's parent
18
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organization, the NAACP. Few of the publications made much 
money; the majority of black newspapers operated on a 
shoestring. Only the Defender approached a regular 
circulation of 100,000 before 19 2 0 . 26 The list includes only 
two black newspapers from the South, making this primarily a 
study of Northern black newspapers. After several violent 
attacks on black newspapers in Southern states at the end of 
the 19th century, black newspapers in that region drastically 
curtailed their attack on American racism. Black newspapers 
outside of the South expressed a wider range of opinions.
“The Crisis sold 100,000 copies in May of 1919, but it 
was a one-time high.
19
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CHAPTER 2
"RENOVATING THE PUBLIC MIND": 
ORIGINS OF THE FIGHTING BLACK PRESS
No, Brother Freeman. we must not be silent. We 
have but one weapon unimpaired and that weapon is 
speech, and not to use this and use it freely, is 
treason to the oppressed.
--Frederick Douglass1
Throughout the 19th century, Frederick Douglass and many 
other black authors, publishers and editors of autobiography, 
poetry, oration, pamphlets, novels, and periodicals employed 
speech as a weapon against oppression, slavery, and racism. 
Of these works, periodicals account for the steadiest and most 
voluminous output. African Americans produced 27 newspapers 
and journals before the Civil War and hundreds more afterward. 
As Douglass suggested and as literary scholars have shown, 
these literary efforts were not concerned principally with the 
achievement of aesthetic excellence or with faithful 
descriptions of reality; first and foremost, they were 
intended as "weapons" in a war that took place not on grassy
Quoted in Mildred I. Thompson, Ida B. Wells-Bamett: An 
Exploratory Study of An American Black Woman, 1893-1930. vol. 
4 of Black Women in United States History, ed., Darlene Clark 
Hine (Brooklyn: Carlson, 1990), 45.
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battlefields, but within words, languages, and discourses as 
writers sought to influence the American mind.2
The Antebellum Black Press
Freedom's Journal, the first African American newspaper, 
was founded in 1827 in part to unite and define "people of 
color" as a group, and like other black newspapers, it 
contributed to the creation of a separate black identity by 
promoting a shared heritage, a pantheon of heroes, and a 
mythos of struggle, survival, and triumph. It also advocated 
uplift of African Americans through moral and intellectual 
improvement; cooperative ventures; and, in the Journal1s 
words, linking "together by one solid chain, the whole free 
[black] population, so as to make them think, and feel and 
act, as one solid body, devoted to education and 
improvements."3 John B. Russwurm, one of the original editors 
of Freedom's Journal, ultimately came to reject America 
altogether and advocate colonization of all black Americans to
20n the battlefield analogy for language, see M. M. 
Bakhtin, The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays, translated by 
Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist; edited by Michael Holquist 
(Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981), 282. On
sacrificing aesthetics for utilitarian aims, see Henry Louis 
Gates Jr., Figures in Black; words. Signs, and the Racial Self 
(New York, Oxford University Press, 1987) .
3Quoted in Bella Gross, "Freedom's Journal and the Rights 
of All," Journal of Negro History. 17 (July 1932), 284-5, see 
also, 258, 259-60, 272, 284.
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Africa. His coeditor, Samuel Cornish, however, followed the 
path of most other free blacks who envisioned his race as a 
nation within and part of the American nation.
Frederick Douglass, the most famous of all antebellum 
black publishers, also saw his newspapers as media of 
communication among blacks. He saw it as his duty as editor 
to promote the "moral and intellectual improvement of the 
colored people," to make blacks aware of "their own latent 
powers" to fight prejudice, and to provide them with hope for 
the future.4 His newspapers promoted community activities, 
accentuated positive accomplishments and events, and provided 
hope in a way that Frankie Hutton argues "was a clever form of 
resistance to oppression and to the race's degraded status."5
But early black newspaper publishers also hoped to make 
contact with white America. Freedom1 s Journal defined itself 
as a "channel of communication between us and the public, " and 
an instrument of "defense."5 Douglass referred to his work 
in journalism as "renovating the public mind, and building up 
a public sentiment, which should send slavery to the grave."7 
He hoped "to remove prejudice" against blacks by demonstrating
4Douglass quoted in Roland E. Wolseley, The Black Press, 
u. S. A. (Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1971), 20, 22.
5Hutton, Frankie, The Early Black Press in America. 1827 
to 1860 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1993), xii.
6Freedom1 s Joumal quoted in Gross, "Freedom's Journal 
and the Rights of All," 284-85.
7Frederick Douglass, The Life and Times of Frederick 
Douglass (1892; New York: Collier, 1962), 259.
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"their capacity for a more exalted civilization than salary 
and prejudice had assigned them." Blacks who founded 
newspapers in the antebellum period frequently did so in 
direct response to denial of access to white newspapers. Rev. 
Samuel Cornish and John B. Russwurm founded Freedom's Journal 
as a means of responding to the daily, vicious attacks on 
blacks by, among others, Mordecai M. Noah, editor of the New 
York Enquirer. Martin R. Delany founded The Mystery in 
Pittsburgh in 1843 after the local dailies refused to print 
blacks' letters.8 When William A. Hodges attempted to rebut 
the New York Sun' s attacks on black voting rights in 1846, the 
daily newspaper would only print his letter-to-the-editor for 
a fee of $15 and even then altered its content. An editor 
told Hodges "The Sun shines for all white men and not for 
colored men," and that if he wanted a public forum for his 
ideas, he should start his own newspaper. A year later, 
Hodges took the Sun's advice and established the Ram's Horn.9 
These men preferred to have their say in the existing 
mainstream press, and founded their own journals only when 
rebuffed.10
"Clint C. Wilson II, Black Journalists in Paradox: 
Historical Perspectives and Current Dilemmas (New York: 
Greenwood Press, 1991), 25, 32.
*1. Garland Penn, The Afro-American Press and Its Editors 
(Springfield, Mass.: Willey & Co., 1891; New York: Amo Press 
and the New York Times, 1969), 61-63.
l°0n the extent of white readers of one antebellum 
newspaper, see William S. McFeely, Frederick Douglass (New 
York: Touchstone, 1991), 153.
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Whether writing to white newspapers or in their own 
publications, black authors trying to reach white America 
faced formidable obstacles. White readers had trouble 
believing that black people were even capable of writing. 
Phillis Wheatley, the first African-American poet, was quizzed 
by a panel of 18 of Boston's most eminent citizens, including 
John Hancock, to evaluate her claim to having authored a book 
of poetry which included references to Greek and Latin Gods, 
Milton, and Pope. Only with their "Attestation" could she 
secure a publisher.11 Authors of slave narratives usually 
included a preface or "authenticating document" in which a 
white writer assured skeptical white readers that the book was 
indeed written by a literate black man or woman.12
White Americans both North and South generally accepted 
as given the notion of blacks' inferiority. The Victorian 
world view rested on a belief that the world was divided 
between dichotomous and hierarchical elements which must 
remain separated: human and animal, civilized and savage,
“Henry Louis Gates Jr. argues that "writing, for these 
slaves, was not an activity of mind; rather, it was a 
commodity which they were forced to trade for their humanity." 
See "Editor's Introduction: Writing 'Race' and the Difference 
it Makes," in "Race." Writing, and Difference, ed. Henry Louis 
Gates, Jr. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985), 7-9. 
According to another author, Wheatley "did not write as a 
Negro; she wrote as an eighteenth-century Bostonian, a proper 
eighteenth-century Bostonian." See Lerone Bennett, Jr., 
Before the Mayflower: A History of the Negro in America,.1619- 
1964. 6th ed. (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1964), 64.
120n authenticating documents, see Robert B. Stepto, From 
Behind the Veil: A Study of Afro-American Narrative (Urbana: 
University of Illinois Press, 1979), 3-6.
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white and black. Even most northerners who favored
emancipation of the slaves--including Abraham Lincoln-- 
believed that inferior blacks should be sent back to Africa 
because it would be impossible for them to live in harmony 
with superior whites.13
African American journalists sought to renovate the 
public mind not by showing the Victorian world view to be 
false, but by showing that blacks were human, not animal; 
civilized, not savage. They placed on display the doings of 
respectable, middle-class blacks, ignored the masses of lower- 
class blacks, criticized the attacks of white newspapers, and 
defended the virtue and honor of black women. As Hutton 
concludes, antebellum black editors sought both to guide black 
behavior and "mold white attitudes" by documenting "the 
abilities and successes of free blacks."14
130n racial attitudes in the antebellum period, see George 
M. Fredrickson, The Black Image in the White Mind: The Debate 
on Afro-American Character and Destiny. 1817-1914 (New York: 
Harper and Row, 1971; Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University 
Press, 1987), chapters 1-5; and Thomas F. Gossett, Race: The 
History of an Idea in America (New York: 1975). Frederickson 
argues that Lincoln acknowledged the humanity of blacks while 
denying them equality with whites and favoring colonization to 
Africa. See George M. Frederickson, "A Man, but Not a 
Brother: Abraham Lincoln and Racial Equality," in The
Arrogance of Race: Historical Perspectives on Slavery. Racism.
flhd ...S.QSial Inequality (Hanover, N.H. : Wesleyan University
Press, 1988), 54-72. On Victorianism and race, see Stanley
Coben, Rebellion Against Victorianism:__The Impetus__
Cultural Change in 1920s America (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1991), 69-90.
14Hutton, Early Black Press in America. 74, 39-43, 66.
For another interpretation which argues that the antebellum 
black press sought to "attract white readers, thus furnishing 
an evidence of Negro abilities as well as an exposure to his
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Rise of the Black Press in the South
The Civil War marked a major and abrupt turning point for 
the black press, causing the end of anti-slavery newspapers 
and the beginning of Afro-American newspapers in the South. 
L'Union. established in union-occupied New Orleans on Sept. 
27, 1862, became the South's first black newspaper, just five 
days after Lincoln issued the Emancipation Proclamation and 
three months before it took effect.15 Black newspapers were 
founded in Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Alabama in 
1865 and in Mississippi in 1867. The first Texas paper, the 
Freeman1s Press. owned by a white radical Republican in 
Austin, but operated and read by blacks, was founded in 1868, 
and weeklies were started up in Arkansas in 1869 and Florida 
in 1870. Most of these were short-lived, with a life span of 
a couple of years--few survived a decade or more. Circulation 
figures were low, but comparable to white rural community 
weeklies, usually under 1,000.“
viewpoints," see Benjamin Quarles, Black Abolitionists (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1969), 84-89, esp. 89.
“Thomas J. Davis, "Louisiana," in The Black Press in the 
South. 1865-1979. ed. Henry Louis Suggs (Westport, Conn.: 
Greenwood Press, 1983), 151-176, esp. 160, 157.
“The Montgomery Sentinel of Alabama printed 1,000 copies 
weekly in 1872 and three South Carolina newspapers had 
circulations of 480, 280, and 1,000 in 1873. See Allen
Woodrow Jones, "Alabama," in Black Press in the South, ed. 
Suggs, 25; and Theodore Hemmingway, "South Carolina," in 
ibid.. 293 . Although these numbers seem ridiculously small by
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Despite frequent violence against them during 
Reconstruction, many of the new papers took strong political 
stands.17 Although protest was virtually impossible in 
places like Mississippi, in most of the South editors usually 
supported Republican candidates; agitated for political and 
sometimes even social equality; criticized white politicians, 
the Democratic Party, and the Ku Klux Klan; and organized 
black resistance. In his study of the South Carolina press, 
for example, Theodore Hemmingway found that Reconstruction 
papers like the Missionary Record (1871-75) "were all militant 
in protecting and securing the rights of the freemen," and 
"advocated full economic, social and political rights" while 
attacking white supremacy.18
Toward the end of the nineteenth century, Southern whites 
perfected and encoded in law the system of exclusive white 
rule and racial segregation in housing, public facilities, and
today's standards, even major urban newspapers' circulations 
were generally much lower in the mid-19th century. The New 
York Sun, a leading daily in the nation's largest city, for 
example, had a circulation of just 43,000 in 1868. And 
"country weeklies" in small towns generally sold less than 
1,000 copies a week--often less then 500. See Frank Luther 
Mott, American Journalism; A History of Newspapers in the 
United States Through 250 Years. 1690-1940 (New York: 
Macmillan, 1941), 374, 396; John Cameron Sim, The Grass Roots 
Press: America's Community Newspapers (Ames: Iowa University 
Press, 1969), 29.
170n violence against the black press during 
Reconstruction, see John Nerone, Violence Against the Press: 
Policing the Public Sphere in U. S. History (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1994), 131-8.
1BHemmingway, "South Carolina," 299.
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institutions. Blacks would now be virtually excluded from 
politics and even persecuted for statements they made in their 
newspapers. As part of their "redemption" of the South, white 
elites established a system of white supremacy, with 
intellectual and "scientific" justifications, cultural taboos, 
ritualistic means of enforcement, and restrictive rules of 
discourse. This system was solidified and embodied in new 
state constitutions at different times in different states 
after 1890, and by the first decades of the twentieth century, 
blacks had been effectively excluded from politics in the 
South, and most black editors there had moved away from the 
most strident forms of protest. This change was accomplished 
by a combination of physical coercion--including a general 
increase in violence against blacks and direct attacks on 
black newspapers--and the persuasive power of a new ideology 
derived from the hegemonic ideas of the Gilded Age, including 
social Darwinism, commercial values, individual social 
mobility, and political conservatism.
Hundreds of black citizens were being lynched every year 
toward the end of the century, and in the 1880s and 1990s, 
angry whites drove several black newspapers out of business. 
In 1887, publisher Jesse C. Duke of the Montgomery Baptist 
Leader had to flee the state of Alabama with a mob on his 
heels after he wrote, in response to the lynching of a black 
man for alleged rape, of "the growing appreciation of the
28
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white Juliet for the colored Romeo."19 R. C. 0. Benjamin, 
editor of the Birmingham Negro American, and a self-proclaimed 
"chronic disturber of the peace," was forced into exile that 
same year for defending Duke in print. In 1889, after 
Mansfield E. Bryant, "the most aggressive and fearless editor 
in the country, " predicted in his Selma Independent the 
outbreak of a race war in which, he hoped, blacks would wipe 
whites out of existence, he was arraigned on charges of making 
"incendiary utterances," narrowly escaped a lynching, and 
finally fled to Nashville.20
But Tennessee would prove to be no haven. In 1892, white 
Memphians drove Ida B. Wells to the North after she wrote an 
unequivocal attack on lynching. Twenty-nine years old that 
year, Wells already had an impressive career as journalist and 
activist. In addition to co-publishing her own journal, the 
Memphis Free Speech and Headlight, she had filed a lawsuit in 
1884 challenging the Chesapeake and Ohio Railroad's Jim Crow 
practices; written articles in the New York Freeman. the 
Indianapolis World, and the Chicago Conservator; worked as a 
school teacher in Memphis Tennessee; and helped raise her 
newspaper's circulation from 1,500 to 4,000 with a one-woman 
circulation drive in the lower South. Some of the Free 
Speech1 s more incendiary polemics were reprinted in the white 
press, including Wells's 1891 call for violent retribution
19Duke quoted in Jones, "Alabama," 30.
20Jones, "Alabama," 31-33; Benjamin quoted, ibid.. 33.
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against lynchers, which resulted in the expulsion from Memphis 
of the paper's first owner. Wells and an editorial associate, 
J. L. Fleming, purchased the paper from him, setting the stage 
for their own expulsion. A year later, when three friends of 
Wells--black men who owned a successful grocery store--were 
lynched for resisting arrest, she advised black readers to 
leave the city (2,000 did) and boycott streetcars, and began 
a series of exposes on lynching and the rape myth. A few 
weeks later, in late May, when five blacks were lynched for 
allegedly raping white women, she wrote,
Nobody in this section believes the old threadbare 
lie that Negro men assault white women. If 
Southern men are not careful they will over-reach 
themselves and a conclusion will be reached which 
will be very damaging to the moral reputation of 
their women.
Fortunately for Wells, she happened to be visiting 
Philadelphia when, in response to the editorial, a 
bloodthirsty mob led by leading white citizens descended on 
the office, destroying its contents. They seem to have been 
heeding the counsel of the Memphis Daily Commercial. which 
reprinted Wells1 editorial (presumed to be written by a man) 
and added:
The fact that a black scoundrel is allowed to live 
and utter such loathsome and repulsive calumnies is 
a volume of evidence as to the wonderful patience 
of Southern whites. . . .  There are some things 
that the Southern white man will not tolerate, and 
the obscene intimations of the foregoing have 
brought the writer to the very outermost of public 
patience. We hope we have said enough.
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Well's partner also escaped the city safely, but they were 
warned never to publish another issue, and Wells never 
returned to Memphis.21 It is not surprising that remarks 
about sex between black men and white women were the cause of 
Wells's and Fleming's expulsion. These issues obsessed white 
supremacists and drove their fears and hatred of blacks during 
those years.
An editorial on lynching also led to the expulsion of 
editor Alex Manly of the Wilmington Daily Record from 
Wilmington, North Carolina six years later. In an editorial 
on lynching in 1898 he noted that many blacks had white men 
for fathers and suggested that white women often accused their 
black lovers of rape as a way to save their reputations. 
White-owned newspapers reprinted the editorial; the Raleigh 
News and Observer even distributed 300,000 copies as a 
leaflet. At a time when, according to Joel Williamson, many 
white "race radicals" all over the South had become convinced 
that black men were insatiable, sex-hungry beasts, waiting for 
any opportunity to brutalize white women, "the Manly editorial 
became a cause celebre in the white supremacy campaign." One 
white speaker suggested " ' choking the Cape Fear River with the 
bodies of Negroes' " as a response to the editorial. An ad hoc
“Thompson, Ida B. Wells Barnett. 15, 16, 29-30.
Thornbrough, T. Thomas Fortune: Militant Journalist (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1972), 123-24. Rodger
Streitmatter, Raising Her Voice: African-American Women
Journalists Who Changed History (Lexington: University Press 
of Kentucky, 1994), 50-54.
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committee of moderate city officials voted to expel Manly and 
the Daily Record from Wilmington, but when the editor seemed 
to delay leaving, an angry mob burned the Record office, then 
rampaged through the black neighborhoods shooting down 
inhabitants. When the smoke cleared, 30 African Americans had 
been killed and scores of blacks were fleeing the city.22
The decline of protest in the Southern black press was a 
result not only of intimidation, but also the triumph of an 
individualistic, self-help ethos. Booker T. Washington became 
the agent through which the conservative self-help ideology of 
the times was disseminated among African Americans.23 
Washington operated Tuskegee Institute, a well-known 
vocational training school for blacks, in Tuskegee, Alabama. 
Though he was influential in the South in the 1880s and 90s, 
especially in Alabama, Washington was catapulted into the role 
of leader of black America in 1895 after whites chose him to 
deliver a speech at the Atlanta Exposition in which he 
outlined his philosophy of black advancement. In the famous 
speech, Washington counseled survival through adjustment to,
22Joel Williamson, The Crucible of Race: Black-White
Relations in the American South Since Emancipation (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1984) , 195-201; Henry Louis Suggs and
Bemadine Moses Duncan, "North Carolina, " in Black Press in
the South, ed. Suggs, 266-67.
“While black papers in Alabama "continued to protest
racial violence, segregation, white supremacy, and 
disfranchisement, . . . the editors were less militant.
Booker T. Washington's influence upon black editors in Alabama 
became evident by the mid-1890s, and his ideas of racial
survival were reflected more each year in the black 
newspapers," according to Jones, "Alabama," 36.
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rather than protest against, the South's system of white 
supremacy. Black people should stop protesting for equality 
and civil rights and focus on self-improvement and uplift, 
especially in the economic realm. If they proved themselves 
economically useful, Washington reasoned, whites would welcome 
them as full citizens. Washington's economic determinism was 
not developed in a vacuum, but emerged from the intellectual 
and cultural currents of the second industrial revolution: the 
Social Darwinism of William Graham Sumner, Andrew Carnegie's 
Gospel of Wealth, and the rags-to-riches fantasies of Horatio 
Alger.24
Black newspapers increasingly reflected this philosophy, 
giving less coverage to politics and placing more emphasis on 
business, individual self help, moral uplift, and group 
achievement. After Washington's home state adopted a 
constitution that disfranchised black voters in 1901, "most 
black editors in Alabama recognized that politics held limited 
promise for safe-guarding the rights of Afro-Americans in the 
state," one historian has written. When they did discuss 
politics, they "emphasized earning political rights through 
observation, education, and economic self-sufficiency." 
Accommodation perhaps reached its peak when the Selma Advocate 
announced in its first issue in 1915 that it would never print
24August Meier, Negro Thought in America, 1880-1915 ;
Racial Ideologies in the Age of Booker T. Washington. (Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1963; Ann Arbor: Ann 
Arbor Paperbacks, 1966), 88-89.
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"anything that has a tendency to bring about unpleasant 
relations between the races."25
Some editors during the New South era implicitly 
accommodated white supremacy simply by de-emphasizing politics 
and racial conflict while increasing their attention to social 
and economic issues. Others overtly endorsed and practiced 
the philosophy of accommodation with white racism and 
adjustment to, rather than protest against, white supremacy. 
When Isaiah Montgomery, the only black man at the 1890 
Mississippi state constitutional convention, voted with the 
majority to restrict black civil rights, much of the black 
press in the state supported him.2S John Willis Menard's 
Southern Leader supported a new Florida constitution that 
included a poll tax aimed at preventing blacks from voting. 
An editorial expressed the hope that whites would "'ever feel 
kindly towards the colored people'" for backing the new 
document. In opposing T. Thomas Fortune's militant Afro-
25Jones, "Alabama," 39.
26Julius Eric Thompson, "Mississippi," in Black Press in
the South, ed. Suggs, 179. Rev. C. S. Buchanan, editor of the
Baptist Preacher and Teacher was expelled in 1904 from West
Point, Miss., after a group of 100 whites "objected to his
printing activities and economic position in the community."
On the black press in Mississippi, see also Julius E.
Thompson, Black Press in Mississippi. 1865-1985 (Gainsville: 
University Press of Florida, 1993), 13-14; and Neil R.
McMillen, "Black Journalism in Mississippi: The Jim Crow 
Years," Journal of Mississippi History, 49 (1987), 129-138.
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American League that same year, Menard argued that racial 
prejudice should be handled "'with soft gloves.1"27
Although it was the most visible and controversial aspect 
of the Washingtonian philosophy, accommodationism may not have 
been its most important component. At the core was dedication 
to self-help and the notion that hard work, self-improvement, 
and upright behavior would guarantee economic success and 
personal advancement. Many blacks, even a young W. E. B. Du 
Bois, believed that the degraded condition of blacks, rather 
than race prejudice, kept them down.28 Black newspapers, 
including many that rejected accommodation, called on their 
readers to become educated, buy land, and establish 
businesses. Furthermore, they extolled middle class Victorian 
morality and values of thrift, industry, temperance, and 
cleanliness. Numerous black editors rejected dependence on 
whites or the notion of reparations for slavery in favor of a 
model of manly reliance. Matthew M. Lewey, editor of the 
Florida Sentinel. wrote a few years before Washington's 
Atlanta Address that African Americans should "rely entirely 
upon ourselves in the development of manly character, aspire 
to excel in everything, work hard day and night, get money,
27Jerrell H. Shofner, "Florida," in Black Press in the 
South, ed. Suggs, 93-95.
28Clarence E. Walker, "The American Negro as Historical 
Outsider, 1836-1935," Canadian Review of American Studies. 17 
(Summer 1986), 147.
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educate our children, don't beg but depend upon our own brain 
and muscles."29
The social separatism of the Tuskegee program and its 
emphasis on self help contributed to the ongoing development 
of black nationalism, or "moderate racialism," a belief in 
racial collectivism which made a priority of advancement of 
the whole race, especially in business, and required 
individual service and charity to the race, but also 
acknowledged the importance of interracial good will.30 
Editors, well before Washington's arrival on the scene, had 
called on blacks to "be a unit in action" in business and 
politics in order "to build each other up."31 In addition to 
political and economic cooperation, moderate racialism usually 
meant black pride. As the Savannah Tribune put it, one should 
"love his race and do his part to advance its interests."32 
Black newspapers sought to foster love of race by running 
profiles of blacks successful in business, politics, arts, and 
other endeavors; citing the contributions of blacks to 
American and world history; and broadcasting the social and
29Quoted in Penn, Afro-American'Press and Its Editors.
173 .
30On moderate racialism, see Albert Lee Kreiling, "The 
Making of Racial Identities in the Black Press: A Cultural 
Analysis of Race Journalism in Chicago, 1878-1929," Ph.D. 
diss., University of Illinois, 1973, 464.
“Arkansas Freeman. Oct. 5, 1869, quoted in Calvin Smith, 
"Arkansas," in Black Press in the South, ed. Suggs, 66.
32Savannah Tribune. Jan. 1, 1876, quoted in Alton Hornsby, 
Jr., "Georgia," in Black Press in the South, ed. Suggs, 120.
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economic advancements of the race as a whole. The Nashville 
Globe advocated the study of Negro history, the patronizing of 
black businesses, and racial purity. Its publisher, Richard 
Boyd, sold black dolls which he advertised in 1908 as toys 
that would teach black "children how to look upon their 
people," because "They represent the intelligent and refined 
Negro of today, rather than that type of toy that is usually 
given to the children."33
The white South did not eliminate all militancy--or even 
all discussion of interracial sex--from the Southern black 
press. Alabama's Birmingham Era survived, for example, even 
after it defended Duke's remarks by citing examples of 
consensual liaisons between white women and black men, and 
opposing a miscegenation bill under consideration by the state 
legislature.34 Some Southern newspapers, like the Dallas 
Express, the St Louis Argus, and the Richmond Planet continued 
to emphasize protest. John L. Mitchell Jr. of the Planet 
"hammered away at the barbarity of Southern [lynch] mobs 
without suffering reprisals from whites." Mitchell spoke of 
blacks arming themselves in self defense, criticized 
incompetent police and racist judges, and even warned of a 
bloody race war. But he seems never to have challenged the
33Lester C. Lamont, Black Tennesseans. 1900-1930 
(Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1977), 16.
Nashville Globe. Aug. 28, 1908, quoted in Samuel Shannon,
"Tennessee," in Black Press in the South, ed., Suggs, 332.
34Jones, "Alabama," 33-34.
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rape myth, and after the turn of the century, even this gadfly 
"muted" his tone.35 By the 1890s, most Southern black 
newspapers had become extremely cautious.
The combination of the threat of violence and the 
attractiveness of Booker T. Washington's self-help ideology 
worked a great change in the Southern black press. In part, 
these newspapers had altered their approach to mollify white 
readers. Though white Southerners may not have bought enough 
black newspapers to increase circulation revenues, enough of 
them read the black press that the white community would find 
out when when racial etiquette had been violated. In the 
cases of Wells and Manly, for example, white newspaper editors 
reprinted offending black articles in their own newspapers. 
Black editors found themselves in a difficult position. They 
could generally not count on persuading white Southerners and 
knew anything deemed offensive might be used as a reason to 
persecute them. Black editors in the South could not ignore 
their white readers. In order to preserve their own safety, 
they had to refrain from saying certain things. In addition, 
black editors had moved away from protest and politics because 
they had come increasingly to accept Washington's ideas about 
self help and industry. In the end, however, catering to 
white readers damaged the Southern black press enormously.
“Fitzhugh Brundage, "'To Howl Loudly' : John Mitchell Jr. 
and his Campaign Against Lynching in Virginia," Canadian 
Review of American Studies. 22 (Winter 1991), 325-41, esp.
325, 329, 332-33.
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Black readers--the ones who accounted for circulation revenue- 
-wanted to read the things that had to be left unsaid. What 
George Schuyler observed about black papers in Mississippi-- 
that they avoided "nine-tenths of the real news and 
practically all of the possible topics crying for comment"-- 
was true of black newspapers in other states only to a lesser 
degree.36 Not surprisingly, Southern blacks increasingly 
turned to Northern papers for race news and the black press 
declined precipitously all over the South, especially after 
1915.37
“Quoted in Thompson, Black Press in Mississippi. 20. On 
Mississippi black press, See also, ibid.. 11-12, 13, 17, 20; 
Julius Eric Thompson, "Mississippi," in Black Press in the 
South, ed. Suggs, 180-82; and Neil R. McMillen, Dark Journey;
Black Mississippians in the Age of Jim__CEQw (Urbana:
University of Illinois Press, 1989), 172-77.
37Some Southern black newspapers like the Dallas Express, 
the Nashville Globe, and most notably the Norfolk Journal and 
Guide prospered after the turn of the century, but these were 
the exceptions. In Alabama, the black press "declined
rapidly" after 1915, in both the number of papers published 
and in overall circulation. See Jones, "Alabama," 36, 37, 39- 
40, 42; Selma Advocate quoted, 39.
The years 1914 to 1920 marked a "departure point in the 
affairs of Florida blacks" which had the effect of making the 
state's African-American press "much less dynamic and more 
static" and "more difficult to establish and maintain," with 
the result that many readers now turned to Northern papers for 
race news, according to Jerrell H. Shofner. The black press 
in Florida had been thriving: the Jacksonville Florida
Standard reached a circulation of 17,000 in 1910, one of the 
highest in the nation; the National Negro Press Association 
was established in the state in 1911; and in 1914, the state's 
leading black paper, the Gainsville Florida Sentinel was moved 
to Jacksonville to be published as a daily. But as Negro
laborers began to leave the South that year in what would come
to be known as the "Great Migration, " Sentinel publisher 
Matthew M. Lewey decided to continue publishing as a weekly. 
See Shofner, "Florida," 99-100, 105, 106.
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Agitation and Accommodation in the Worth
The golden age of black journalism began shortly after 
the end of Reconstruction. Between 1879 and 1895, a dozen 
influential and long-lasting black newspapers as well as many 
other minor or short-lived ones were established. Though the 
vast majority of African Americans still lived in Southern 
states, the most important of these publications arose outside 
of the South. They included the California Eagle (at first 
called the Owl) in 1879; the Washington Bee in 1882; the 
Cleveland Gazette and the New York Globe (later reincarnated 
as the New York Freeman and the New York Age) and the Richmond 
Planet in 1883; the Philadelphia Tribune in 1884; the Appeal 
of St. Paul and Chicago in 1885; the Indianapolis Freeman in 
1888; the Baltimore Afro-American in 1892; and the Broad Ax of 
Salt Lake City in 1895 (it moved to Chicago four years later) . 
Two of these, the Philadelphia Tribune and the Baltimore Afro- 
American. still publish and all survived through World War I. 
It is no coincidence that most of these newspapers were 
located in the North. In the more hospitable climate there, 
black newspapers could agitate relatively freely for black 
equality and citizenship rights. Many of the editors of these
On the decline of the black press in other states, see 
Smith, "Arkansas,” 73; Hemmingway, "South Carolina,1 296, 299- 
200, 302; and James Smallwood, "Texas," in Black Press in the 
South, ed. Suggs, 361.
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new newspapers could claim membership in a group which became 
known in the 1890s as the "Afro-American Agitators."
Atlanta Constitution editor and New South prophet Henry 
Grady, who invented the label, meant it as an insult, but 
Agitators adopted it as a badge of honor.38 The Agitator 
editors of newspapers like the New York Age. the Cleveland 
Gazette, the Richmond Planet, the Indianapolis World the St. 
Paul Appeal, the Chicago Broad Ax. the Washington Bee and the 
Chicago Conservator were independent and outspoken advocates 
of civil rights who boldly criticized racial inequities and 
railed against the precipitous decline of race relations-- 
especially in the South--in the late 19th and early 20th 
centuries. Most, like Calvin Chase of the Washington Bee and 
Harry C. Smith of the Cleveland Gazette, denounced Booker T. 
Washington. Julius Taylor of the Chicago Broad Ax sometimes 
praised Washington in the 1890s, but attacked him bitterly 
after 1900, hurling such epithets as "moral pygmy, " and the 
"Great Beggar of Tuskegee.1,39 T. Thomas Fortune, the leading 
Agitator journalist, and the only one who has been the subject 
of a full-length, published biography, did not attack 
Washington and accommodationism. Instead, he developed an 
alliance with the "Wizard of Tuskegee" and argued that
38Thombrough, T. Thomas Fortune. 110 .
39Quoted in Kreiling, "Making of- Racial Identities in the
Black Press," 200.
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different approaches were required in the North and South.40 
Most Agitators agreed with Booker T. Washington on several 
significant matters. For example, like him, the Agitators had 
faith in upward mobility and middle class values; emphasized 
black and white unity of interests; supported industrial 
education; and advocated land and business ownership as means 
of black uplift.41
But there were even more important differences between 
Washington and the Agitators. In contrast to Washington's 
opposition to "social equality," most Agitators were 
assimilationists who believed in the unity of the human race 
and even racial amalgamation. Appeal editor John Q. Adams 
called for the elimination of any kinds of racial designation 
which accentuated black distinctiveness. Rather than "African 
American" or "Negro," blacks should use the term "colored." 
"The colored people of America are Americans and not 
'negroes.' Any man who uses the world 'negro' to describe the 
Americans who happen to be darker than other Americans does
40Kreiling, "Making of Racial Identities in the Black 
Press," 186.
41Thombrough, T. Thomas Fortune. 54-5, 157-8. Kreiling, 
"Making of Racial Identities in the Black Press," chapters 4 
and 5. Howard-Pitney, "Calvin Chase's Washington Bee and 
Black Middle-Class Ideology, 1882-1900," Journalism Quarterly. 
63 (Spring 1986), 89-97. On Chase's support of economic
uplift and industrial education, see Meier, Negro Thought in 
America. 45, 92. On the support of Smith's Gazette and
Taylor's Broad Ax for industrial education, see Thomas Kirkman 
Jones, "The Debate over African-American Industrial Education, 
1901-1914: A Post-Revisionist Historical Case Study," Ph.D 
diss., University of Tennessee, 1993.
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himself and his children a great wrong," Adams wrote. "All 
persons in this country should be considered Americans without 
any prefixes or suffixes."42 Harry C. Smith opposed separate 
black institutions of any kind, even those which would benefit 
blacks in their communities. He opposed creation of a 
separate hospital, home for girls, and YMCA in Cleveland.43 
Fortune thought the best course for the future of mankind 
would be the mixing of races. He advocated the spread of 
Christianity in Africa and promoted the term "Afro-American" 
over "Negro" because he believed American blacks were "a new 
race, more American than African."44 Fortune also believed 
the term forced white Americans to assert the humanity of 
blacks. "All the white newspapers of this country regard you 
as 'negroes' and write Negro with a little 'n, 111 he told a 
convention of black businessmen in 1906.
They regard you as a common noun. . . Now I get
around that undesirable title by adopting "AFRO- 
AMERICAN, " which calls for the use of two big 
capital "A's." (Laughter and applause). I AM A 
PROPER NOUN, NOT A COMMON NOUN!"45
42Appeal. March 6, 1915, p. 2; and "Census Segregation," 
ibid.. June 5, 1915, p. 2.
43Kenneth L. Kusmer, "Smith, Harry C[lay]," in Dictionary 
of American Negro Biography, ed. Rayford Logan (New York: W. 
W. Norton, 1982), 564.
44Thombrough, T. Thomas Fortune. 145, 146, 133.
45Quoted in Thornbrough, T. Thomas Fortune. 134.
43
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Where Washington preached political passivity combined 
with absolute loyalty to the Republican Party, Agitators 
tended to advocate political activism and independence. 
Calvin Chase said blacks should split their votes between the 
Democratic and Republican Parties, since the latter had 
"deserted, disowned, and frowned upon the colored people of 
the South in 1876. "4S Julius Taylor's Broad Ax was 
originally a Democratic journal, though he later came to 
support mostly Republican candidates.47 Though Harry C. 
Smith generally supported Republicans, he helped to organize 
an Interstate League of Independent Colored Voters in 1902, 
advised blacks to vote against a Republican president in 1908, 
and supported a local Democratic candidate in 1909.48 
Fortune supported Democrat Grover Cleveland for president in 
the late 1880s. Blacks, he said, should follow the principle 
of "race first: then party."49
Perhaps the starkest difference between Tuskegee and the 
Agitators was over black assertiveness. Where Washington 
counseled passivity, Agitators called for political 
involvement and advocated armed self defense or even
46Quoted in Meier, Negro Thought in America. 30.
47Kreiling, "Making of Racial Identities in the Black 
Press," 187, 193-94.
48Kenneth L. Kusmer, A Ghetto Takes Shape: Black
Cleveland. 1870-1930 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 
1976), 133-34.
49Thombrough, T. Thomas Fortune. 86-93. Quoted in Meier, 
Nearo Thought in America. 31.
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retaliatory violence.50 Harry Smith, editor of the Cleveland 
Gazette, served three terms in the Ohio state legislature. 
John Q. Adams kept the Appeal going with income from minor 
political appointments.51 Editor John Mitchell of the 
Richmond Planet, the only major Southern Agitator, exhibited 
unusual bravery by calling on blacks to arm themselves. "The 
best remedy for a lyncher or a cursed mid-night rider," he 
dared write in 1890, "is a 16-shot Winchester rifle in the 
hands of a Negro who has nerve enough to pull the trigger."52
Fortune advocated self-defense and endorsed retaliation 
after both the Wilmington riot in 1898 and the Atlanta riot in 
1906. "'The trouble will go on in Atlanta,'" he told a white 
reporter after the latter incident, in which thousands of 
whites rampaged through black neighborhoods, killing and 
burning, "until the Negro retaliates--until, driven to bay, 
the Negro slays his assailant."53 In a letter to the 
Brooklyn Eagle in 1900, Fortune gave what his biographer, Emma
50On the Chicago Conservator's endorsement of retaliatory 
violence, see Kreiling, "Making of Racial Identities in the 
Black Press," 140. On the Appeal's belief in political 
activism despite some sympathy with the Tuskegee approach, see 
ibid., 170-80.
51Kreiling, "Making of Racial Identities in the Black 
Press," 166.
“Quoted in Ann Alexander, "Mitchell, John R., Jr.,"
Dictionary of American Negro Biography, ed. Logan, 444-45. 
Though Mitchell bucked the Southern trend toward accommodation 
in the 1890s, he moved away from agitation and emphasized 
economic betterment after 1902, according to Alexander.
“Quoted in Thombrough, T. Thomas Fortune. 279. See
also, ibid.. 183.
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Lou Thombrough, called "his most effective defense of the use
of retaliatory force":
The blackman's right of self-defense is identically 
the same as the white man's right of self-defense.
. . . When the law does not protect me, as it does 
not in the South . . . what am I to do? Accept it 
all meekly, without protest or resentment? . . .
Slaves do that sort of thing, and are worthy to be 
slaves, but free men, American freemen! Who 
expects them to do it?54
Though they opposed Booker T. Washington's ideas, some 
Agitators, notably Chase and Fortune, came to rely on him for 
financial help, which compromised their editorial independence 
and led other militants to attack them. Washington secretly 
became one of the chief stockholders of the Age, and in 1907, 
after suffering a mental breakdown, Fortune sold his share of 
the paper to Fred Moore, whom Washington was covertly 
subsidizing.55 Calvin Chase, an outspoken critic of 
Washington since 1895, took a $100 payoff to write a series of 
pro-Washington editorials in 1906, and then continued to back 
Tuskegee until 1915.56
54Thombrough, T. Thomas Fortune. 200.
“Washington bought the shares through his personal 
secretary, Emmett J. Scott. See Thombrough, T. Thomas 
Fortune. 296-308. See also, Emma Lou Thombrough, "More Light 
on Booker T. Washington and the New York Age." Journal of 
Negro History. 43 (January 1958), 34-49.
“Louis R. Harlan, "The Secret Life of Booker T. 
Washington," Journal of Southern History, 37 (August 1971), 
393-416, esp. 410-11; Meier, Negro Thought in America. 224-36, 
esp. 226, 232. On Washington's control of the black press, 
see also, August Meier, "Booker T. Washington and the Negro 
Press, With Special Reference to the Colored American
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According to Albert Lee Kreiling, the significance of 
Northern Afro-American Agitators lies in their impact on black 
consciousness. Agitator journals established a ritual of 
outrage over the decline of race relations in the South. 
Promoting political independence and self help over dependence 
on whites and maintaining faith in the power of moral suasion 
to overcome racial problems, they helped to form a middle- 
class African-American identity and group consciousness, and 
a reassuring secular religion or mythos in a confusing urban 
modern world.57 But this argument privileges the unconscious 
motives of historical actors while shortchanging their 
conscious motives and the impacts of their actions. The 
Agitators may have contributed to the construction of 
satisfying rituals, but they also responded to and demolished 
racist arguments and provided an alternative to Washington's 
doctrine of surrender. More importantly, they forced at least 
a few white Americans to face the issue of race and to 
confront the gap between American ideals and the practices of 
lynching, segregation, and disfranchisement.
Magazine. " Journal of Negro History. 38 (January 1953), 67-90; 
Thornbrough, "More Light on Booker T. Washington and the New 
York Age." 34-49; Stephen R. Fox, Guardian of Boston: William 
Monroe Trotter (New York: Atheneum, 1970), 70-71.
57Kreiling, "Making of Racial Identities in the Black 
Press," 10-13, 110, 117-20, 464-65.
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As the Washington Bee1 s motto put it, they handed out 
"Honey for Friends, Stings for Enemies."58 The Chicago Broad 
Ax's editor portrayed the black newspaper as a weapon against 
white racism and the mainstream press. "The vast majority of 
the daily newspapers are ever ready to use their great power 
to assist to pull [African Americans] down," Julius Taylor 
wrote. But on the other hand, "the little Colored newspapers 
are constantly struggling as best they can to fight their 
battles for them."59 When Ida B. Wells began writing for the 
New York Age she believed she now had the "opportunity to tell 
the world for the first time the true story of Negro 
lynchings."60 Fortune believed that Negro journals were
necessary to respond to white newspapers, which were 
"published by white men for white men; give, in the main, news 
about white men, and pitch their editorial opinions entirely 
in the interest of white men." All white newspapers in the 
South and two-thirds of those in the North and West were 
"leagued against the Negro and his rights," Fortune wrote, so 
blacks must make an attempt to fight back. "[T]he only way we 
can hope ever to win our fight is to arm ourselves as our
58Hal S. Chase, "Chase, W[illiam] Calvin," Dictionary of 
American Negro Biography, ed. Logan, 99.
“Chicago Broad Ax. Dec. 18, 1915.
60Ida B. Wells, Crusader for Justice: The Autobiography 
of Ida B. Wells (Chicago: University-of Chicago Press, 1970), 
63 .
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opponents do, support those newspapers alone that support us, 
and support those men alone that support us."61
And white America sometimes felt compelled to respond in 
kind. Thornbrough cites a number of occasions when white 
journalists responded to Fortune's utterances in the Globe. 
Freeman. and Age. When he wrote in the Globe in 1883 that 
blacks should defend themselves with guns if necessary, he 
engendered a "spate of protests in the white press," according 
to Thornbrough. A year later, the white Wilminatonian of 
Delaware felt compelled to rebut his defense of interracial 
marriage and brand the Globe a " 'rabid journal. ' " Other white 
newspapers, including the Macon Telegraph and the New York 
World, criticized the Globe. while others, including the New 
York Sun, the Boston Herald, and the Springfield Republican, 
praised it. Harper's Weekly and a few white dailies in the 
South all spoke out against the New York Freeman1 s call for an 
Afro-American League in 1887. Fortune's speech to the A. M. 
E. church conference in 1900, in which he advocated armed 
resistance, led the New York Times to write an editorial under 
the headline "'A Very Foolish Negro.'" Several white 
newspapers derided his proposal, printed in the black magazine 
Voice of the Nearo in 1903, to appoint a black governor of the 
Philippines and encourage African Americans to migrate
“Fortune quoted in Thornbrough, T. Thomas Fortune. 45-46.
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there.62 Such white criticism did not intimidate Fortune, 
safe from Southern mobs. On the contrary, it emboldened him 
to speak out more sharply in response to them. He would often 
print a white editorial alongside his own response, visually 
displaying the dialogue between him and white America.
At a time when African Americans were largely invisible 
to whites--hidden, as W. E. B. Du Bois put it, behind a "vast 
veil"--this small opening up of dialogue was neither an 
inconsequential nor an insignificant outcome.63 Though most 
whites ignored the black press, not all did. And to the 
extent that black journalists like Fortune forced white people 
to pay attention to their utterances, they succeeded in poking 
holes in the veil, in making themselves visible, and in 
forcing whites to reconsider their assumptions about African 
Americans and race.64
“Thornbrough, T. Thomas Fortune. 48-50, 108-9, and 199. 
Ida Wells reported that "the Age was on the exchange list of 
many of the white periodicals of the North." See Wells, 
Autobiography of Ida B. Wells. 78.
“On the concept of invisibility, see Ralph Ellison, 
Invisible Man (New York: Random House, 1952) . On the veil 
metaphor, see W. E. B. Du Bois, The Souls of Black Folk (New 
York: Vintage Books, 1990), 8.
“Hans-Georg Gadamer argues that dialogue leads to a 
"fusion of horizons," and that "one is required to take 
account of the positions of others in discussing an issue or 
subject -matter with them. Here, even if one holds to one's 
initial point of view one has nevertheless to deal with the 
objections, considerations and counter-examples that others 
introduce. In the end, whether one changes one's position or 
maintains it, the view that results is more developed than the 
one with which one began and the same holds for the views of 
all participants . " See Georgia Wamke, Gadamer: Hermeneutics. 
Tradition and Reason (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
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Not all of the major late 19th century black newspapers 
could be considered Agitator journals. Yet the leading non- 
Agitator journal of the period, the widely circulated 
Indianapolis Freeman, also engaged in dialogue with white 
America, though in different ways. Founded in 1888 and taken 
over in 1892 by George F. Knox, a committed accommodationist 
and ally of Tuskegee, the Freeman reflected white ideas and 
reassured whites of the reasonableness of African 
Americans.65 Knox was an embodiment of the Tuskegee program 
of hard work, self-help, and political accommodation; his life 
story even resembled Washington's. Both men were born into 
slavery and achieved phenomenal success in the face of 
extraordinary odds. Both were optimistic leaders who preached 
self-help and adjustment to the segregated society rather than 
protest against it. Each presented himself as evidence that 
an upright, moral, and productive life could overcome the 
limitations imposed by a racist society.“ Like Washington, 
Knox had relied heavily during his life on the benevolence of 
white friends. As slaves in Tennessee, his family had enjoyed
1987), 170.
“The Freeman claimed a circulation of 16,000 in 1903, and 
20,000 in 1913. See Willard B. Gatewood Jr., "Introduction,"
Slave and Freeman; The Autobiography of George L_, Knox
(Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1979), 32; For an 
account which suggests these figures are probably exaggerated, 
see Emma Lou Thornbrough, "American Negro Newspapers 
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"'special considerations'" from their masters, and were 
treated better than other slaves.67 He made his fortune as 
owner of several barbershops--first in the town of Greenfield, 
Indiana, and then in Indianapolis--which catered exclusively 
to elite white customers, some of whom he followed into 
Republican Party politics in the 1870s.69 Indeed, like 
Washington, it was his influence with whites that gained him 
a position of leadership within the black community in the 
1890s.69 The Indianapolis World and other opponents 
sometimes expressed resentment that Knox had been "thrust 
forward as the leader of Negroes" by whites and that his 
success had depended on his refusing to serve blacks in his 
barbershops.70
According to Willard B. Gatewood, Knox was shaped by his 
contacts with whites and most of his views on important issues 
were modeled on those of white mentors.71 He believed most 
blacks should remain in the South; eschewed social equality; 




70Indianapolis World quoted in Gatewood, "Introduction," 
24, 25. On the phenomenon of black leaders chosen by whites, 
see David Potter, "John Brown and the Paradox of Leadership 
Among American Negroes," American Experiences: Readings in 
American History. 3d ed., Randy Roberts and James S. Olson 
eds. (New York: Harper Collins, 1994), 291-300.
71Gatewood, "Introduction," 17.
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lawlessness; and promoted black business and middle class 
values of thrift, industry, and clean living. He expressed an 
often unfounded optimism. At the nadir of black history, when 
race relations were deteriorating in the most profound ways, 
he saw "little reason to be dissatisfied with conditions in 
this country."72
Knox's views were not entirely alien to those of the 
Agitators. Like them, he espoused middle-class values and 
sought to establish links with the "'best white people'" while 
shunning "'lower elements' of both races."73 Like most 
Agitators, he saw himself as more American than African, came 
to see a need for political independence from the Republican 
Party, and opposed bans on intermarriage.74 Like Agitators, 
he supported vocational training but also the right of black 
students to pursue a more academic education.75 Unlike 
Washington, Knox openly participated in politics and even 
engaged in some limited protest activities. He spoke out 
against lynching, for example, and after 1917 protested 
against the KKK, supported a Federal anti-lynching bill, and 
called for improved housing.76
72Quoted in Gatewood, "Introduction," 35.
73Gatewood, "Introduction," 17.
74Gatewood, "Introduction," 36, 27.
7SGatewood, "Introduction," 34.
76Also like some Agitators, Knox accepted financial 
assistance from Tuskegee. See Gatewood, "Introduction," 34.
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"At times," Gatewood writes, "Knox assumed the position 
of a thoroughgoing accommodationist and at others one that 
seemed to place him among the more militant elements of the 
black community. On one occasion he was altogether capable of 
pursuing both simultaneously."77 Like Southern
accommodationists, Knox never completely eliminated protest, 
but rather made it a higher priority to placate white people, 
whom he saw as a source of patronage. In this sense, the 
newspaper was geared to white readers.
The Black Press Enters the 20th Century
With so many of the older journalists captured by 
Tuskegee, the mantle of opposition to Booker T. Washington 
fell to a new generation of activist journalists who became 
known as "radicals." William Monroe Trotter started the 
movement in 1901 when he established his Boston Guardian 
newspaper. In its pages, Trotter carried on a bitter fight 
against Washington, Tuskegee, accommodation, and segregation 
of any kind.
A graduate of Harvard College, Trotter had been raised by 
his father, James, a prosperous Federal officeholder, in a 
white Boston neighborhood. The elder Trotter fought for the 
Union Army in the Civil War, authored a book on black
77Gatewood, "Introduction," 35.
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musicians, served a lucrative term as recorder of deeds in 
Washington under the Cleveland administration, and taught his 
son to stand up to white foes in the neighborhood.70 Monroe 
was a quick study, and he grew up lacking in any feelings of 
inferiority, utterly assured in his conviction that blacks 
deserved an equal place with whites in American society. 
After graduating magna cum laude from Harvard in 1895, he 
tried a succession of jobs while becoming increasingly 
involved in black protest activities.79 Finally, in 1901, he 
embarked on his life work as publisher of the Guardian.00 
Though other militant editors had combined journalism with 
direct protest activities, Trotter took protest further than 
any black journalist since the Civil War--and perhaps ever. 
In 1903, Trotter was sent to jail for his role in the "Boston 
Riot" when he and some cohorts disrupted speeches of Fortune 
and Washington at a meeting of the National Business League in 
Boston by throwing red pepper onto the platform and shouting 
unanswerable questions at the speakers.01 Reported in 
newspapers across the country, the riot made whites aware for 
the first time of African American opposition to the Tuskegee 
program. As Trotter biographer Stephen R. Fox wrote, "Few 
white men at this time agreed with the radicals' case, but at
78Fox, Guardian of Boston. 4-12.
79Fox, Guardian of Boston. 16-19, 21-28.
0OFox, Guardian of Boston. 29-30.
01Fox, Guardian of Boston, 49-58.
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least they knew of its existence after the riot."82 Most 
white philanthropist allies of Washington were appalled, yet 
it was a first step for some of them toward establishment of 
the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People 
in 1909.83
Most important of all, the Boston Riot led W. E. B. Du 
Bois, a former Harvard classmate of Trotter's and the leading 
black intellectual of his generation, toward an alliance with 
the radicals. Du Bois became co-founder in 1905 of the 
militant Niagara Movement, a group of mostly northern black 
men, united in opposition to Tuskegeean accommodation and in 
outspoken advocacy of civil rights. The Niagara Movement was 
short lived--a victim of internal squabbling among Trotter, Du 
Bois, and others. But members of the group, especially Du 
Bois, were influential in establishing the NAACP.84
That new organization sponsored one of the most well- 
written and influential black journals ever published, the 
Crisis. Where most black newspapers were owned and operated
82Fox, Guardian of Boston. 53-58, esp. 58.
83Meier, Negro Thought in America. 176-81; Fox, Guardian 
of Boston. 60-66.
840n the Niagara Movement, see Du Bois, "A Brief Resume 
of the Massachusetts Trouble in the Niagara Movement," 1907, 
1-13, W. E. B. Du Bois Papers, W. E. B. Du Bois Library, 
University of Massachusetts, Amherst; Elliott Rudwick, "The 
Niagara Movement," Journal of Negro History. 42 (July 1957), 
177-200; Fox, Guardian of Boston. 101-110, 112-114; David
Levering Lewis, W.E. B. Du Bois; Biography of a Race. (New 
York: Henry Holt, 1993), 376-77. For more on Trotter, see 
Meier, Negro Thought in America. 174, 224, 232; W. E. B. Du 
Bois, "William Monroe Trotter," Crisis. 41 (1934), 134.
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wholly by African Americans, the Crisis. was overseen by 
whites. Though edited and run by an African American, W. E. 
B. Du Bois, the journal was unique among black publications. 
The all-white NAACP executive board maintained oversight 
powers, and in this way Du Bois found himself in close 
proximity to some of the white readers that all black journals 
sought to reach. Where other black editors seldom actually 
got replies from their attempts to establish dialogue with 
whites, Du Bois got frequent feedback from his white 
colleagues, who often criticized his editorials or sought to 
modify is positions.
Du Bois encountered the most interference from Oswald 
Garrison Villard, whom the editor charged with unconscious 
race prejudice.85 But even Mary White Ovington and Joel 
Spingam, allies in whom Du Bois saw "no shadow" of racial 
prejudice, disagreed pointedly with him over rhetoric.86 
Both Ovington and Spingam--like Villard--sought to increase 
the executive board's control over the Crisis.87 They also
850n white attitudes in the Progressive Era, see George 
M. Fredrickson, The Black Image in the White Mind; The Debate 
on Afro-American Character and Destiny. 1817-1914 (New York, 
1971), 304, 283-319.
86W. E. B. Du Bois to Joel E. Spingam, Oct. 28, 1914, The
Correspondence of w.____ B_,_Dyi. .B.pig, vol. l, ed. Herbert
Aptheker (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1973), 
206-207.
87Du Bois and Spingam battled for control of the Crisis 
in 1914 and 1915. In 1919, Ovington disciplined the editor 
for failing to submit his editorials to a committee for 
approval. On efforts to control Du Bois, see Joel E.
Spingam, et al. to NAACP board of directors, Dec. 6, 1915, Du
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used friendly persuasion to modify Du Bois 1 s behavior. In one 
instance, Spingam advised his "friend" that the NAACP board 
had come to see the Crisis editor as a spoiled child who 
refused to "'play the game'" and subordinate his own will for 
the good of the group. "Many" now believed Du Bois should be 
"eliminated" from the organization. Spingam hoped Du Bois 
would stay, but he suggested the editor become more 
pliable.88 Ovington advised Du Bois to stop offending whites 
in his editorials and reminded him that his job depended on 
pleasing white readers.89
The organization's white founders, who needed at least 
one visible black "founder," chose Du Bois because of his 
brilliance as a scholar and his eloquence as a writer, and 
perhaps also because he seemed more willing to placate whites 
than most other militants. Villard had said that in contrast 
to the other contentious black radicals at the 1909 founding 
conference, Du Bois's "attitude and bearing were
Bois Papers; Charles Flint Kellogg, NAACP: A History of the 
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1967), 92-115; Elliott
Rudwick, W. E. B. Du Bois: Propagandist of the Negro Protest. 
2d ed. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1968) , 
165-78; and Lewis, W. E. B. Du Bois. 468-500.
88Joel E. Spingam to W. E. B. Du Bois, Oct. 24, 1914, in 
Correspondence of Du Bois. ed. Aptheker, 200-202.
89Mary White Ovington, "The National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People," Journal of Negro History. 9 
(April 1924), 112. Mary White Ovington to W. E. B. Du Bois, 
April 11, 1914, Du Bois Papers; and Kellogg, NAACP. 101.
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faultless."90 Significantly, the most important black 
leaders of this period, including Washington, Trotter, and 
Marcus Garvey, were critical of white domination of the NAACP 
and Du Bois.91
But despite white interference, Du Bois spoke out for 
black equality and against racism in a clear and militant 
voice. He frequently outmaneuvered NAACP board members to get 
his way and wrote on taboo subjects like social equality and 
armed black self-defense.92 Yet his proximity to white 
people altered the dynamic of his effort. The Crisis was 
certainly more measured than, say, the Guardian. Du Bois, for 
example, had accepted the editorship with the condition that 
he not attack Tuskegee. Compared to other black editors, the 
idea that he was speaking to a white audience was far less 
abstract. It was a daily reality of which his colleagues 
often reminded him.
Historians have seen the significance of the creation of 
the Guardian and the Crisis as providing a counterpoint to 
Tuskegee and polarizing the black community between those who
90Rudwick, W. E. B. Du Bois. 125.
910n Washington, see Booker T. Washington to Thomas T. 
Fortune, Jan. 20, 1911, The Booker T. Washington Papers, vol 
10, eds. Louis R. Harlan and Raymond W. Smock (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1979) , 55-56; and Washington to 
Emmett J. Scott, Jan. 16, 1914, ibid. . vol. 12, 417. On
Trotter, see Fox, Guardian of Boston. 140-44, 202, 223. On 
Garvey, see Elliott M. Rudwick, "Du Bois versus Garvey: Race 
Propagandists at War," Journal of Negro Education. 28 (Fall 
1959), 421-30, esp. 423-24.
92Lewis, W. E. B. Du Bois. 500.
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favored protest and those who endorsed accommodation. 
According to this scenario, after Booker T. Washington's death 
in 1915, the radicals assumed domination of the leadership of 
black America. The assertive "New Negroes" of the 1920s look, 
on the surface, like the intellectual descendants of radicals 
like Trotter. A closer look, however, reveals that the New 
Negro was more a melding of the radical and Tuskegee 
philosophies. New Negroes tended to believe in both equality 
and self help, full citizenship and black nationalism. August 
Meier pointed out that most of the Northern intellectuals who 
eventually joined the NAACP had earlier supported Washington 
and continued to be influenced by his ideas.93
This melding of radical and conservative was evident in 
the journalistic career of James Weldon Johnson, an early and 
enthusiastic supporter of Booker T. Washington, who would 
become field secretary of the NAACP. Johnson was hired to 
write editorials for the New York Age in 1914 by publisher 
Fred Moore, a former Treasury Department messenger and a real 
estate investor who had little experience in newspapers. 
Moore hired T. Thomas Fortune to run the editorial page from 
1911 to 1914. In September of 1914, Johnson replaced
93Meier, Negro Thought in America. 245-47, 256-78. For 
a nuanced view of the way conservative and radial ideology 
came together in the New Negro, see Kreiling, "Making of 
Racial Identities in the Black Press," chapter 9.
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Fortune.94 At the age of 43, Johnson had already run his own 
daily newspaper in Jacksonville, Florida, (it lasted less than 
a year) and worked as a teacher, a school principal, a lawyer, 
a member of a popular Broadway song-writing team, and U. S. 
Consul to Venezuela and Nicaragua. Moore told Johnson he 
wanted a "conservative and constructive" editorial policy, and 
when Johnson accepted, he told Washington the new editor was 
"a good friend of ours." Nonetheless, Johnson's editorials, 
which unlike others in the black press appeared under a 
byline, never shied away from condemning racial injustice in 
all its forms and taking on Southern racists, like Tom Watson, 
and the South in general. He advocated protest, but not the 
use of physical force, called for group solidarity and pride, 
endorsed self help, and espoused mainstream economic and 
political doctrines. Johnson clearly believed that one of the 
main objectives of an editorial writer should be to reach 
white as well as black readers. As the young editor of the 
Jacksonville Daily American. Johnson "did his best, in his 
reasonable arguments, to direct the opinion of both races," 
according to biographer Eugene Levy. And in an October 22,
94Moore's mismanagement led Washington to seize control 
of the paper in 1908. The paper was operating at a weekly 
deficit of $200, and the succession of journalists Moore hired 
to write editorials brought the paper more in line with 
Tuskegee principles. Thornbrough, T. Thomas Fortune. 255, 333, 
331, 334, 314.
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1914 editorial for the Age, the new editor said black 
newspapers should be considered "'organs of propaganda.1"95
At the same time Johnson took over the Age editorial 
page, a group of new black newspapers, which would lead the 
black press into the twentieth century, were just getting off 
the ground. They included the Chicago Defender, established 
in 1905; the Amsterdam News. established in 1909; and the 
Pittsburgh Courier and Norfolk Journal and Guide. both 
established in 1910. These local weeklies were joined later 
in the 1910s by a group of more radical, national 
publications, including the socialist monthly Messenger in 
1917 and Marcus Garvey's Negro World in 1919.
Around the same time, Charlotta Spears (later Spears- 
Bass) became the only woman owner of a black newspaper when, 
in May of 1912, she purchased the California Eagle with $50 of 
borrowed money. From the beginning she put the paper on a 
course of "social and political activism," fighting for equal 
employment of blacks in government jobs and campaigning 
against The Birth of a Nation and discrimination in 
housing.96
95Eugene Levy, James Weldon Johnson: Black Leader. Black 
Voice (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973), 54, 151- 
60.
96Kathleen Thompson, "Charlotta Spears Bass (1880-1969)" 
in Black Women in America, vol. 1, ed. Darlene Clark Hine, 93; 
and Charlotta A. Bass, Forty Years: Memoirs from the Pages of 
a Newspaper (Los Angeles: Charlotta A. Bass, 1960), 30-31, 33.
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Of these, the Courier, the Journal and Guide, and the 
Defender would become, along with the Baltimore Afro-American, 
the highest circulation black weeklies in the decades after 
the war. They adopted a bolder, more sensational style which 
appealed to a less literate, heavily working class audience 
than the middle class readers who bought black newspapers 
before this time. The Defender blazed the trail and set the 
tone for the new mass-circulation black press. Starting with 
no capital, Robert S. Abbott built his newspaper into the 
first highly profitable black publication with a regular 
circulation in excess of 100,000.97 The real birth of the 
mass black press took place in 1910 when a paid employee, J. 
Hockley Smiley, instituted the changes which would give the 
Defender its appeal. Copying Chicago's daily newspapers, 
especially Hearst's Herald Examiner and Evening American. 
Smiley adopted large headlines, bold illustrations, and 
sensational copy. Hearst even sued Abbott in 1918 for 
stealing a mast design. Like Johnson at the Age. Smiley made 
the paper an "organ of racial propaganda."98
At the same time that his paper protested racial 
injustice with a fury that rivaled Trotter's Guardian. Abbott
97The discussion of Abbott and the Defender is based on 
Roi Ottley, The Lonely Warrior: The Life and Times of Robert 
S. Abbott (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1955) . On the newspaper's 
early years, see pp. 87ff. Before 1914, few black newspapers 
sold more than 10,000 copies per week. See Thornbrough, 
"American Negro Newspapers."
980ttley quoted, Ottley, Lonely Warrior. 105. On mast 
suit, ibid.. 140-1.
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admired Booker T. Washington and endorsed the philosophy of 
self help and individual uplift, and he took conservative 
stands on issues unrelated to race. The Defender opposed 
female suffrage in the early 1910s, supported Washington's 
National Negro Business League, provided moral advice to black 
readers, and expressed deep faith in the economic system.59 
At the same time, however, Abbott's editorials supported the 
NAACP and protested race inequality and oppression in strong 
language.
His most important difference with Tuskegee was his
support for black migration out of the South. Through an 
ingenious scheme of distributing the Defender via black 
railroad porters, the newspaper became known to perhaps
hundreds of thousands of Southern blacks and helped to guide 
the migration of an estimated 300,000 to the North during 
World War I. The paper lured migrants by sensationalizing and 
often exaggerating Southern lynchings, continually 
highlighting other examples of racial oppression in the South; 
and portraying Chicago and the North as a land of boundless 
economic opportunity and--at least in comparison to the South- 
-racial justice.100
"On the Defender's conservative stands, see Mary E.
Stovall, "The Chicago Defender in the Progressive Era,"
Illinois Historical Journal. 83 (Autumn 1990), 159-72.
100On the Defender's advocacy of migration, see Katherine 
A. Bitner, "The Role of the Chicago Defender in the Great 
Migration of 1916-1918," Negro History Bulletin. 48 (April, 
May, June, 1985) , 20-26; James R. Grossman, Land of Hope:
Chicago. Black Southerners, and the Great Migration (Chicago:
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While this message was designed primarily for blacks, the 
Defender still often addressed white America, and during the 
war, white America--especially the Federal government and 
Southerners who thought the paper was causing trouble in their 
communities--felt compelled to respond. In essence, the paper 
had re-opened the dialogue between blacks and the white South 
that had been cut off when Southern black newspapers were 
pacified.
Although many black newspapers were stifled by violence 
and diverted by Booker T. Washington, the black press as a 
whole never ceased using speech as a weapon to fight for the 
interests of blacks in America. Further, in 1915, the year of 
Washington's death, the black press was on the verge of a new 
era. Black migrants from the South expanded the Northern 
market for news, and sensational newspapers reached out for 
mass audiences. The war generated greater interest in 
national and international events and raised white concern 
about the black press, while Woodrow Wilson's idealistic war 
aims gave new leverage to those demanding rights at home. 
Through all this, black newspapers would continue to address 
white people, demanding from the nation the rights blacks 
deserved. This time, however, white people would pay greater
University of Chicago Press, 1989), 78ff; Kreiling, "Making 
of Racial Identities in the Black Press," 372; Alan Douglas 
Desantis, "Selling the American Dream: The Chicago Defender 
and the Great Migration of 1915-1919," Ph.D. diss., Indiana 
University, 1993 .
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attention to the black press--perhaps more attention than they 
had ever paid before.
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CHAPTER 3
TO MAKE AMERICA BLUSH: 
LYNCHING AND THE NATIONAL DESTINY
How can any fair-minded American read these two 
headlines without blushing for the public sentiment 
that can suffer such things to be?
--James Weldon Johnson1
The period of greatest proliferation of new black 
newspapers in America, 1880 to 1915, coincided with the worst 
period of lynching of African Americans. While the number of 
annual lynchings peaked in the 1890s, African Americans 
established more black newspapers in 1902--a whopping 99--than 
in any other single year.2 While there may not be a causal 
relationship between lynching and the number of black 
newspapers published, the vigilante killings of thousands of 
African Americans in the South during those years became one
Barnes Weldon Johnson, "Two Headlines," New York Age. May 
25, 1918, p. 4.
2Armistead Scott Pride, "Negro Newspapers: Yesterday,
Today and Tomorrow, " Journalism Quarterly. 28 (Spring 1951) , 
179-88, esp. 181. Pride lists the number of newspapers 
established each year. For a survey of estimates of how many 
black newspapers were in existence in any given year, which 
suggests the peak was after 1910, see Emma Lou Thombrough, 
"American Negro Newspapers, 1880-1914," Business History 
Review. 40 (Winter 1966), 467-90. For an account which draws 
a parallel between the "nadir" of African-American history and 
the peak of black journalism, see Luther P. Jackson, Jr., 
"Forward: Toward an Appreciation of the Black Press," in
Extant Collections of Early Black Newspapers: A Research Guide 
to the Black Press. 1880-1915. ed. Georgetta Merritt Campbell 
(Troy, N.Y. : Whitson Publishing Co., 1981).
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of the chief preoccupations of black editors, especially in 
the North where they could protest lynching without fear of 
reprisal.
During this time, white opinion on lynching, at least in 
the Northern states, was ambivalent and fluid. On one hand, 
most Northerners tended to accept the racist rationalizations 
for lynching offered by Southern apologists. But on the other 
hand they were uneasy about the grotesque brutality of many 
lynchings and the impact it had on the nation's image. While 
white apologists from the South hoped to explain and justify 
the phenomenon of lynching to the rest of the nation and gain 
the complicity of white Northerners by portraying it as grim 
necessity, the black press rebutted these arguments, called 
attention to the savagery of lynching, and highlighted the way 
lynchings soiled America's world image. In this sense, the 
black press was involved in a battle for the moral destiny of 
America. Racist Southern whites hoped to nationalize the 
growing feeling of violent hostility toward black men then 
flourishing in the South. The black press hoped to stigmatize 
that region as outside the pale of American civilization, 
values, and ideals and to build an alliance with Northern 
whites and the Federal government against the South.
The term "lynching" derived from the name of Charles 
Lynch, who was the leader of a vigilante association formed 
during the Revolutionary War to rid Bedford County, Virginia,
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of Tories. In the early nineteenth century, lynching was 
relatively common on the frontier and in places with dispersed 
population and weak law enforcement. Most victims were white 
until the Civil War, when many slaves were lynched to prevent 
rebellion. During Reconstruction, lynchers attacked both 
black and white Republicans, but increasingly chose black 
victims. In the first four years of record-keeping, 1882- 
1885, white victims outnumbered blacks 401 to 227, but from 
1886 onward the number of white victims declined steadily. 
After 1915, when 10 whites were lynched, the number never 
amounted to more than eight in a single year.3
Theories of the causes of lynching have ranged from 
economic to psycho - sexual. Contemporary apologists claimed it 
was necessary to deter black criminals, and especially rapists 
who preyed on white women in sparsely populated areas. Other 
theories tied lynching to economic stress or class conflict, 
southern cultural ideals, or social control." Whatever the
3Stewart E. Tolnay and E. M. Beck, A Festival of
Violence: An Analysis of Southern Lynchings, 1882-193Q
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1992), Appendix C-3. 
Robert L. Zagrando, The NAACP Crusade Against Lynching. 
1909-1950 (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1980) , 9-10. 
Statistical evidence of lynching is sketchy, even after 1882, 
when the Chicago Tribune initiated the first effort to compile 
statistics. Even statistics after that time are considered 
conservative estimates, since some lynchings were never 
reported. On the early history of lynching, see w. Fitzhugh 
Brundage, Lynching in the New South: Georgia and Virginia,. 
1880-1930 (Urbana: 1993), 5-6; on problems with statistics, 
ibid.. 292-93.
"For an interpretation which sees lynching as a means to 
preserve the caste structure of Southern life, see Gunnar 
Myrdal, An American Dilemma; The Negro Problem and Modem
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cause of lynching, its impact on African Americans living in 
the South is clear. Richard Wright, who grew up in 
Mississippi, said that just hearing about lynchings second 
hand conditioned him "as though I had been the victim of a 
thousand lynchings."*
Sex. L y n c h i n g ,  a n d  Civilization
Apologists claimed lynching was aimed primarily at 
deterring black rapists. Yet African Americans were lynched 
for "refusing to say 'Mr.,'" "writing an insulting note to a
Democracy (New York: Harper and Row, 1944, 1962), 563. For an 
account which emphasizes lynching's importance in maintaining 
the sexual status quo of the Victorian Era, see Jacquelyn Dowd 
Hall, Revolt Against Chivalry: Jesse Daniel Ames and the
Women's Campaign Against Lynching (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1979) , 145-49. An interpretation which sees 
lynching as a byproduct of the South's struggle to develop a 
racial system that balanced white separation with control of 
the black population is George M. Frederickson, The Black 
Image in the White Mind: The Debate on Afro-American Destiny. 
1817-1914 (New York: Harper & Row, 1971; Middletown, Conn.: 
Wesleyan University Press, 1987) , 275. An account that finds 
the roots of lynching in the social psychology of the 
generation of white southerners who grew up during the 
turbulence and disruption of the Civil War and Reconstruction 
is Joel Williamson, A Rage for Order: Black-White Relations in
the American South Since Emancipation (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1986) , 117-120. An account which emphasizes 
the relationship between lynching and the New South's economic 
structure, especially its rural labor system is W. Fitzhugh 
Brundage, Lynching in the New South; Georgia and Virginia. 
1880-1930 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1993), 13-14.
'Richard Wright, Black Boy: A Record of Childhood and 
Youth (New York: Harper & Row, 1937; New York: Harper
Perennial, 1989), 84.
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white woman," "wearing a U.S.A. [army] uniform too long," 
"living with a white woman," and other violations of racial 
"etiquette."6 In many of the cases where the victim had been 
charged with rape, the crime was actually a violation of the 
taboo against consensual interracial liaisons between black 
men and white women. But there was a kernel of truth to the 
apologists’ claim. Though any violation of racial etiquette 
could spur a lynching, sexual encounters between black men and 
white women, violent or consensual, were the second most 
common precipitating events of lynchings (after murder).7
Sexual identity had been at the center of dominant racial 
thought and of the black press's attack on it since the first 
black newspaper appeared. In the Victorian world view, 
nonwhites, and especially black men and women, were 
uncivilized, irrational, and uncontrollably driven by sexual 
impulses. Antebellum black editors sought to discredit such 
beliefs by celebrating the moral strength and reporting on the 
respectable activities of blacks, especially free black women. 
By showing black women to be virtuous and pious, they placed 
the blame for miscegenation in the slave South squarely on the 
masters' shoulders. They also offered paternalistic advice
6Crisis. 19 (Feb. 1920) , 183-85; and ibid.. 17 (Feb.
1919), 180. On racial "etiquette" in the South, see J.
William Harris, "Etiquette, Lynching, and Racial Boundaries in 
Southern History: A Mississippi Example," American Historical 
Review. 100 (April 1995), 387-410, esp. 390-93.
7Relations between white men and black women, however, 
did not foster white rage.
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encouraging black women to adhere to Victorian middle class 
standards of respectability in matters such as etiquette, 
courtship and marriage, and fashion--advice that mirrored the 
prescriptions in white women's magazines and was probably not 
relevant to the experiences of the vast majority of black 
women in antebellum America. The advice reflected the 
editors' acceptance of the belief that adherence to Western 
behavioral norms was the key to uplift of the race and that, 
as Freedom's Journal put it, "if we ever wish to be respected 
as a body ... We must make it evident that our principal aim 
is the moral improvement of our people and youth."3 The 
Journal hoped to persuade blacks to act respectably, but more 
important to convince whites that they did.
After emancipation, black editors continued to defend 
black women's honor, but by the 1890s black men needed more 
defending. White supremacists had added to the general 
beliefs about black sexuality the fear that black men were 
naturally prone to become dangerously violent sexual criminals 
who preyed on white women. According to what Joel Williamson 
called the "radical" race doctrines of the New South, 
uncontrollable black male sexuality placed the safety of every 
white woman at risk. Lynching, according to this doctrine, 
was the only way black men could be discouraged from raping 
white women, who were seen as universally pure and chaste-­
“Frankie Hutton, The Early Black Press in America. 1827 
to 1860 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1993), 57-80, 68.
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even asexual--and, in isolated rural areas, vulnerable to 
attack.9
Ida B. Wells, Gerard Manly, and other black editors from 
both the North and the South, opposed this mythology, not by 
assailing Victorian assumptions which undergirded them, but by 
turning those assumptions against lynching and the rape myth. 
They questioned the purity of white women and called attention 
to the transgressions of white men against black women-- 
specifically, the rape of slave women by their masters and, 
after emancipation, the keeping by Southern white men of black 
mistresses. They also extolled the virtue of black men and 
women and attacked anti-miscegenation laws--not because they 
favored interracial marriages, they said, but because they 
believed the laws gave white men license to exploit black 
women outside of marriage. In short, they turned the rape 
myth on its head. Wells has been identified as the first to 
systematically and effectively attack the myth, which even 
Frederick Douglass said he had been inclined to believe before 
Wells convinced him otherwise.10 Shortly before her exile
9Williamson, Rage for Order. 78-86. See also, 
Frederickson, Black Image in the White Mind. 256-82; Hall, 
Revolt Against Chivalry. 145-49; and Donald L. Grant, The 
Anti-Lynching Movement: 1883-1932 (San Francisco: R and E
Research Associates, 1975), 10.
10Mildred I. Thompson, Ida B. Wells-Bamett: An
Exploratory Study of an American Black Woman. 1893-1930. vol. 
4 of Black Women in United States History, ed., Darlene Clark 
Hine (Brooklyn: Carlson, 1990), 32. See also, Gail Bederman, 
"'Civilization,' the Decline of Middle-Class Manliness, and 
Ida B. Wells's Antilynching Campaign (1892-94)," Radical 
History Review. 52 (Winter 1992), 5-30; and Rodger
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from Memphis, she had conducted a study of lynching and
reported that in most cases, lynchings took place after
consensual relationships between black men and white women 
came to light.11 But it had become dangerous for black
journalists to make such claims in the South, as Jesse Duke, 
R. C. 0. Benjamin, Manly, and Wells herself discovered. Only 
after she moved North could Wells fully develop and
disseminate her attack on lynching and the rape myth.15
Organized Northern black agitation against lynching had 
begun in the 1880s when African-American political 
organizations in several states began putting the matter at 
the top of their agendas. These efforts were later taken up 
by two national organizations formed in the 1890s, the Afro-
Streitmatter, Raising Her Voice: African-American Women
Journalists Who Changed History (Lexington: University Press 
of Kentucky, 1994), 49-50.
“Streitmatter, Raising Her Voice. 54.
120n Southern editors and Southern correspondents of 
Northern newspapers persecuted for their attacks on lynching, 
see Grant, Anti-Lynching Movement. 77. Like John Mitchell, 
Jr., of the Richmond Planet, most Southern editors probably 
adopted accommodationist strategies that allowed them to 
protest lynching without suffering reprisals. Mitchell 
published black eyewitness accounts of lynchings, countered 
white newspapers' justifications of the events and wrote 
scathing editorials pointing out the barbarity of lynching. 
"Southern white folks have gone to roasting Negroes," he wrote 
in 1891, "we presume the next step will be to eat them." 
Later, however, Mitchell spoke out less forcefully and worked 
behind the scenes with white liberals to prevent lynchings of 
individuals being held for controversial crimes. See W. 
Fitzhugh Brundage, "'To Howl Loudly': John Mitchell Jr. and 
his Campaign Against Lynching in Virginia, " Canadian Review of 
American Studies 22 (Winter 1991), 325-41.
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American League and the Equal Rights Council.13 Individual 
journalists, such as Frederick Douglass, who denounced the 
rape myth in two articles in the 1890s, and T. Thomas Fortune, 
who called on blacks to fight back against lynchers in the 
1880s, also joined the fray. Harry C. Smith, publisher of the 
Cleveland Gazette and member of the Ohio General Assembly, 
sponsored an anti-lynching bill, which was made law in 1896 
and became a model for other states. But Wells made the most 
effective case against lynching before the turn of the 
century. Once she reached the North, Wells attacked the rape 
myth relentlessly in the New York Age and elsewhere. In 
"Southern Horrors," a pamphlet published in 1892, Wells wrote 
that
there are many white women in the South who would 
marry colored men if such an act would not place 
them at once beyond the pale of society and within 
the clutches of the law. The miscegenation laws of 
the South only operate against the legitimate union 
of the races; they leave the white man free to 
seduce all the colored girls he can, but it is 
death to the colored man who yields to the force 
and advances of a similar attraction in white 
women. White men lynch the offending Afro- 
American, not because he is a despoiler of virtue, 
but because he succumbs to the smiles of white 
women.14
13Grant, Anti-Lynching Movement. 20ff.
14Ida B. Wells, "Southern Horrors: Lynch Law in all its 
Phases," 1892, in On Lynchings: Southern Horrors. A Red
Record. Mob Rule (New York: Arno Press and the New York Times, 
1969), 6.
75
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
In the North, Wells encountered the opposite problem of the 
one she had faced in the South. Now whites generally ignored 
her appeals. Only by travelling to England did she find a 
receptive audience. Her fame there forced some American 
journalists to write about her crusade.1*
Wells "brilliantly and subversively manipulated dominant 
middle-class ideas about race, manhood, and civilization in 
order to force white Americans to address lynching," Gail 
Bederman has argued. At a time when American men were 
sensitive about "dwindling manhood," Wells put the South on 
the defensive by applying the Victorian dichotomy of
civilized/savage to the practice of lynching. Black men were 
truly civilized and manly, while white Southern lynchers acted 
like uncivilized savages. Wells managed to shift the 
discourse on lynching and the rape myth in the Northern daily 
press, Bederman contends:
After 1894, most Northern periodicals stopped
treating lynching as a colorful Southern folkway.
They dropped their jokey tones and piously
condemned lynching as "barbarous11--although they 
still implied one could do little to stop it. It 
became a truism that lynching hurt America in the 
eyes of the "civilized world."16
This strategy worked not because Wells demolished the thinking 
behind the rape myth, but rather because she turned that
lsZagrando, NAACP Crusade Against Lynching. 12-14.
16Bederman, "'Civilization,' the-Decline of Middle-Class 
Manliness, and Ida B. Wells's Antilynching Campaign," 22.
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thinking against itself. She joined the battle on the 
linguistic territory of her enemy. The fear of a 
deterioration of Americans1 image in their own minds and 
before the world became the wedge black journalism would 
henceforth use to split the lynching South from the rest of 
America.
While white uneasiness about lynching may have grown as 
a result of Wells' efforts, white Northerners never reached a 
solid anti-lynching consensus and most continued to accept, on 
some level, the Southern defense of the practice. Even 
prominent progressives like Theodore Roosevelt and muckraking 
journalists who sometimes spoke out against lynching also 
accepted Southern rationalizations. Roosevelt, for example, 
was careful to condemn both lynching and rape in the same 
speeches, since he believed that the latter caused the 
former.17 A study of muckraking journalism after the turn of 
the century shows that five leading magazines either ignored 
lynching or mixed their condemnations with rationalizations. 
Collier1 s. for example, could condemn it as "one of the worse 
blots on our civilization" but also print articles by Southern 
apologists like Thomas Nelson Page who justified lynching to 
prevent rape. In its harshest criticisms, Collier's never 
challenged the belief that lynching arose from a need to curb
17William L. Ziglar, "The Decline of Lynching in America, " 
International Social Science Review. 63 (Winter 1988), 14-25, 
esp. 16-17.
77
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
black criminality and protect white women. Even Ray Stannard 
Baker, an opponent of The Birth of a Nation and one of the few 
muckrakers to concern himself with racial issues, attributed 
lynching to "poor enforcement of the law" in his two-part 1905 
series on the subject. If black criminals were more 
successfully and swiftly tried and punished by the justice 
system, lynching would cease. In general, white progressives 
like Baker, who wrote about "the animal-like ferocity" of the 
Negro, failed to attack the racist notions underlying lynching 
because they accepted them.18
A few white progressives who held more enlightened racial 
views helped to form the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People in 1910, in part to attack 
lynching. Led by Oswald Garrison Villard, editor of the New 
York Evening Post and the Nation magazine, the organization 
conducted investigations of lynchings, sought court action 
against lynchers, distributed press releases, printed anti­
lynching polemics in its monthly magazine, the Crisis. and 
lobbied state and Federal governments to enact anti-lynching 
legislation. But the group was unable to immediately
discredit the notions that maintained a hold on the white 
northern press.19 Furthermore, some of the white members of
18Maurine Beasley, "The Muckrakers and Lynching: A Case 
Study in Racism," Journalism History. 9 (Autumn-Winter 1982), 
86-91., esp. 87-89; Zagrando, NAACP Crusade Against Lynching. 
14-16.
19Zagrando, NAACP Crusade Against Lynching.
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the NAACP seem to have shared some of the racist notions of 
the day. A zoologist who spoke at the organization's founding 
conference said that Negro brains were more susceptible than 
Caucasian brains to defects that led to inferior "reason, 
judgement, self-control or voluntary inhibitions."20 W. E. 
B. Du Bois, the only black NAACP officer in the early years, 
believed Villard, the leading figure in the organization 
during that time, viewed blacks as inferior and opposed social 
equality. Villard never invited Du Bois to his home for a 
social visit and expected blacks to adopt an attitude toward 
him that was "humble and thankful or certainly not assertive 
and aggressive," Du Bois claimed. Du Bois said he feared that 
the unconscious prejudices of Villard and May Childs Nemey, 
the organization's secretary from 1912-1916, would lead to the 
demise of their experiment in interracial cooperation.21
Thus, by 1915, even the most liberal of Northerners were 
not free of the kinds of beliefs about race which supported 
the practice of lynching.22 In a series of three editorials 
in January, following the lynching of a black family in
20Elliott M. Rudwick, W. E. B. Du Bois. 123.
21Du Bois to Joel E. Spingam, Oct. 28, 1914, in The
Correspondence of W. E. B. Du Bois. vol. 1, ed. Herbert 
Aptheker (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1973), 
206-207.
22Grant, Anti-Lynching Movement. 77-82. Lynchings were 
not unheard of in the North. For an account of the lynching 
of a black man in a Northern town in 1911, see Dennis B. 
Downey and Raymond M. Hyser, No Crooked Death: Coatsville. 
Pennsylvania, and the Lynching of Zachariah Walker (Urbana: 
University of Illinois Press, 1991).
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Monticello, Georgia, the New York Times denounced lynchings as 
"exhibitions of barbarity," which had generated feelings of 
"shame and indignation . . . all over the country."23 Still, 
the editorials expressed understanding for the original 
purpose of lynching--to protect whites living in "sparsely 
settled" and "badly policed" rural areas against black 
criminality.
Where men's lives and women's honor are dependent 
almost entirely on the vigilance and courage of 
each householder, the moment a criminal element 
appears and begins to make life and honor insecure 
the veneer of civilization falls off and men become 
primeval.
Such conditions occurred more often in the South "because of 
the legacy of African slavery," the Times asserted. 
Northerners had therefore supported lynching until lately, 
when, in cases like Monticello--where women and a boy were 
lynched merely for resisting arrest--the practice had gotten 
out of hand. Because lynchings were no longer carried out 
primarily in retaliation for the "usual crime" of rape, the 
Times reasoned, they had to be stopped. The editorials also 
depicted lynching not as a defining element of Southern 
society, but as the work of a small unrepresentative minority. 
Most of the residents of the "thriving and growing State," of 
Georgia opposed lynching, according to the Times, and a
23New York Times. Jan. 18, 1915, p. 8, col. 3.
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Southern governor or judge could put an end to the phenomenon 
by "just once" standing up to the mob.24 The Times saw 
uncivilized behavior in the South on both sides of the color 
line.
The Battle over "Birth of a Nation"
With Northern opinion thus moving away from acceptance of 
lynching, yet still inclined to sympathize with Southern 
concerns about black criminality, a powerful defense of 
lynching, in the form of the ground-breaking film, The Birth 
of a Nation, hit the nation's theaters in 1915. Producer- 
director D. W. Griffith based his film on Thomas Dixon's 1905 
novel, The Clansman, which had already been made into a 
successful play. Dixon wrote his "nightmare of interracial 
brutality, rape, and castigation," as one historian described 
it, to "teach the North . . . what it has never known--the
awful suffering of the white man during the dreadful 
Reconstruction period . . .  to demonstrate to the world that
24New York Times. Jan. 22, 1915, p. 10, col. 3; and Jan. 
19, 1915, p. 8, col. 3. For similar reasoning, in which Ray 
Stannard Baker accepted the notion that lynching was once 
necessary to prevent rape, but now had gotten out of hand and 
was contributing to general lawlessness, see, Beasley, 
"Muckrakers and Lynching," 88.
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the white man must and shall be supreme."25 Though somewhat 
tamer than the novel, the film version conveyed the same 
message. It depicted Reconstruction as a disaster imposed by 
vengeful and misguided radicals in Congress who hoped to 
overturn the social order by forcing on whites a ruling class 
of blacks who became "drunk with wine and power," corrupted 
the government, refused to work, and worst of all pursued 
union with white women.2* In a climactic scene, a young 
white heroine jumps to her death to escape Gus, a white actor 
in blackface, who has proposed marriage--a code in the movie 
for rape. In the end, the South is redeemed by the rise of 
the Ku Klux Klan, which rescues not only the majority white 
population, but those good blacks who are content to remain in 
their places as loyal and powerless servants. As Du Bois put 
it, the film showed the Negro as either "an ignorant fool, a 
vicious rapist, a venal or unscrupulous politician or a 
faithful but doddering idiot."27 Dixon said he hoped the
25Leon F. Litwack, "The Birth of a Nation," in Past 
Imperfect: History According to the Movies, ed. Mark C. Carnes 
et al. (New York: Henry Holt, 1995), 138. Thomas Cripps, Slow
Fade to Black: The Negro in American Film, 1900.-_l-9.42. (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1977), 44, 46.
2*Film quoted in Cripps, Slow Fade to Black. 51.
27David Levering Lewis, w. E. B. Du Bois: Biography of a 
Race (New York: Henry Hold, 1993), 507.
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film would "create a feeling of abhorrence in white people, 
especially white women, against colored men."28
But the filmmakers' central message was embodied in two 
surprising plot twists. In one, the former Confederate 
protagonists, the Camerons, are arrested for membership in the 
Ku Klux Klan, but manage to escape (with the help of their 
faithful former slaves) and flee to an old cabin in the woods. 
Inside, they discover the place is occupied by two Union Army 
veterans. Instead of driving the Confederates out, the 
veterans welcome them. An intertitle proclaims: "The former 
enemies of North and South are united again in common defense 
of their Aryan birthright," and they all prepare to fight to 
the death against the Reconstruction government' s approaching 
black militia. Meanwhile, Austin Stoneman, a radical 
Republican who preaches total Negro equality throughout the 
story, changes his mind when, toward the end, the malevolent 
mulatto Lieutenant Governor Silas Lynch, tries to "marry" 
Stoneman's daughter. Thus North and South are reunited in 
their determination to protect white women, keep African 
Americans in their place, and assure the continuation of white 
supremacy in America.29 To a great extent, the film's vision 
of Northern and Southern whites united to keep blacks
28Quoted in Jack Beatty, The Rascal King: The Life and 
Times of James Michael Curley. 1874-1958 (Reading, Mass.: 
Addison-Wesley, 1992), 182.
29D. W. Griffith, The Birth of a Nation. 1915, dist. by 
Republic Video; See also, Litwack, "-Birth of a Nation, " 139- 
40.
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subordinated did reflect the reality of the post- 
Reconstruction period. Dixon and Griffith wanted to solidify 
the alliance and push blacks even farther down.
Few white Americans found anything to object to in the 
film. The Chicago Tribune said it was "in all essential 
episodes grounded on historical fact, representing the 
struggles of that terrible time in the south. . . .  It 
presents what the south says and the north of our day, at 
least, is inclined to believe to be truth.30 Woodrow Wilson, 
his daughters, and the cabinet screened it in the White House 
just 10 days after its February release in Los Angeles. 
Though Wilson probably did not say, as historians enjoy 
reporting, "It is like writing history with lightning, and my 
only regret is that it is all so terribly true," the 
filmmakers used Wilson's White House screening as a way to 
lend legitimacy to their production.31 For the same reason,
30Quoted in Cleveland Gazette. June 5, 1915, p. 2.
31Thomas Cripps and Leon Litwack, for example, use the 
quote. See Cripps, Slow Fade to Black. 52; and Litwack, "The 
Birth of a Nation," 136. According to the only attributed 
first-hand account of the White House preview, "Wilson seemed 
lost in thought during the showing, and . . . walked out of
the room without saying a word when the movie was over." 
Wilson's alleged quote first appeared, without attribution, in 
a 1937 magazine article. See The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, 
vol. 32, ed. Arthur Link, (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1985), 267, n. 1. Although Wilson asked that Dixon 
and Griffith not mention his viewing the film in the press, 
the filmmakers used the White House preview and the Supreme 
Court Chief Justice's viewing in their arguments against 
censorship in New York and Boston. See Arthur S. Link, 
Wilson: The New Freedom (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1956), 253. Supreme Court Chief Justice Edward White 
and Margaret Blaine Damrosch wrote to the White House of
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they arranged another showing for Supreme Court Chief Justice 
Edward White, other Justices, senators, and congressmen.32 
One might expect Southerners like White and Wilson to agree 
with Griffith's slanted view of history. White allegedly 
confided to Dixon that he had ridden with the Klan in his 
youth. And Wilson, who believed black reconstruction policies 
had led to the "veritable overthrow of civilization in the 
South," had written some of the historical accounts Griffith 
used in his research for the movie. The film even quoted 
Wilson in intertitles.33
More surprising was the acceptance of the film by many 
liberal whites, some with a history of supporting blacks. 
George Foster Peabody, a generous philanthropist of black 
institutions, California Governor Hiram Johnson, critic Bums 
Mantle, explorer Richard Harding Davis, novelist Booth 
Tarkington, and S. S. Frissell, a supporter of the NAACP, all 
accepted the film as accurate. Watching the film, medical
rumors Wilson and White had "sanctioned" the film. Wilson 
told his personal secretary, Joseph P. Tumulty to "please say 
I have expressed no opinion about it." See Warren Forman 
Johnson to Woodrow Wilson, March 29, 1915, Papers of Woodrow 
Wilson, vol. 32, ed. Link, 454-55; and Edward Douglass White 
to Joseph Patrick Tumulty, April 5, 1915, ibid.. p. 486; and 
ibid.. vol. 33, p. 86, n. 1.
32Michael Rogin, Ronald Reagan, the Movie and Other 
Episodes in Political Demonology (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1987), 195.
“Wilson Quoted in Rogin, Ronald Reagan, the Movie. 193. 
See also, Florette Henri, Black Migration: Movement North. 
1900-1920 (Garden City, NY: Anchor Press/Doubleday, 1975), 
229.
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reformer Dorothea Dix advised, would "make a better American 
of you." Some reformers thought its historical theme made a 
vast improvement over the sexual and slapstick titillation of 
most other films of the day.34 Reviewers praised the film 
and enthusiastic moviegoers flocked to see it in theaters.35
Dixon's hope that the film would "revolutionize Northern 
sentiments" against Negroes seems to have been largely 
realized.36 Mary White Ovington reported that as she left a 
New York showing she heard a man exclaim: "I would like to 
kill every nigger. I would like to sweep every nigger off the 
earth." A white Indiana viewer shot and killed a black 
teenager after viewing the film. Houston audiences shouted 
"lynch him!" during the scene in which Gus chases the young 
woman over the cliff. The number of lynchings nationwide grew 
significantly in 1915, and a revived Ku Klux Klan emerged.37 
The makers of the film seemed to be succeeding at unifying
34Rogin, Ronald Reagan, the Movie. 197.
3SCripps, Slow Fade to Black. 57.
36Quoted in Henri, Black-Migration, 227.
37Beatty, Rascal King. 181. Lewis, W_, _ E,.. JL.. Pu Pols, 507. 
On the influence of Birth of a Nation on the reestablishment 
of the Ku Klux Klan in 1915, see David M. Chalmers, Hooded 
Americanism: The History of the Ku Klux Klan (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 1987), 22-32; and Bill Stanton, Klanwatch; 
Bringing the Ku Klux Klan to Justice (New York: Grove
Weidenfeld, 1991),83. On the Klan's later use of the film as 
a recruiting tool, see Leonard J. Moore, Citizen Klansmen: The 
Ku Klux Klan in Indiana. 1929-1928 (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 1991), 3.
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North and South against black, and spreading, in the words of 
Michael Rogin, "the screen memory, in both meanings of that 
term, through which Americans were to understand their 
collective past and enact their future."38 For African 
Americans, the consequences of this historical sensibility 
were literally deadly.
The danger in allowing such a message to enter the 
American psyche unchallenged must have been obvious to African 
Americans who undertook a major campaign to ban the film from 
theaters, or failing that, to discredit it with the public. 
Although the NAACP undertook much of the direct action, black 
journals undergirded the campaign from the beginning. Even 
before the film first opened at Clunes Auditorium in Los 
Angeles as The Clansman on February 8, the California Eagle 
demanded "that it be denied theatrical recognition in Los 
Angeles."39 In its campaign against the film, the Eagle 
threatened to withhold black votes from public officials 
refusing to support a ban and pointed to ways in which it made 
black and white people look bad. An editorial called the 
movie "the most diabolical and damnable prejudice-making play 
which has ever been produced by man."40 A judge ordered that 
it be shown with a few cuts.41 The film's widespread
38Rogin, Ronald Reagan, the Movie. 192.
39CaliJ-oxiLka.-^ agl-S, Jan. 30, 1915.
40Califomia Eagle. Feb. 6, 1915.
41Califomia Eagle. Feb. 13, 1915.
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popularity in the next several months seemed to confirm the 
editors' worst fears and the filmmakers' fondest hopes: that 
The Birth of a Nation was spreading Southern sentiment on race 
and justifying lynching in white Northerners' minds. "Clunes1 
Auditorium is thronged each day with all sorts of cultured 
people applauding the glorification of mob-murder!" William 
Easton wrote in the Eagle. "Mr. Griffith and Thomas Dixon are 
conducting a day and evening school to teach all who will pay 
the price, how easy it is to 'lynch, ' how gracefully it can be 
done, and what wonderful maneuvering it admits of." 
Moviegoers at one showing broke into "tumultuous applause, a 
sort of hilarious happiness," upon the entrance of the Klan, 
he reported.42
Opposition to the film became well-organized as the NAACP 
geared up for the March 3 premier in New York City. 
Protestors demanded first that certain scenes be removed, then 
whole sections of the film; called for a preview by black 
leaders; filed suit in court to prevent the film's opening; 
flooded the mayor's office with protesters; and mobilized 
widespread support among blacks of all ideological stripes and 
important liberal whites. Whites who lined up with the NAACP 
included not only its former chairman, Oswald Garrison 
Villard, publisher of the New York Post and the Nation 
magazine, but also muckraker Ray Stannard Baker, settlement 
house organizer Jane Addams, movie producer Lewis Selznick,
42California Eagle. Sept. 4, 1915, p. 3.
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Rabbi Stephen A. Wise, and reviewer Francis Hackett, who wrote 
a negative appraisal of the film in the New Republic.43 The 
film ran, but the opposition had again won a few cuts.
Protest culminated in Boston, where William Monroe 
Trotter used the leverage of black votes to pressure Mayor 
James Michael Curley to ban the film. Curley ordered the 
filmmakers to cut five of the most objectionable scenes before 
allowing it to open in a downtown theater on April 10. 
Trotter, still unsatisfied, led a group of protesters to the 
lobby of the theater; after club-wielding police officers 
arrested ten protesters, including Trotter, a few others 
managed to get in. During the climactic rape scene, one threw 
a "very ancient egg" into "the exact middle of the white 
screen." In the following days, Trotter led a protest 
gathering at Faneuil Hall and a march on the State House. The 
2,000 angry blacks protesting on the State House steps won a 
promise from Governor David Ignatius Walsh to draft a new 
censorship law. Despite the law, which Walsh signed on May 
21, The Birth of a Nation played to large audiences until mid- 
October. Still, Trotter's threats seem to have had an effect 
on Curley, who sought to win back black votes by appointing 
more African Americans to city posts and submitting an anti- 
lynching bill to U. S. Senator Henry Cabot Lodge.44
43Cripps, Slow Fade to Black. 55-57.
44Stephen R. Fox, The Guardian of Boston: William Monroe 
Trotter (New York: Atheneum, 1970), 191-97. Cripps, Slow Fade 
to Black. 59-61. Beatty, Rascal King. 180-85.
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Meanwhile, protests continued around the country and the 
film was banned at least temporarily in Chicago, and later 
throughout Illinois; Pasadena, California; Wilmington, 
Delaware; St. Louis; Massachusetts outside of Boston; and 
Ohio.45 In Ohio, editor Harry C. Smith of the Cleveland 
Gazette waged one of the most dogged campaigns against The 
Birth of a Nation of anyone in the black press.
In many ways, Smith's attack on the film mirrored the 
strategy of Griffith and Dixon. Where the filmmakers sought 
to unify North and South against black, Smith sought to unify 
North and black against South. They portrayed blacks and he 
portrayed Southern whites as uncivilized brutes. They 
portrayed Southern whites and he portrayed blacks as 
respectable and law-abiding victims. Both highlighted support 
of their positions by figures of authority.
A charter member of Fortune's "Afro-American Agitators," 
Smith was an uncompromising integrationist, an opponent of 
separate black institutions, Booker T. Washington, and the 
South, a wary observer and frequent opponent of the NAACP, and 
an ally of Trotter. A political activist, Smith had won three 
terms in the state legislature in the 1890s and formed the
45See Cripps, Slow Fade to Black. 63; Lewis, W. E. B. Du 
Bois. 507-8; Fox, Guardian of Boston. 197; Henri, Black 
Migration. 231; and "Wilmington Bars Photo-Play, " Afro- 
American Ledger. June 5, 1915, p. 1. Henri claims that the 
film was banned in Cleveland, but not in the rest of Ohio. 
Evidence from the Gazette, however, indicates the film was 
banned in the state for at least a year. See also, David A.
Gerber, Black Ohio and the Color Line, 13£_Q-15.15. (Urbana:
University of Illinois Press, 1987), 467.
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Interstate League of Independent Colored Voters in 1902; he 
would receive 60,000 votes in the Republican primary for Ohio 
secretary of state in 1920, and he perpetually endorsed and 
worked for candidates for local, state and national 
offices.46 During 1915 he gave more space to his campaign 
against The Birth of a Nation than to any other political 
topic.47 Most of his coverage revolved around efforts to 
persuade state and city officials--especially Gov. Frank 
Willis--to censor the film. He printed letters to and from 
Willis and other officials, editorials, petitions, news 
accounts, official pronouncements, and reprints from other 
papers relating to the film and his campaign to ban it. Smith 
portrayed the white governor as aligned with blacks against 
the outrageous film even before Willis had taken decisive 
action. He praised Willis so extensively for supporting 
censorship that editor Calvin Chase of the Washington Bee
46Kenneth Kusmer, A Ghetto Takes Shape: Black Cleveland. 
1870-1930 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1976), 130- 
34. On his 1920 campaign, see Cleveland Gazette. Sept. 4, 
1920, p. 1. See also, Summer E. Stevens and Owen V. Johnson, 
"From Black Politics to Black Community: Harry C. Smith and 
the Cleveland Gazette. " Journalism Quarterly. 67 (Winter 
1990), 1090-1102.
47Based on a content analysis of twelve editorial pages, 
one randomly selected from each month during 1915. Other 
topics include national, state, and local party politics, 
Booker T. Washington, economic policy, proposed legislation, 
and the Supreme Court's ruling overturning the grandfather 
clause.
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called Smith the Sancho Panza of Ohio.48 Willis was an 
important authority whose opposition gave greater credence to 
Smith's own criticisms of the film. Further, the governor's 
stand with blacks against the white South stood as proof 
against the Birth of a Nation's assertion of a unity of whites 
against blacks.
Smith also printed articles written by white authors who 
affirmed the humanity of African Americans and attacked 
Griffith's film. When the state attorney general, E. C. 
Turner, upheld the censor board's decision on Birth of a 
Nation. Smith reprinted it in full. Turner focused more on 
the film's slander of the North than of blacks. He criticized 
the historical absurdity of portraying Northern leaders 
consorting with Negro mistresses when white slaveowners had 
caused most race mixing, scenes unflattering to Union Generals 
Sherman and Grant and to Union soldiers, the portrayal of the 
South as superior to the North, the representation of black 
soldiers as rapists, and the portrayal of the outlaw Ku Klux 
Klan as heroic. "This picture is neither of a moral, 
educational, amusing nor harmless character," Turner
<8Washington Bee. Jan. 22, 1916, p. 4. On Smith's 
"fulsome praise" of Willis, see Cleveland Gazette. May 1, 
1915, p. 2; and '"Birth of a Nation, '" ibid.. Sept. 4, 1915, 
p. 2. Smith broke with Willis in February of 1916 and he ran 
for Ohio Secretary of State in 1920. See Cleveland Gazette. 
March 4, 1916, p. 2; April 7, 1917, p. 2; and Aug. 7, 1920, p. 
1 .
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concluded.49 The article put the lie to Dixon's notion of a 
unity of whites against blacks.
The Gazette also attacked the historical accuracy of the 
film. An article by John R. Lynch, who had been a Mississippi 
Congressman during Reconstruction, called Birth of a Nation a 
"fiction pure and simple, painted from a diseased and 
prejudiced imagination . . . , calculated to incite crime and 
general disorder in the community." Lynch hoped that "the 
eyes of the people will eventually be opened" to the truth.50 
In his own criticisms of the film, Smith, like Turner, did not 
dwell on the way the film injured African Americans.
"The Birth of a Nation" is not only vile in parts 
but positively a dangerous film because it 
ridicules and reviles sacred historical figures 
(soldiers and statesmen) of this country, attacks 
loyalty, praises rebels and their organizations 
like the infamous Ku Klux Klan, and promotes the 
mob spirit wherever it is exhibited.51
He framed the film as an attack on the North and on 
America's best ideals rather than on blacks. This was a 
conscious strategy to influence Northern white opinion.
49Cleveland Gazette. Feb. 5, 1916, p. 2. Smith also
reprinted an article written by a "white friend" in the Moving 
Picture World, which called another film Smith sought to ban, 
"The Nigger," a "repulsive, harmful" film "that never should 
have been made." See Cleveland Gazette. April 3, 1915. For 
another example of white criticism of the film, see "The Birth 
of a Nation," Cleveland Gazette. May 12, 1917, p. 2.
50Cleveland Gazette. June 5, 1915, p. 2. 
“Cleveland Gazette. May 13, 1916, p. 2.
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Advising local black activists in 1917 how to most effectively 
attack the film, he explained that instead of stressing 
blacks' gripes they should focus on how the film "ridicules 
the loyal Federal soldier of the war of the rebellion, insults 
the North and does far worse in the case of such abolitionists 
as Lovejoy. . . . Make it clear that somebody else's 'ox is 
gored1 besides ours."52
In this case and others when Smith addressed blacks in 
relation to the film, he usually offered suggestions on how 
best to turn whites against it. In addition to showing how 
the film offended whites, black opponents should show greater 
unity in their protests and, most importantly, behave 
respectably during demonstrations.53 When in early 1917 a 
court ruled that the film must be shown, Smith blamed the 
decision on a last-minute protest by a "mob" made up of the 
"lowest Negroes," some recruited from saloons. Not only did 
the protesters make a "weak demonstration," but on their way 
home they vandalized a street car and tailor shop windows. 
"The decent respectable, law-abiding Afro-Americans of this 
city repudiate them," he declared, while calling for the 
"arrest and punishment" of the mob members. According to 
Smith, a judge, who heard the case on Monday afternoon, handed 
down his decision against censorship on Tuesday morning in
“Cleveland Gazette. March 10, 1917, p. 2.
53"The Infamous Film 'the Birth of a Nation,'" Cleveland 
Gazette. March 3, 1917, p. 1; and "The Beatty Bill," ibid.. p. 
2 .
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part because of the actions of the unruly black protesters the 
night before.54 The unruly protesters, it seems, had 
reinforced the filmmakers' claim that blacks were lawless and 
uncivilized, the labels Smith and the rest of the black press 
were trying to pin on the South.
Like black editors going back to antebellum times, Smith 
encouraged and publicized respectable behavior among blacks to 
both qualify them for citizenship and prove to whites that 
they deserved it. Smith turned against Willis early in 1916 
because he appointed as oil inspector a black saloon owner-- 
someone Smith thought would not be a "satisfactory 
representative" of the race.55 In the context of lynching 
and The Birth of a Nation controversy, proper black behavior 
became even more important. After all, Smith was arguing that 
African Americans were not prone to uncivilized violence, that 
lynching was not necessary to keep them in order. Efforts 
such as these to emphasize black accomplishments and 
respectability should not be explained away merely as 
reflecting the class biases of bourgeois editors, or as part 
of an attempt to compensate middle class blacks for feelings 
of inferiority, as E. Franklin Frazier argued.55 Rather they
54"Birth of a Nation Won," Cleveland Gazette. April 14, 
1917, p. 1.
“Cleveland Gazette. March 4, 1916, pp. 1, 2.
S5E. Franklin Frazier, Black Bourgeoisie (New York: Free 
Press, 1957), 24-26, 179ff.
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were part of an effort to mold and "shape public opinion about 
ourselves, " as James Weldon Johnson put it.57
Smith hoped to counter Griffith's attempt to portray a 
unity of interest of Northern and Southern whites against 
blacks. Instead of portraying the South as victim of the 
North in the Civil War and Reconstruction, Griffith had 
portrayed the entire nation as the victim of blacks and 
radical Republicans, who formed an evil alliance and seized 
power after the assassination of Lincoln.sa In contrast, 
Smith portrayed the film, white supremacists, and the South as 
the enemy of loyal Union soldiers, fundamental American 
ideals, and true Americans. Smith and Griffith were engaged
57New York Age. Feb. 11, 1915, p. 4. Not every black
newspaper used the same tactics as Smith did against The Birth 
of a Nation. The Baltimore Afro-American, for example, 
focused more on how the film injured blacks than how it 
insulted whites. The paper also optimistically exaggerated 
the degree of white opposition to the film, arguing that "no 
thinking man" accepts its historical premise, and that praise 
of the film focused mainly on its production techniques while 
its message received "universal condemnation." But like the 
Gazette, the Afro-American tried to use the black vote to 
convince local officials to censor the film, and sought to 
discredit Dixon, calling him a "criminally vicious," "yellow 
dramatist." The Afro also reprinted critiques of the film 
from white publications, including the Congregationalist and 
Christian World, which confronted Dixon in an interview with 
the fact that white Southern men more often crossed the color 
line for sex than black men; the National Tribune, which wrote 
a scathing indictment of the "cowardly and infamous" Ku Klux 
Klan; and the Boston Herald, which quoted Moorefield Storey's 
criticisms of the film. When the "Hate of a Nation" left 
town, an editorial advised theater owners to "fumigate" the 
theater. See Baltimore Afro-American. Aug. 7, 1915, p. 4;
March 4, 1916, p. 4; April 1, 1916, p. 4; June 5, 1915, p. 4; 
May 6, 1916, p. 4.
590n this reading of the film, see Rogin, Ronald Reagan, 
the Movie. 211-12.
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in a struggle over the meaning of key events in American 
history with direct bearing on the character and meaning of 
America in the present. Where the filmmakers set up a duality 
in American life between civilized whites and inferior, 
uncivilized blacks, Smith sought to establish a different one, 
between the true and the false America. On one side, 
humanistic, democratic, and civilized, stood the North, the 
(loyal) Union, the Constitution, the Declaration of 
Independence, and abolitionism; on the other, inhuman, 
undemocratic, and violent, stood the South, the (disloyal) 
Confederacy, racism, disfranchisement, and Jim Crow.59
Although some localities barred The Birth of a Nation, 
the censorship campaign mostly failed to achieve its major 
objective.40 Thomas Cripps sees the campaign, at least in 
its later phases, as misguided because it put blacks in the 
dubious position of opposing free speech and because their 
protests actually boosted the popularity of the film.51 In 
Oakland, promoters allegedly paid a group of blacks to boycott
"For example, Smith compared Harriet Beecher Stowe, the 
antebellum, Northern anti-slavery author, Dixon was a greedy 
hack who distorted historical conditions and viewed the world 
through "prejudiced eyes." Stowe, on the other hand, adhered 
to "actual conditions as they existed," and had earned a 
lasting place in the hearts of Americans. She was a 
humanitarian, Dixon was "the exact opposite," "a mischief 
maker, [and] an agitator" whose work injured "ALL" the people. 
See Cleveland Gazette. March 10 1917, p. 2.
50In addition to the localities already mentioned, some 
other officials banned the film during the war to prevent race 
riots and assure the loyalty of blacks.
“Cripps, Slow Fade to Black. 66-69.
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the film to generate publicity. Griffith predicted the "silly 
legal opposition . . . will make me a millionaire if they keep 
it up."62 Some black newspapers, including the Washington 
Bee and the Chicago Defender, opposed continued protest for 
this very reason--though not before condemning the film and 
answering its argument. Booker T. Washington and his 
followers adopted this stance early on, and his personal 
secretary, Emmett J. Scott, put his energies behind production 
of "The Birth of a Race," a film which would present the 
opposing view. Underlying these different tactics, however, 
lay a basic similarity--a belief in the absolute necessity of 
answering Griffith. Black journalists could not sit idly by 
and allow such a negative statement to go unanswered, and so 
sought to answer it in some way even if only, as the 
Washington Bee proposed, by letting "our conduct be of such a 
nature that [it] will put a quietus on the indictment."63
And while The Birth of a Nation had a devastating impact 
on race relations, the campaign against it did have a 
mitigating affect. Important liberals like George Foster 
Peabody reversed their early endorsement of the film, 
Hollywood producers in the future shied away from negative 
black roles, and Southerners like Justice White and some of
“Griffith quoted in Henry, Black Migration. 230.
63"'Birth of a Nation,'" Washington Bee. April 1, 1916. 
On the Bee1 s criticism of the film, see, "Violence vs. Common 
Sense," ibid. . Oct. 2, 1915, p. 4; '"The Birth of the Nation," 
ibid.. Feb. 19, 1916, p. 4; and '"The Birth of A Nation,'" 
ibid.. April 22, 1916, p. 4.
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his congressional friends came to be embarrassed by their 
early sanctioning of the film.64 Even President Wilson felt 
it necessary to leak to the press the news that he disapproved 
of the "unfortunate production."65 Such recriminations may 
have become necessary because the protests had changed the 
climate and made it unrespectable--or at least politically 
inexpedient--to support the film. Black opposition may have 
prevented The Birth of a Nation from fully nationalizing 
Southern race sentiment. At the very least, African Americans 
had their say and Griffith's racist justification of lynching 
did not go unanswered.
Lynching, the South, and America
Although other black newspapers did not spill as much ink 
as Smith did on The Birth of a Nation, they tried to 
accomplish similar ends with their comments on a series of 
gruesome lynchings that took place in the South during the 
long run of the controversial film. They sought to show that
64See Cripps, Slow Fade to Black. 61, 67. Hollywood also 
shied away from positive portrayals of blacks. Cripps says 
this was a negative impact of the film. This seems doubtful,- 
Hollywood may well have dropped unflattering black roles 
because of the protest against Birth of a Nation, but 
flattering roles did not exist in any case.
65Rogin, Ronald Reagan, the Movie. 195; Cripps, Slow.Fade 
to Black. 62; Henri, Black Migration. 231. See also, Woodrow 
Wilson to Joseph P. Tumulty, April 28, 1915, in Wilson Papers, 
vol. 33, ed. Link, p. 86.
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lynching violated the nation's ideals and set the white South 
apart from the rest of the country and that indifference to 
the practice jeopardized the nation's moral well being.
The first of these lynchings took place in January 1915 
in Monticello, Georgia. As mentioned above, the New York 
Times condemned the lynching not so much because the practice 
was fundamentally wrong, but because it had gone too far. Don 
Barber, his son Jesse, and Ella and Eulla Charles had been 
arrested for forcibly ejecting from their home a police 
officer who suspected they were making moonshine. An 
"infuriated mob of hellish demons," as the New York Age 
described the lynching party, broke into the jailhouse dragged 
the four outside, hanged them from a tree, and riddled their 
bodies with bullets.66 Monticello "stripped bare" the 
Southern defense of lynching, leaving nothing but "naked 
brutality and savagery," James Weldon Johnson wrote. Unlike 
the Times. which attributed the lynching to an 
unrepresentative minority of Georgians and took seriously the 
Governor's offer of a $500 reward for the lynchers, black 
newspapers depicted the event as the "pleasant pastime" of the 
community's "BEST CITIZENS" and ridiculed the offer of a 
reward as disingenuous. "Whoever heard of [a] white man being 
convicted for lynching a colored person in Georgia?" the Afro 
asked. Where the New York Times saw "shame and indignation"
66 "Mob of Hundred White Men Are Incarnate Fiends in Death 
Bacchanalia," New York Age. Jan. 21, 1915, p. 1.
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all over the country, the Acre and the Afro saw indifference.
Except for a voice here and there, Age editorialist James 
Weldon Johnson wrote, America was, as usual, silent. "It is 
as though the nation's moral senses are numbed and 
paralyzed.1,67 Lynching thus could not be ignored by 
Northerners--all Americans were implicated.68
Monticello began one of the worst years for lynching in 
the twentieth century. With 50 blacks and 10 whites lynched 
in the South, 1915 saw the most lynchings since 1908.69 
Black newspaper accounts often attempted to show how the 
practice had become a part of Southern culture, participated 
in by most whites. In its report on the lynching of Will 
Stanley in Temple, Texas, the Chicago Defender reported that
hundreds of men, women, boys and girls . 
cheered as the victim went up in smoke. . . The 
streets were filled with pedestrians and
67James Weldon Johnson, "Is This Civilization?" New York 
Age. Jan. 21, 1915, p. 4; and untitled editorial, ibid.. Jan. 
30, 1915, p. 4. "How Long," Baltimore Afro-American. Jan. 23, 
1915, p. 4. "Serving Two Masters," Chicago Defender. Feb. 6, 
1915, p. 8. The Age did print a story on a "wave of 
indignation" over the lynching. See New York Age. Jan. 28, p. 
1 .
68Booker T. Washington, whose comments on the Monticello 
lynching had been solicited by the New York World, took an 
approach that was closer to that of the Times. He praised 
liberal Southerners who opposed lynching, allowed that the 
lynch victims had committed a crime that required punishment, 
and unlike black commentators who portrayed the lynching as 
yet one more in a long line of outrages, said he was "shocked 
beyond measure." He even suggested that the lynching did more 
harm to whites than blacks. See New York Age. Jan. 21, 1915, 
p. 1.
69Tolnay and Beck, Festival of Violence. Appendix C-3.
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automobiles loaded with fascinated onlookers.
Trees fringing the street on the side of the square 
nearest the burning were filled with boys, while 
scattered through the throngs were many young 
girls.70
This was no secretive crime committed under cover of darkness 
off in the woods, but a public event that took place in a 
"well lighted public square" with the entire community 
participating. In the Afro-American. Col. J. 0. Midnight, a 
traveling correspondent, whose columns appeared in several 
black newspapers under different names, described the cold 
calculation with which the crowd went about gathering wood for 
the fire to bum Stanley.11
The year's most sensationalized lynching--of a white 
man--took place in Georgia that summer. In mid-August, a mob 
broke into the jail cell of Leo Frank, whose death sentence 
for the murder of a teenage girl had recently been commuted to 
life in prison, drove him to a secluded spot and hanged him. 
The 1913 trial and conviction and subsequent appeals of the 
Jewish factory manager had received much attention in the 
nation's press, and by the time of his lynching, his case had 
become a cause celebre. The lynching received enormous
attention in daily newspapers across the country, appearing as 
the lead story in most northern dailies, including the New 
York Times, which devoted several pages to the story on August
70Chicago Defender. Aug. 7, 1915, p. l.
71Baltimore Afro-American. Aug. 7, 1915, p. 6.
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18. An editorial called the crime "the most atrocious 
lynching ever committed in any Southern state."72 Frank's 
skin color likely contributed to the editor's judgement, since 
no other aspect of the lynching set it apart.73
Ambivalent black editorialists, reporters, and columnists 
welcomed the great attention now focused on the crime of 
lynching while scolding the white press for caring more about 
the murder of one white man than the lynchings of thousands of 
blacks. Some of these commentators saw the Frank lynching as 
a medium through which black feelings and ideas about lynching 
and the South would be conveyed to white audiences. The New 
York Age said the lynching would serve the "great purpose" of 
fixing "the eye of the nation upon this bold fact, that 
Georgia and several of her sister states are not civilized, in 
the modem sense of the word. And this is something which 
innumerable lynchings and burnings of colored men, women and 
children have failed to do." Perhaps Americans would now be 
willing to do something to address the failure of the South to 
measure up to the ideals of American democracy. At the same 
time, editors could not help but criticize the white press's
72New York Times. Aug. 18, 1915, p. 10; see ibid.. Aug. 
17 for original story.
730n the Frank lynching, see Leonard Dinnerstein, The Leo 
Frank Case (Birmingham: Notable Trials Library, 1991) ; Nancy 
MacLean, "The Leo Frank Case Reconsidered: Gender and Sexual 
Politics in the Making of Reactionary Populism," Journal of 
American History. 78 (December 1991) , 917-48; and Eugene Levy, 
" ' Is the Jew a White Man?' : Press Reaction to the Leo Frank 
Case, 1913-1915," Phylon. 35 (June 1974), 212-22.
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greater interest in the lynching of a white man. Johnson 
compared the "bold" columns in the white press "crowded with 
every detail" of the Frank lynching with three "modest" lines 
about the lynching of three African Americans who had been 
arrested for poisoning mules. "The lynching of the three 
Negroes attracted no wider attention than did the original 
offense of poisoning the mules," Johnson added with bitter 
irony.74
The Chicago Defender blended its criticisms of the white 
press with its satisfaction that mainstream newspapers finally 
recognized the South as "a region of illiteracy, blatant self- 
righteousness, cruelty and violence." Welcoming the attention 
the case brought to lynching and the story1 s prominence on 
nearly every front page and on the lips of many prominent 
Americans, the paper ridiculed the Chicago Tribune1s belated 
criticism ("notwithstanding five-thousand Afro- 
Americans . . . lynched") of the state of Georgia. Columnist 
W. Allison Sweeney accused the Tribune of "RIDICULOUS 
hypocrisy."7S Black newspapers generally disagreed with 
those who criticized Frank's trial and protested his 
innocence, since the only other suspect was a black man. 
Sweeney and Johnson both said that it seemed unlikely that a
74James Weldon Johnson, "Once More Georgia, " New York Age. 
Aug. 26, 1915, p. 4.
75"Lynching a Real Crime at Last!" Chicago Defender. Aug. 
21, 1915, p. 1; and W. Allison Sweeney, "The South Has Always 
Been Backward," ibid.. p. 8.
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Southern jury would convict an innocent white man of murder 
with a black scapegoat so close at hand. In their comments on 
the Frank lynching, Sweeney, Johnson, and others were pleased 
not simply that the case would bring outrage against lynching, 
but that it would call attention to the deviance of the South 
from American civilization and ideals. The Cleveland Gazette 
reprinted an article on the lynching from a Milwaukee daily 
headlined "The South at the Bar." Black editors welcomed the 
outrage of Northern whites at Southern practices because it 
suggested a coming over to the belief that the South stood 
outside of and opposed to the norms of American 
civilization.76
White newspapers again paid some notice to a lynching-- 
this time of a black man--nine months later when 15,000 
citizens of Waco, Texas, turned out in broad daylight on the 
city's central square to watch or participate in the burning 
alive of Jesse Washington, a 17-year-old boy who had just been 
convicted of raping and killing a white woman. The event 
attracted more attention than any previous lynching, according 
to an NAACP official, and became a centerpiece of that 
organization's antilynching campaign.77
76Cleveland Gazette. Aug. 21, 1915, p. 2 and Aug. 28,
1915, p. 2; New York Age. March 25, 1915, p. 4 and May 6,
1915, p. 4, esp. July 1, 1915, p. 4. When the governor's life 
seemed to be in danger for having commuted Frank' s death 
sentence, one newspaper though whites would now discover that 
"the mob spirit knows not the limitations of the color-line." 
See Baltimore Afro-American Ledger. June 26, 1915, p. 4.
77Zagrando, NAACP Crusade Against Lynching. 30.
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Yet the media did not give Washington's lynching nearly 
as much attention as it gave to the killing of Frank. The New 
York Times reported on the Washington lynching only briefly 
the following day, on page four, and expressed its usual 
ambivalence in a May 17 editorial. The editor condemned the 
Waco community for bringing "disgrace and humiliation on their 
country as well as themselves," but added that Washington's 
alleged crime was "the one that goes furthest toward 
justifying resort to any measures of no matter what severity, 
so long as they are reasonably held to promise a deterrent 
effect." The worst aspect of the lynching, the editorial 
continued, was that outside observers would conclude that such 
things could take place in no "other land even pretending to 
be civilized. . . The assertion is probably not true, but to 
disprove it will be difficult."78 Black editors hoped to 
exploit such sensitivity to the impact of lynching on 
America1s image.
The Cleveland Gazette played to that sensitivity by 
linking all of American culture in the Waco horror. A front 
page account told how the lynchers dragged Jesse Washington's 
body through the streets, dismembered the corpse for 
souvenirs, and left its disembodied head to a group of "little 
boys" who sold the gold teeth for $5 apiece. "Waco is a 
center of American 'culture' in Texas, a great Southern
78New York Times. May 16, p. 4, col. 3; May 17, p. 10, 
col. 5.
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College Town," Che article continued. Yet in this "Christian 
city of 40,000 . . .  no responsible voice was raised in 
protest that bloody Monday."79 Institutions of religion and 
higher education were implicated in the deed because of their 
failure to stop it. Children were taught from an early age to 
act like fiends. The Gazette saw mob violence not as an 
aberration, but as part of the normal activity of Southern 
communities.
Lynching and American Foreign Policy
In their comments on Waco, the Defender and the Age 
juxtaposed lynching with America's foreign policy. The Wilson 
administration had landed troops in Haiti in 1915, starting an 
occupation that would last until 1934. Meanwhile, the 
administration was poised for an invasion of Mexico to restore 
order and would eventually enter the World War in Europe under 
the banner of promoting values of democracy, rule of law, and 
international justice. Before seeking to bring civilization 
abroad, the Defender suggested, the country should consider 
bringing it to Texas. "Why Mexico? Why bother about Germany 
or Japan? No civilized nation has disgraced itself with the 
above scenes in the past fifty years." In an editorial
79"That Waco Lynching," Cleveland Gazette. July 29, 1916,
p. 1.
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addressed to the presidential nominees, the writer suggested 
that the whole South be placed under martial law and appealed 
to the national sense of justice and honor in the eyes of the 
world. "Shall the American Republic be pointed at with scorn 
by the foreign powers as a barbarous nation?" James Weldon 
Johnson added:
We talk about helping Haiti and Santo Domingo and 
Mexico to rise to a higher level of civilization 
and development; it is enough to make the devil 
gasp in astonishment, seeing that we have in our 
own country such a community as Waco, Texas.80
Despite such sentiments, when the United States invaded 
Haiti in 1915, black newspapers actually gave cautious 
support, hoping the nation's good (Northern) side would 
prevail, but warning that its bad (Southern) side might make 
matters worse. The Age's Johnson favored intervention but 
warned that, given its own racial problems, the United States 
would have to take special care to convince the Haitians of 
its benevolent motives and that the mission would succeed only 
if guided by "American officials who are free from narrow and 
bitter race prejudice." Johnson was something of an expert on
""Civilization," Chicago Defender. May 19, 1916, p. [8] ; 
"To the Presidential Nominees," ibid.. June 10, p. [8]; James 
Weldon Johnson, "Chance for Humanity," New York Age, May 25, 
1916, p. 4. The Age drew a parallel between the nation's role 
as "protector of human rights before the world" and its 
toleration of lynching within its own borders in 1915. See 
New York Age. Aug. 5, 1915, p. 4. On black press reaction to 
previous U.S. adventures, see David J. Hellwig, "The Afro- 
American Press and United States Involvement in Cuba, 1902- 
1912," Mid America. 71 (April-July 1990), 135-45.
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Latin American affairs, having served as a U. S. consul in 
Venezuela and Nicaragua from 1906-1913. While supporting the 
intervention, Johnson could not help but wonder why Americans 
would seek to "abolish atrocities in Mexico and Nicaragua and 
Haiti, with examples of such inhumanity [within] our very 
doors."81 Like Johnson, the Defender approved of the U. S. 
occupation, but expressed doubts. Domestic racial policies 
proved that the action was not taken "for the love of the 
black man" in Haiti. "We await with interest the finale of 
the affair."ej African Americans would draw the parallels 
between domestic race relations and foreign policy even more 
forcefully and persistently during World War I, asking America 
to make the "south safe for the Negroes" instead of worrying 
about democracy in Europe.83 In drawing this parallel, 
editors sometimes seemed to veer toward the pessimistic 
conclusion that the racism that spawned lynching could not be 
overcome. The Savannah Tribune warned that "The Soul of 
America is dying from repeated and continued inertia" 
regarding lynching. The practice "de-humanized" the entire 
country, betrayed its political values, revealed the practice
81New York Age. Aug. 12, p. 4 and Sept. 2, 1915, p. 4.
“Chicago Defender. Aug. 14, 1915, p. 8. For an example 
of a black newspaper that opposed the Haiti intervention, see 
"Haiti," Washington Bee. Oct. 16, 1915, p. 4; and "The United 
States," ibid.. Oct. 23, 1915, p. 4.
“Boston Guardian fragment, circa October 1918, folder 91, 
box 5, William Monroe Trotter Papers, Boston University, Mugar 
Library; Stephen R. Fox, The Guardian of Boston: William 
Monroe Trotter (New York, 1970), 216-17.
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of Christianity to be a farce, even brought into question the 
nation's right to call itself civilized.84 In depressed 
moments like these, writers expressed a weariness and a 
sadness about it all. Roscoe Dunjee, editor of Oklahoma's 
Black Dispatch, could not look at an American flag "without 
remembering 4,000 blacks had been lynched" or hear a patriotic 
song without realizing that "the only portion which applies to 
blacks is that which says 'Land where our fathers died.1"88 
But such flights of pessimism never fully overcame optimism 
about America. Though ever critical of America's role as 
world advocate for democracy, most black journalists never 
dismissed it out of hand.
Embedded even in the editorials on lynching was a 
reverence for national ideals as articulated in the law, the 
Declaration of Independence, and the Constitution, and a 
guarded optimism--or at least the hope--that the North, 
Northerners, or the Federal government might apply those 
ideals to African Americans. Newspapers expressed these hopes 
by advocating and taking seriously the possibility of 
solutions to these problems like Federal antilynching laws and 
black migration to the North; by addressing appeals for action 
against lynching to Northerners or the Federal government; and
84Savannah Tribune. April 1, 1916.
85Dunjee quoted in William S. Sullins and Paul Parsons,
"Roscoe Dunjee: Crusading Editor of Oklahoma's Black Dispatch.
1915-1955," Journalism Quarterly. 69 (Spring 1992), 204-13.
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by heaping most of the blame for lynching on Southern culture 
and "Southern gentlemen" rather than on all white Americans. 
Further, by assuming that American involvement in Mexico and 
Haiti could be beneficial for those countries--especially 
black Haiti--editors like Johnson showed faith in the positive 
possibilities of America's true ideals while acknowledging and 
warning against the damage that its racist realities could do. 
Finally, by endorsing black participation in World War I at 
the same time they saw so clearly the nation's potentially 
fatal flaw, African-American newspapers showed a fundamental 
but hard-headed optimism about America.
In an editorial in the spring of 1918, the Age reprinted 
two headlines from the New York Tribune. one about the 
horrific lynching in Georgia of a pregnant black woman named 
Mary Turner, the other about the heroic actions of two black 
soldiers, Henry Johnson and Needham Roberts, on the 
battlefield in France.
The shame and the glory of America are at once 
strikingly set forth in the two articles printed 
under these diverse headlines. . . . How can any
fair-minded American read these two headlines 
without blushing for the public sentiment that can 
suffer such things to be?84
Johnson and other black editors relied on the optimistic 
proposition that "fair-minded" Americans could be made to 
blush, not simply out of sympathy for black victims, but at
"‘James Weldon Johnson, "Two Headlines," New York Age. May 
25, 1918, p. 4.
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seeing how summary executions of black people made a mockery 
of what America pretended to be and at seeing the contrast 
between lynching and the patriotic loyalty of African 
Americans. World War I would give these arguments greater 
weight than they had ever had before.
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CHAPTER 4
NATIONAL LOYALTY AND THE BLACK PRESS
The ideological becoming of a human being, in this 
view, is the process of selectively assimilating 
the words of others.
--M. M. Bakhtin1
As America approached and eventually entered World War I, 
national leaders began preparing the nation for participation 
by promoting a definition of loyalty which called individuals 
to place national duty ahead of personal desires or group 
considerations. Men like Woodrow Wilson and Theodore 
Roosevelt began preaching about self sacrifice and undivided 
loyalty and railed against selfishness and self-indulgence. 
How were African Americans to respond to these appeals? On 
one hand, they might reject the notion that they had a duty to 
a nation in which they experienced second class citizenship 
and often lacked the protection of the law. More likely, as 
they had done in all past American wars, African Americans 
might participate fully in the war, hoping that a grateful 
nation would return the favor by advancing black interests. 
After all, black participation in the Revolution had led the 
Northern states to abolish slavery, and black soldiers
*M. M. Bakhtin, The Dialogic Imagination, ed. Michael 
Holquist, trans. Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist (Austin: 
University of Texas Press, 1981), 341.
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fighting for the Union Army had helped to justify the
Emancipation Proclamation. Again in World War I African 
Americans would contribute admirably to the war effort. It 
was not clear, however, what reward, if any, they would 
receive in exchange. The black press tried to show that 
African Americans conformed to a demanding standard of loyalty 
that subordinated all other interests to national duty, yet 
still demand something in return.
This chapter looks at the way black newspapers handled 
"loyalty" and related words and concepts, like "preparedness, " 
"unity," and "Americanism," which became central to all
discussions of national issues during the period of World War 
I. They selectively assimilated those words, in Bakhtin's 
phrase, transforming them and deploying them in ways that 
would serve their own interests. The extent to which they 
succeeded is the extent to which they made the war itself an 
instrument of black advancement. But it was no easy task, 
because the white leaders who coined the phrases that would 
lead America into war never meant for them to advance the
interests of weak minority groups. In fact, quite the
opposite. In transforming "loyalty" and "Americanism" to 
their advantage, then, blacks faced an uphill struggle.
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The Demand for Lovaltv and the. Black Response
After the outbreak of war in Europe in August of 1914, 
some Americans began to worry about the loyalty of the 
nation's so-called hyphenated Americans, the approximately 30 
million first- and second-generation European immigrants. In 
particular, some feared, eight million German-Americans might 
not be willing to fight a war against their former homeland.2 
Such worries added fuel to a campaign that had been underway 
since the 1890s to "Americanize" these new immigrants.3 
Institutions as diverse as the Daughters of the American 
Revolution and Hull House had guided the Americanization 
campaign from a variety of motives, from helping the 
immigrants adjust to their new home to eradicating radicalism 
among the new population. Until the start of the European 
war, Americanization advocates like Prances Kellor focused 
mainly on offering night classes in the English language to 
new immigrants and lacked broad popular support.
By the summer of 1915, however, the divided loyalties of 
"hyphenated Americans" had become a major concern and Kellor 
headed up a new organization, the National Americanization 
Committee, supported by businessmen and political leaders and
2Daniel M. Smith, The Great Departure: The United States 
and World War I. 1914-1920 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1965) , 
2 .
3For an account of "Americanization" see John Higham, 
Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism. 1860- 
1925 (1963; New York: Atheneum, 1977), 234-63.
115
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
dedicated to "stimulating naturalization, breaking the 
immigrant's ties with the Old World, and teaching him an 
American culture."4 The phrase "Hyphenated Americanism" 
became associated with disloyalty. "There is no such thing as 
a hyphenated American who is a good American, " former 
president Theodore Roosevelt told the Knights of Columbus at 
a speech in Carnegie Hall in October of 1915. "The only man 
who is a good American is the man who is an American and 
nothing else."5 Though somewhat less zealous, Woodrow Wilson, 
too, sounded the alarm about hyphenates. In his annual 
message to Congress in December of 1915, he warned that 
foreign-born citizens "have poured the poison of disloyalty 
into the very arteries of our national life. . . . Such
creatures of passion, disloyalty, and anarchy must be crushed 
out."* Congress applauded these remarks enthusiastically.7
The issues of loyalty and Americanism became major themes 
of the presidential election of 1916. First as a candidate 
himself and then on the stump for Republican nominee Charles
4Higham, Strangers in the Land. 243. On Kellor, see 
Lucille O'Connell, "Kellor, Frances," in w n t . a h i American 
Women: The Modem Period, ed. Barbara Sicherman, et al.
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980), 393-95.
5Theodore Roosevelt, "Americanism, " in Fear God and Take 
Your Own Part (1916), vol. 20 of The Works of Theodore 
Roosevelt. ed. Hermann Hagedom (New York: Charles Scribner's 
Sons, 1925), 457.
*David M. Kennedy, Over Here: The First World War and 
American Society. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), 24.
7Arthur S. Link, Wilson: Confusions and Crises, 1915-1916 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), 37.
116
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Evans Hughes, Roosevelt advocated a military buildup, American 
entry into the war, and an extreme brand of nationalist 
conformity. Roosevelt saw something "sinister" in
identification with any but American nationality and argued 
that "hyphenated Americans," along with pacifists, war 
profiteers, and those who advocated peace at any price, came 
"perilously near being treasonable to this country." He 
declared, "I do not believe in hyphenated Americans. ... We 
have a right to ask all of these immigrants and the sons of 
these immigrants that they become Americans and nothing 
else."8 Wilson, too, called for national unity. Just before 
the Democratic convention in July, Wilson outlined his 
definition of loyal citizenship in a speech on "The American 
Spirit" to the Citizenship Convention, a meeting organized by 
the Bureau of Naturalization in Washington. Though concerned 
about German-Americans when he criticized "certain men" who 
"draw apart in spirit and in organization from the rest of us 
to accomplish some special object of their own," Wilson's 
message could be interpreted to apply to any ethnic minority 
with its own exclusive organizations. He asserted that 
forming ethnic organizations
is absolutely incompatible with the fundamental 
idea of loyalty, and that loyalty is not a self- 
pleasing virtue. I am not bound to be loyal to the 
United States to please myself. I am bound to be 
loyal to the United States because I live under its
8Theodore Roosevelt, Fear God and Take Your Own Part. 
330-31, 328.
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laws and am its citizen, and, whether it hurts me 
or whether it benefits me, I am obliged to be 
loyal. Loyalty means nothing unless it has at its 
heart the absolute principle of self-sacrifice. 
Loyalty means that you ought to be ready to 
sacrifice every interest that you have, and your 
life itself, if your country calls upon you to do 
so. And that is the sort of loyalty which ought to 
be inculcated into these newcomers--that they are 
not to be loyal only so long as they are pleased, 
but that, having once entered into this sacred 
relationship, they are bound to be loyal whether 
they are pleased or not; and that loyalty which is 
merely self-pleasing is only self-indulgence and 
selfishness.9
In a speech a few days later at the Washington Monument, 
Wilson added: "Disloyalty . . . must be absolutely crushed." 
At the same time, the Democratic national convention adopted 
a platform plank, drafted by Wilson himself and conceived as 
the centerpiece of the campaign, which promoted Americanism 
and denounced hyphenism.10
On some level, Wilson's and Roosevelt's formulations of 
national loyalty as incompatible with ethnic identity and 
superior to every other interest was antithetical to the 
interests of African Americans--if not downright impossible to 
implement. Oppressed as a group, they needed to agitate for 
redress as a group. Set apart because of their ethnic
9Woodrow Wilson, "An Address on the American Spirit," 
July 13, 1916, in The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, vol. 37, ed. 
Arthur S. Link (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), 
414-18.
10In spite of Wilson's intentions, the theme "he kept us 
out of war" supplanted Americanism as the dominant note of his 
reelection campaign. See Ray Stannard Baker, ed. Woodrow
Wilson, Life and Letters:__Facing War. 13.15.-19-12, vol. 6
(Garden City, NY: Doubleday, Doran & Co., 1937), 249-58.
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identity by whites, they could not simply decide to renounce 
their blackness or their African-ness. Yet, black newspapers 
strove to adopt as far as they could the language of 
Americanism and loyalty so pervasive in America during the 
years before and during World War I. African-Americans, they 
argued, had no divided loyalties, no homeland other than the 
United States to whom they owed allegiance, and no reason to 
be disloyal. Journalist Ralph Tyler, writing in the Appeal. 
a black weekly in St. Paul, called on blacks to use the term 
"colored American" rather than "Negro" or "Afro-American" as 
a way of de-emphasizing difference. "We are not Africans 
because we are native born and native sired Americans." The 
editor of the newspapers agreed, and called on all ethnics to 
"wipe out forevermore the hyphen in American citizenship."11 
The Baltimore Afro-American speculated that, "in view of the 
bad odor attached to hyphens," it might soon have to rename 
the paper "simply THE AMERICAN."12
In general, however, the black press saw the hyphen issue 
not as one requiring a change in black identity, but as one 
that highlighted the difference between the recent European 
immigrant, with his foreign languages and customs and
“Ralph W. Tyler, "Proper Name for Race Discussed," The 
Appeal. March 6, 1915, p. 1; ibid.. p. 2. The discussion of 
the issue continued. See also, ibid.. May l, 1915, pp. l, 2; 
June 5, 1915, p. 2; Aug. 7, 1915, p. 2; and Oct. 2, 1915, p. 
2 .
“Baltimore Afro-American. Dec. 11, 1915, p. 4. See also, 
ibid.. March 31, 1917, p. 4.
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attachments to European states, and the African American, who 
"is an American first, last and always."13 The New York Age 
came out in favor of forcing immigrants to learn English.14 
Hyphenated European immigrants, the Chicago Defender argued, 
had "sworn allegiance [to America] as a matter of form and .
. . would on the slightest provocation aid their fatherland
against their adopted home."15 African Americans, others 
argued, were farther removed from old world culture and 
politics, and could thus give their undivided loyalty to 
America. "Its language is our only tongue, and no hyphen 
bridges or qualifies our loyalty," one editorialist wrote.16 
Also unlike recent immigrants, African Americans had proven 
their loyalty by participating in all the nation's past wars,
“California Eagle. March 3, 1917, p. 1.
“New York Age. March 15, 1917, p. 4.
15"Our Defense Plan," Chicago Defender. Sept. 18, 1915, 
p. 10.
“Louisville Courier-Journal. quoted in Chicago Proafl.Ax, 
March 17, 1917, p. l. See also, Baltimore Afro-American.
March 31, 1917, p. 4. The Cleveland Gazette labeled Wilson's 
adoption of the hyphenate issue a transparent political ploy, 
but joined most other black newspapers in accepting the 
language of Americanism. The Gazette' s criticism of hyphenism 
was itself driven by partisan politics, since it singled out 
the Democrat Wilson while ignoring the far more impassioned 
rhetoric of the Republican Roosevelt. See Cleveland Gazette. 
Nov. 6, 1915, p. 2, and William A. Byrd, "Americanism,"
Cleveland Gazette. July 29, 1916, p.2.
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creating "the splendid illustrious record of the 'black 
Phalanx1 from Crispus Attucks and Bunker Hill to Carrizal."17
During the tense years leading up to American entry into 
the war, many black papers also supported preparedness, the 
campaign for a military build-up. Though the campaign was led 
by the politically conservative National Security League, 
which sought "to militarize American society" by building up 
the Army and Navy and instituting universal military training, 
some progressives, led again by Roosevelt, also clamored for 
preparedness.18 Roosevelt noted that abolitionists who were 
also peace advocates came to support the Civil War, and he 
compared opponents of preparedness to Tories in the 
Revolution, Copperheads in the Civil War, and even John Wilkes 
Booth, Lincoln's assassin. Patriotism required preparedness. 
"We must prepare ourselves against disaster by facing the fact 
that we are nearly impotent in military matters," he 
warned.19
17Califomia Eagle. March 17, 1917, p. l. The desire to 
keep the black war record intact was another reason for many 
editors to support the war effort. On similar themes, see 
also, for example, Baltimore Afro-American Ledger. Aug. 8, 
1914, p. 4; Appeal. June 24, 1916, p. 2; Savannah Tribune. 
July 1, 1916, p. 2; New York Age. April 5, 1917, p. 4; and 
Chicago Broad Ax. April 21, 1917, p. 1.
“Kennedy, Over Here. 31; Nathan Miller, Theodore
Roosevelt: A Life (New York: William Morrow, 1992), 540-52.
“Roosevelt's statement on abolitionists was made in a 
paper delivered to the American Sociological Congress in 
Washington, D.C., Dec. 28-30, 1914. See Theodore Roosevelt, 
The Writings of Theodore Roosevelt, ed. William H. Harbaugh 
(Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1967), 362. See also, Theodore 
Roosevelt, "Peace Insurance by Preparedness Against War," in
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Initially opposed to the idea, Wilson adopted in the 
summer of 1915 a policy of "reasonable preparedness," which 
called for a $500 million shipbuilding program, a small 
expansion of the regular Army, and the creation of a new 
reserve Army--distinct from the National Guard--of 400,000.20 
His preparedness address of Nov. 4, 1915 was met with
opposition from some leading progressives and a group of about 
fifty Congressmen, most of them former Populists from the 
South and West.21 Most of the black press, however, 
supported preparedness in one form or another.
Shortly after the President's proposal was submitted to 
Congress, the Western Negro Press Association issued a 
resolution "unqualifiedly" endorsing "reasonable 
preparedness." The same conference called for the training of 
black officers and soldiers and promised that blacks "can be 
trusted to come to the Nation's defense at any time."22 The 
New York Age, the Cleveland Gazette, and the Chicago Defender 
all endorsed preparedness while accusing some of those who 
opposed it of un-American sentiments. Pro-preparedness essays 
appearing in these newspapers tended to ignore the anti­
preparedness stand of Northern peace activists--who also often 
supported racial equality--while focusing their criticisms on
Fear God and Take Your Own Part. 349.
20Link, Wilson: Confusions and Crises. 15-18.
21Link, Wilson: Confusions and Crises. 23-30.
“Chicago Broad Ax. Jan. 8, 1916, p. 1.
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the Southern Democrats in Congress who threatened to block 
Wilson's plan. The Defender lumped the "non-American 'solid 
South'" together with "hyphenated Americans" whose opposition 
to preparedness was making the nation a coward in the eyes of 
the rest of the world.23 Similarly, the Gazette claimed that 
the main opponents to preparedness were Southern Democrats and 
that only the "patriotic action of the republicans in 
congress" would provide for the nation's defense. Editor 
Smith, who favored preparedness, also argued that Wilson 
himself lacked the patriotic fervor to challenge Congress and 
push through the preparedness bill.24 Nonetheless, Congress 
approved Wilson's preparedness legislation substantively 
intact during the following summer.2S By standing on the 
side of military preparedness these editorialists situated 
themselves in a position of loyalty to the country, while 
placing their mostly Southern enemies on the side of 
disloyalty, with the "hyphenated Americans."
These black writers were trying to bend to their own 
purpose words that were intended to crush dissent, bolster
23"Our Defense Plan," Chicago Defender. Sept. 18, 1915, 
p. 10; and "A Step Backward," ibid.. Nov. 4, 1916, p. 12.
24"Wilson and Congress," Cleveland Gazette, March 4, 1916, 
p. 2. See also, ibid.. Nov. 6, 1915, p. 2. On Smith's
support of preparedness, see ibid.. May 13, 1916, p. 2.
“The major alteration Congress made was to eliminate the 
proposed national reserve force in favor of strengthening the 
existing National Guard. Southern Democrats had opposed the 
national force because they "feared formation of Negro 
volunteer units." See Link, Wilson: Confusions and Crises. 
327-38.
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national unity, militarize the nation, and facilitate the 
process of making war. They showed blacks were more American 
than most citizens, were prepared to fight and die to defend 
their country, and had an unblemished record of loyalty that 
they intended to keep intact in the current crisis. Yet, if 
these words proved to be of use to blacks for their own cause 
of equal rights, they also retained some of the intent of the 
white leaders who used them first. They placed their black 
users squarely behind a war they might legitimately have 
opposed and in some cases led them to put the cause of the war 
ahead of black freedom and civil rights.
Some editorial writers gave the impression that they 
were supporting the war against their better judgement. Just 
before the declaration of war in 1917, for example, The Appeal 
expressed hope that America had the "wisdom" to stay out of 
the "horrible, inhuman, unnecessary war." But if it did not, 
the editorial continued, blacks would participate, "as they 
have never been disloyal to their native land."26 Similarly, 
the California Eagle opposed the war but promised blacks would 
nevertheless be loyal. Even before Wilson's declaration of 
war, the Eagle, which would later condemn Du Bois's editorial 
calling on blacks to "close ranks," warned that "this is not 
the time for adverse expressions of non-patriotic
26"Are We to Get Into the War?" The Appeal. March 3, 1917,
p. 2.
124
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
sentiments."27 Rev. William A. Byrd wrote in the Cleveland 
Gazette that the war was being fought "not for national honor 
but for gain and sordid greediness" and that "the right or 
wrong of the matter has never entered the consideration." 
Yet, Byrd continued, African Americans "are going to take our 
part in this damnable war ... to keep this country in safety 
from the foe without."28 The Chicago Broad Ax denounced the 
war as economically motivated, but, in an echo of Wilson's 
"American Spirit" address called on blacks "in this hour of 
peril" to "forget--all thoughts of self or race."29
That call was in keeping with Wilson's claim that a 
citizen had to subordinate "every interest that you have" to 
national loyalty. But most African American writers could not 
really do it. A month after calling blacks to forget all 
thoughts of race, the Broad Ax said that if blacks were to 
fight in Europe, "we must be given some assurances of better 
treatment at home."30 This dilemma dogged black writers 
throughout the war. How could they live up to Wilson's
27Califomia Eagle. Feb. 3 and March 17, 1917.
28William A. Byrd, "The War," Cleveland Gazette. April 7, 
1917, p. 2.
29Chicago Broad Ax. March 31, 1917, p. 1; and ibid.. March 
17, 1917. For a similarly ambivalent response by William 
Monroe Trotter, see Stephen R. Fox, The Guardian of Boston: 
William Monroe Trotter (New York: Atheneum, 1970), 215-7.
30Louisville Courier-Journal. quoted with approval in 
Chicago Broad Ax. March 17, 1917, p. 1. See also the quote of 
Rev. George C. Powell of the Abyssinian Baptist Church of New 
York City, in ibid.. April 28, 1917, p. 1.
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demanding standard of loyalty while continuing to work for the 
advancement of black human rights?
The New York Age, the Crisis, and the Chicago Defender, 
supported the war from the beginning and advocated unqualified 
black participation.31 Still, even these publications could 
not "forget--all thoughts of self or race" (though the Crisis 
advised doing so in 1918) . They struggled to distinguish 
their group actions from those of disloyal hyphenates and the 
unreconstructed South or to justify them as at one with the 
war aims. In reality the two things sometimes came into
conflict. Just before the election of 1916, the New York
Age1 s James Weldon Johnson violated Wilson's principle of 
national unity and Roosevelt's dictum that to vote in an 
ethnic block is "to be a traitor to American institutions" by 
advising blacks to cast their votes solely on the basis of 
racial interests. "Nevertheless," Johnson added,
in taking up this issue, we are not guilty of 
hyphenism. We are not seeking the advantage of any 
outside power at the expense of the United States.
We are simply seeking, as Americans of undivided 
loyalty, to maintain our status and rights as 
citizens. If we do not succeed in doing that, all
other issues will be of no importance to us.32
"See, for example, "First in Everything America, " Chicago 
Defender. May 6, 1916, p. 8.
"Roosevelt, "Americanism," 459. James Weldon Johnson, 
"Wake Up Colored Men! Wake Up!" New York Aae. Nov. 2, 1916, p. 
4.
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Johnson tried to make a distinction between black group 
interests and hyphenates' divided loyalties and to find a way 
to fulfill the requirements of the prevailing definition of 
national loyalty, which became increasingly powerful as the 
war approached, while still making the case for black 
advancement.
Throughout the nineteen-month period of America1s 
participation in the war, situations arose which highlighted 
the conflict between national and group interests. Like 
Johnson's explanation of his voting strategy, the black press 
tried each time to reconcile the two things, but never fully 
resolved the contradictions. The rest of this chapter 
investigates three situations in which one or more black 
newspapers confronted this dilemma and examines the way that 
they tried to resolve it.
A Rumor of Rebellion
Around the time of America's entry into World War I, 
newspapers began to report that German agents were attempting 
to foment rebellion among African Americans. Such reports 
might hurt or help African Americans. On one hand, they 
threatened to contradict the black press's claims of black 
loyalty. On the other, they highlighted the sources of 
blacks' frustrations, showed that the nation could not take
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their loyalty for granted, and might lead the Federal 
government to do something to ease those frustrations to 
ensure black loyalty. Indeed, these and other reports of 
black "unrest" would finally lead the government to just such 
a strategy. As America entered the war in the spring of 1917, 
black newspapers faced a dilemma over how to cover this story. 
Should they dismiss it as false, thereby preserving blacks' 
reputation for loyalty to the Federal government, or should 
they use it as a lever to argue that some kind of action must 
be taken to assure black enthusiasm for the war effort. Black 
editors handled the story in a variety of ways, but some tried 
simultaneously to dismiss the story of a German plot among the 
black population and use it as evidence of the need for racial 
justice. Among these, the efforts of the Baltimore Afro- 
American were most prodigious.
The Afro was typical of many black newspapers in terms 
of its unenthusiastic support of the war, its continued 
demands for black rights during the war, and its celebration 
of black loyalty. After the outbreak of war in Europe in 
August of 1914, the Afro, like many other black papers, 
condemned the war, seeing in it evidence of Western 
"barbarism" and of the failure of European Christianity.33
33Baltimore Afro-American Ledger. Aug. 15, 1914, p. 4.
For an example of a similar reaction to the outbreak of war in 
1914, see editorials written by T. Thomas Fortune, New York 
Age. Aug. 3 & 27, 1914, p. 4. Both Fortune and Afro editorial 
writer George Bragg were replaced by editorialists with more 
secular viewpoints during the following year.
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"The present war ought to teach us that only that nation is 
blessed who has the Lord for their God, not on their tongue 
but in their hearts and lives."34
The Afro1 s moralistic response to the war was in keeping 
with the tone of the editorial page under the supervision of 
George F. Bragg, Jr., a veteran newspaperman and Episcopal 
minister, "whose religiosity suffused the newspaper from 1900 
to 1915. "3S But although Bragg saw the war as a travesty, he 
also saw from the beginning its potential as a vehicle to 
publicize black loyalty. Days after the outbreak of war in 
Europe, a black "subject of the British crown" stopped by the 
newspaper's office on his way to the front. An editorial 
described the visit and concluded that "when the call is made 
to defend the honor of the flag, whether it is in America, 
England, or elsewhere, the colored man can be depended upon to 
answer when his name is called."34 Bragg was typical of 
black editors who sought to display the loyalty of blacks not 
only to the United States, but to the Allied nations as well.37
“Baltimore Afro-American Ledger. Sept. 5, 1914, p. 4.
“Hayward Farrar, "See What the Afro says: The Baltimore 
Afro-American. 1892-1950," Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 
1983, 17-18, 77.
36Baltimore Afro-American Ledger. Aug. 8, 1914, p. 4.
Another editorial on the same page cites blacks1 loyalty in 
past U. S. wars.
37See, for example, "African Troops in the War, " New York
Age. Sept. 3, 1914, p. 4; "American Press Fair to Colored
Troops at Front," Cleveland Gazette. July 29, 1916, p. 2;
Savannah Tribune. April 2, 1916, p. 4 and July 1, 1916, p. 1.
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With Bragg's departure in 1915, the Afro1s tone became 
"decidedly less religious."38 Nonetheless in the 32 months 
between the outbreak of the war and America's entry, the Afro- 
American continued to see no particularly compelling 
justification for the war, even while applauding and 
encouraging black support of or participation in it. An 
editorial asserted that the European War had won "increased 
respect" for the fighting abilities of Africans--France and 
other participants had called up troops from African colonies. 
Their loyalty and effectiveness in battle would "do more to 
bring about universal brotherhood than anything that has 
happened during the past century," the editorial continued.39 
The good of the war could be found not in beating the Germans 
or saving the Allies, but in advancing black interests by 
putting black loyalty on display and winning national 
goodwill. The Afro consistently demanded that blacks be 
guaranteed the right to serve in the armed forces, and yet 
even after Wilson had outlined his idealistic war aims and on 
the eve of a declaration of war, the Afro continued to see the 
war itself as senseless.40 In March of 1917, an editorial 
declared that it was "too bad" that U. S. participation had
38Farrar, "See What The Afro Says," 25-6.
3Baltimore Afro-American. Feb. 3, 1917, p. 4.
40On demands that blacks be allowed to fight, see "A Negro 
Regiment," Baltimore Afro-American. June 3, 1916, p. 4; and 
"Let Us Unite," ibid.. April 14, 1917, p. 4.
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become inevitable and that "all able bodied men would be 
called for a useless sacrifice on European battlefields.1141
While praising blacks' unconditional loyalty in past 
wars, the Afro began to suggest they would demand better 
treatment before fighting this time. In 1916, the paper 
suggested that some blacks were unwilling to fight in the war 
with Mexico because " ' a country good enough to die for ought 
to be good enough to vote in.1"42 In February of the 
following year, the paper suggested that before "thoughtful 
colored people" rushed to volunteer in the war they were 
waiting to see if the Federal government would take any action 
against mob violence and lynching in the South. They were 
asking: "'Why should I be shot in protesting against
ruthlessness on the European continent, when there is 
ruthlessness in my home town that I cannot protest too loudly 
against?'"43 In March, the paper went even further, 
suggesting that blacks had "'no duties where we have no 
rights.'"44 Unconditional loyalty, it seemed, had meant
41Baltimore Afro-American. March 10, 1917, p. 4.
42The editorial quoted the Los Angeles Tribune. 
"Unwilling to Fight," Baltimore Afro-American. July 8, 1916, 
p. 4.
43"Ruthlessness, " Baltimore Afro-American. Feb. 10, 1917,
p. 4.
44By putting the phrase in quotation marks, in both the 
headline and the text, the Afro seemed to be quoting the 
"patriots of 1776," who recognized their duties to England 
only so long as England recognized American rights. See "'We 
Have No Duties Where We Have No Rights, '" Baltimore Afro- 
American. March 17, 1917, p. 4.
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little to the government in the past, and this time blacks 
should stop acting "puppy-like." The lessons of the Jews in 
Russia and the Irish in the United Kingdom seemed clear now. 
They were "endangering" the war effort in those countries by
employing the opportunity while the nation is at 
war to get themselves heard on the question of 
human rights.
In the United States there is no better time 
[t]han now for [t]he Negro to urge his claims as 
never before.45
Each African American should "regard his loyalty as an asset, 
to be sold at the price of citizenship."46
It was around the time of Wilson's war message that 
reports began circulating that German spies were seeking to 
incite rebellion among African Americans, and again the Afro 
tried to use the story both to reaffirm black loyalty and to 
point out that blacks would not follow their white fellow- 
citizens into war like loyal puppies.47 The Afro reported 
that German spies had met with blacks in Greensboro, North
45"Now is the Time," Baltimore Afro-American. March 24, 
1917, p. 4. See also, "On Compromisers," ibid.. March 31,
1917, p. 4.
46"Why This Particular Honor?" Baltimore Afro-American, 
March 31, 1917, p. 4.
47For what one postal censor regarded as a "concrete 
example" of propaganda circulating among blacks in the South, 
see U. S. Postal Censorship memorandum, New York, Sept. 7,
1918, in Federal Surveillance of Afro-Americans (1917-1925): 
The First World War, the Red Scare, and the Garvev Movement, 
ed. Theodore Komweibel, Jr. (Frederick, Md. : University 
Publications of America, 1986, microfilm), reel 19, frames 
396-7.
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Carolina, and New York City in order to carry out the "Plan of 
San Diego, " a plot allegedly devised sometime in 1915 by a 
group of Germans, unnamed African-American leaders, and 
Mexicans in San Diego to seize the state of Texas and hand it 
over to blacks. Articles in the Afro argued that the attempt 
to generate a rebellion among blacks had failed miserably. 
One article quoted J. Thomas Newsome, a black attorney from 
Newport News, Virginia, who pointed out that blacks had even 
been loyal to the Confederate South during the Civil War "when 
the Negro had his greatest opportunity to strike at the very 
heart of the South." The recent selection of a black regiment 
to guard the capitol, black soldiers1 service in the war with 
Mexico, and the recent pledges of support of the war by black 
leaders and black organizations also demonstrated the loyalty 
of African Americans and the unlikelihood of any disloyal 
activities among them during the war. Though the newspaper 
did not dispute the story that German agents had approached 
blacks, it condemned any attempt to use the story "to make the 
great mass of colored people in this country appear disloyal 
to the United States. "4“
But at the same time the Afro asserted black loyalty in 
the face of foreign agents, it simultaneously pointed out that 
simmering resentments among blacks had made the German plot 
plausible. If blacks were the most loyal of any ethnic group
‘“Baltimore Afro-American. April 7, 1917, p. 1; April 14, 
1917, p. 1; April 21, 1917, p. 1; and May 5, 1917, p. 1.
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in America, they were "also the most proscribed against," and 
had more reason than any other group to rebel. In an 
editorial, the Afro listed the many reasons blacks would have 
to be disloyal, and even reported that "some few colored men 
in Georgia and Alabama have grown sick and tired of 
repression, and accepted the offer of the German agents to 
stir up a rebellion in the Southern States with the hope of 
winning complete franchise, freedom and political and social 
equality." But the author quickly added that most African 
Americans remained loyal and rejected the enticement "as far 
as can be ascertained." Further, the editorial claimed that
the larger number of sensible people recognize the 
folly of a rebellion that is not sure of success.
Now is the time to continue our insistence upon 
right, and now is the time to demand guarantees 
before going to war willingly, BUT NOW IS NOT THE 
TIME FOR REBELLION. 1,49
The Afro1s response to rumors of black rebellion 
reflected a deep ambivalence about whether to characterize 
black loyalty as rock solid or in danger of erosion. Harry 
Smith's Cleveland Gazette also took the occasion to reaffirm 
black loyalty, pointing out that any German agents working 
among blacks in the South would "have found, and quickly too, 
that, 'Negroes' have too much pride in the flag, for which 
they have given their life's blood, to give such traitorous
49"No Time Now for Rebellion, " Baltimore Afro-American. 
April 7, 1917, p. 4. For a similar response to the German 
Agent story, see the National Equal Rights League statement, 
ibid.. April 21, 1917, p. 1.
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action any serious consideration." Blacks supported the war 
out of pure national loyalty: "Because we stand for the flag 
and our nation and because here is our home." Smith also 
pointed out, however, that African Americans had good reason 
to rebel: "Underlying the reasons for the attempts of the
Germans to stir up Southern 'Negroes' against the government, 
is the fact that they have not been accorded near all to which 
they are entitled as American citizens." Further, Smith 
seemed to contradict his simple "pride in the flag" theory of 
black loyalty by characterizing black support of the war as a 
means of self-preservation and group advancement. African
Americans, he said, would not be "so unwise as to allow
discretion to be cast to the winds and seek an unpropitious 
moment to show resentment." Smith concluded that "every Afro- 
American" viewed the war as an opportunity for "bettering our 
position" by showing "the metal of which we are made, " and 
thus shaping public "sentiment." Thus, the Gazette argued 
that blacks supported the war out of both pure national 
loyalty and group interest, while at the same time warning 
that they might not support it at all. Like the Afro, the
Gazette's contradictions regarding the rumors of rebellion
reflected an ongoing tension between conditional and 
unconditional loyalty, between pledges of loyalty and threats 
of rebellion.50
so"The Afro-American Loyal," Cleveland Gazette. April 14, 
1917, p. 2. William Monroe Trotter of the Boston Guardian 
also both discounted reports of black disloyalty and warned
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Such tension was glossed over in the Crisis1 s one 
editorial on the subject. In the editorial, "Loyalty," Du 
Bois wrote off the rumor as a plot by the "Bourbon South" to 
stop the black migration to the North. Fearful of losing its 
cheap labor supply, Du Bois argued, "the slave-thinking South" 
hoped to persuade the nation that blacks were a menace and 
that martial law must be declared to keep them in their place. 
Du Bois then deflected the accusation of disloyalty back onto 
the white South, saying Negroes had been far more loyal to the 
national government. The African American "never has been a 
disloyal rebel. He never fought for slavery in a land of 
Liberty. He never nullified the basic principles of democracy 
because he hated the people whom he had hurt!" Du Bois wrote. 
Blacks would remain loyal despite being "enslaved, raped and 
despised." Unlike the Afro and the Gazette, he did not hint 
that they might be disloyal for those reasons.51
The tension between loyalty and discontent reappeared in 
the Afro in other contexts during the early months of the war. 
Some editorials expressed a lack of enthusiasm for the war or 
poked fun at exuberant expressions of patriotic sentiment. 
When Roscoe Conkling Simmons, a traveling promotor of the 
Chicago Defender, said he "'would rather be an American 
colored man, waving about my head the Red, White and Blue,
that discrimination would affect the level of black 
participation. See Fox, Guardian of Boston. 215-16.
51 "Loyalty, " Crisis. 14 (May 1917), 8.
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than sit at the feast of a king, ' " the Afro remarked that "he 
can only be speaking for himself. Most people would rather 
eat with a king than wave a flag."” Blacks generally stayed 
away from the local Fourth of July celebrations that year, an 
editorial explained, because "only the lighthearted and 
frivolous in times like these can 1 overflow with patriotism 
for a government that is so chary in protecting its citizens. '
. . . Thru their tears they [blacks] cannot see the difference 
between German Frightfulness and American Frightfulness. " But 
the author added that African Americans were nonetheless doing 
their share for the war effort.” When Secretary of War 
Newton Baker announced that black men would be drafted into 
segregated units, and at the same time appealed to them to 
enlist as non-combatant laborers, the Afro advised them to 
refuse.
We believe that the colored American . . . should
be the first to enlist to take his part and do his 
share. But if the government he would serve is 
willing to bow to a hated prejudice and treat him 
as less than a man, then there is nothing else for 
him to do but stay at home and go on with his usual 
work. . . .  He need not be in a hurry when his 
country refuses to accept that service except under
“Baltimore Afro-American. May 25, 1917, p. 4. See also, 
ibid.. May 19, 1917, p. 4.
s3Bal.tJjAgJje_-A.to^Am£fJ-Jiaa, July 7, 1917, p. 4. For an
editorial that calls Navy Secretary Josephus Daniels' proposal 
to name a warship after Frederick Douglass "a hollow mockery" 
because blacks would not be allowed to serve on it, see 
"Secretary Daniels' Joke," Baltimore Afro-American. August 9, 
1918, p. 4.
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conditions which would make him less a man, much
less a soldier.54
As late as June of 1918, Contributing Editor William H. Weaver 
warned that continued lynchings threatened to erode blacks' 
"commendable" patience, loyalty, and patriotism.55
But the Afro also called for a "universal upholding of 
hands" against the common enemy in Europe, and ran front page 
stories on Negro groups pledging loyalty, examples of black 
patriotism which appeared in the white press, and the 
eagerness of black men to volunteer for the Army.56 In the 
fall of 1917, an editorial said "there must be no slackers." 
The time had come for "hard work" and "service and sacrifice 
. . . to carry on the war."57 In that first year of the war, 
the emphasis in the Afro was on the threats to black loyalty. 
But as government surveillance increased, the emphasis shifted 
to displaying and encouraging black loyalty. By mid-1918, the 
tone of the editorial page had changed dramatically. By the 
late summer of 1918, the Afro was urging its readers to help
54"Southern Bourbons Win," Baltimore Afro-American. Sept. 
15, 1917, p. 4.
“William H. Weaver, "Weekly Views and Comments," 
Baltimore Afro-American. June 28, 1918, p. 4.
56"Let Us Unite, " Baltimore Afro-American. April 14, 1917, 
p. 4; "Pledge Loyalty on Part of Negro," ibid.. April 21, 
1917, p. 1; "Colored Citizens Show Patriotism," ibid.. April 
28, 1917, p. 1; "They Want to be Soldier Boys," ibid., May 26, 
1917, p. l. See also, "Emphasize Loyalty And Preparedness," 
ibid.. May 5, 1917, p. 1.
“Untitled editorial, Baltimore Afro-American. Oct. 27, 
1917, p. 4.
138
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
the war effort in any way they could, whether by subscribing 
to the liberty loan or opening their homes to stateside 
soldiers. "Help--or by not helping handicap your boy at the 
front," the paper declared. The paper even recommended 
drafting striking workers into the Army to force them to do 
their part.58 Unlike many black newspapers, the Afro 
defended Du Bois's "Close Ranks" editorial.59
Government surveillance and threats of censorship and 
even prosecution clearly had an impact on the Afro, whose 
publisher, John H. Murphy, was visited by government agents 
late in 1917.60 As one editorial put it, the Afro and other 
black newspapers had been muzzled by the Federal government 
and it was "sensible to recognize that the colored 
publications must leave many things unsaid until after the 
war."81 Thus, threats of black disloyalty disappeared from 
the newspaper in the latter half of the war. But in the 
absence of blatant coercion, and during months immediately 
preceding and following American entry into the war, the Afro 
walked a narrow line between affirming loyalty and threatening 
rebellion, hoping in this way to make the war an instrument of 
black advancement.
“Baltimore Afro-American. Aug. 9, 1918, p.4; ibid.. Sept. 
27, 1918, p.4; ibid.. Sept. 20, 1918, p. 4.
5Baltimore Afca-.American, July 26, 1918, p. 4.
“Mark Ellis, "America's Black Press, 1914-1918," History 
Today. 41 (September 1991), 20-27, esp. 25.
“Baltimore Afro-American. July 26, 1918, p. 4.
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The "Jim Crow" Officer Training Camp
A second dilemma also took shape well before censorship 
became a factor. Early in 1917, Joel Spingam, the white 
NAACP chairman who had become a major in the Army intelligence 
service, persuaded the military brass to establish a camp to 
train African Americans as Army officers. Promoting the camp 
in letters to black newspapers, Spingam argued that the Army 
was not likely to integrate the officer corps in time for the 
war, so blacks had to chose between segregated officer 
training and no such training at all. As leader of America' s 
most influential civil rights organization, Spingam opposed 
segregation, but he believed the advantages of the camp 
outweighed the evils of establishing one more separate 
institution. Blacks could not afford, he argued, to miss out 
on opportunities for advancement that came with military 
service. He reassured militant black editors like Harry Smith 
that "common sense and patriotism need not be inconsistent 
with the most radical conception of the rights of every group 
of American citizens."62 Editors who criticized the camp
62"Dr. J. E. Spingam Explains, " Cleveland Gazette. March 
10, 1917, p. 1. On the officer training camp for blacks, see
Charles Flint Kellogg, The National Association_
Advancement of Colored People. 250-256; Joyce B. Ross, J . E.
Spinaam and the Rise of .-the NAACP, 13.11-1939 (New York:
Atheneum, 1972), 92-95; David Levering Lewis, W. E. B. Du
Bois: Biography of a Race (New York: Henry Holt, 1993), 528- 
32; Arthur E. Barbeau and Florette Henri, The Unknown 
Soldiers: Black American Troops in World War X (Philadelphia:
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opposed separate institutions, but they were even more 
incensed that it had been proposed by blacks (and their 
representatives) themselves.
Like Spingam, Du Bois defended the camp as an imperfect 
means to a worthwhile end. African Americans regularly made 
such bargains, he argued, by participating in "Jim Crow" 
institutions when they were banned from white versions. "We 
continually submit to segregated schools, 'Jim Crow' cars, and 
isolation because it would be suicide to go uneducated, stay 
at home, and live in the 'tenderloin.'" In this case, the 
choice was between the "insult of a separate camp and the 
irreparable injury" of getting no black officers. Another 
reason for accepting the camp was to bolster claims of black 
loyalty while countering the rumors that African Americans 
were plotting with German spies. Opposition to the camp would 
"add treason and rebellion to the other grounds on which the 
South urges discrimination against" blacks.63
The training camp presented a "damnable dilemma," as Du 
Bois put it, which characterized nearly every effort by 
African Americans to participate in the American war effort. 
Whether they tried to join the Army as soldiers or officers, 
serve in the Red Cross as nurses or doctors, or take part in 
the liberty loan, blacks faced segregation and discrimination.
Temple University Press, 1974), 56-57.
“See Crisis. 13 (April, 1917), 270-71. See also, Du
Bois, Autobiography. 265-266.
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Why should black people subject themselves to such 
humiliations to support a war against a distant enemy? some 
wondered aloud. On the other hand, how could black people lay 
claim to self-sacrificing loyalty if they did not participate 
in the war fully? And as Du Bois pointed out, the rumors of 
rebellion made it even more important to affirm such loyalty. 
But the camp controversy involved more than the principle of 
when and how to accept segregated institutions. Individuals 
who generally agreed in their opposition to segregation 
disagreed over the issue of how to make a public response to 
the camp proposal. Most of the mainstream civil rights 
advocates (including most black editors) were integrationists 
who nonetheless supported separate black institutions. All 
could agree, for example, that public transportation and 
Federal offices should be integrated. On the other hand, no 
one denounced the black press or black colleges as Jim Crow 
institutions. Other institutions caused greater disagreement, 
however. Both Harry Smith and William Monroe Trotter 
denounced the establishment of black YMCAs and Hospitals in 
Northern cities.64 Most other integrationists, including
64Trotter opposed and helped to keep out of Boston an all- 
black hospital, a black hotel, and a black YMCA. "The minute 
we accept a separate branch or place, the segregationists get 
the argument on us that we practice and accept it when we can 
get money or position out of it. We ruin our cause by 
advising separation,1 he said. See William Monroe Trotter to 
A. P. Russell, June 9, 1920, box 3, A. P. Russell papers,
Boston University. On Harry Smith's opposition to separate 
YMCAs and hospitals, see "The 'Jim Crow' Y.M.C.A.," Cleveland 
Gazette. March 3, 1918, p. 2; and "New Segregation Efforts," 
ibid.. July 3, 1915, p. 2.
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Robert Abbott of the Defender. James Weldon Johnson of the Age
and even an agitator like Calvin Chase of the Washington Bee, 
using the same logic as Du Bois, usually supported the 
formation of such institutions as necessary evils which would 
contribute to the quality of black life as long as African 
Americans were excluded from white institutions. Du Bois's 
response to the segregated Officer Training Camp is in line 
with the latter approach.65
But other black newspapers which often tolerated black 
institutions demurred in this case. The Chicago Defender 
responded to Spingam's proposal with an editorial entitled 
"'Jim-Crow' Training Camps--No! "66 But the emphatic "No!"
“According to one editor, the black YMCA was "a blessing 
to the community and should receive the unbiased support of 
every race-loving Negro in the city and country." See 
Pittsburgh Courier. Nov. 11, 1911, p. 4. See also, "Opposes 
Colored Y.M.C.A.'s," Indianapolis Freeman. Feb. 11, 1911, p. 
4. For an editorial which supported the segregated camp, see 
Norfolk Journal and Guide. May 12, 1917, p. 4. On Johnson's 
support of a separate YMCA, see Eugene Levy, James Weldon 
Johnson: Black Leader. Black Voice (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1973), 156. The Bee was ambivalent about the 
training camp: "colored people should never accept any
separation or distinction based on race alone, except where 
they must do so, in spite of objection and protest, and then 
only with the understanding that they do so until they can 
change conditions." See "The Summer Military Camp," 
Washington Bee. March 24, 1917, p. 4. But the paper
consistently defended segregated public schools. See Hal S. 
Chase, "Chase, W[illiam] Calvin," Dictionary of American Negro 
Biography, ed. Rayford Logan (W. W. Norton, 1982), 100.
“Henry Louis Gates, Jr. talks about how, in African- 
American literature, writers repeat phrases "inside quotation 
marks in order to reverse or undermine pretended meaning, 
constituting an implicit parody of a subject's complicity." 
As Bakhtin puts it, "the word with a sideward glance at 
someone else's hostile word." Gates calls the process 
"signifyin(g)." Gates and Bakhtin quoted in Dale E. Peterson,
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masked a keen ambiguity. Less than a year earlier, the paper 
had supported the "lesser evil" of training black officers for 
black troops, and throughout 1917 it called on blacks to 
volunteer for military service in the segregated Army. The 
newspaper even chastised blacks for not showing more 
enthusiasm. Yet in April of 1917, the Defender not only 
rejected Spingam's "Jim Crow" camp, it also rejected separate 
black regiments led by white officers. Since the paper did 
not also call for blacks to oppose the war, or refuse to 
participate, it is unclear what the editorial intended that 
black men should do.67 The Defender1 s position was therefore 
more rhetorical than practical. It let white America know 
that Afro-Americans opposed this kind of segregation.
The Defender and the Cleveland Gazette both suggested 
that if blacks declined to sign onto the 0. T. C., the 
government might end segregation in the armed forces once 
casualties began to mount and black help became more 
crucial.68 Smith also argued that instead of training new 
recruits, the Army should promote black career soldiers to the
"Response and Call: The African American Dialogue With
Bakhtin," American Literature. 65 (December 1993), 765-66.
67'"Jim Crow' Training Camps--No!," Chicago Defender. 
April 7, 1917, p. 10. "A Little Previous," ibid. . Aug. 19,
1916, p. 12. For examples of the Defender' s call to black 
participation, see editorials in ibid.. April 28, 1917, [p. 
10]; May 19, 1917, p. 10; Nov. 3, 1917, p. 12.
68"Dr. Spingam's Army Call," Cleveland Gazette. March 10,
1917, p. 2; and "'Jim Crow' Training Camps--No!," Chicago 
Defender. April 7, 1917, p. 10.
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ranks of officers.69 But Smith opposed the camp mainly
because he did not want blacks to be perceived as endorsing
segregation. It was "bad enough to have segregated . . .
military training camps FORCED on us by the government, but 
infinitely worse to ASK for them."70 Like the Defender's 
opposition to the camp, Smith's was incongruous with his 
otherwise generally strong support for the war. He backed 
preparedness fully, cheered Ohio's Army recruitment campaign, 
and publicized evidence of black loyalty--including 
participation in the military and the purchasing of war 
bonds.71 Smith openly discussed his dilemma back in the
beginning of 1916 when he expressed a "lack of desire to
plead" with Wilson for a greater number of blacks regiments 
and a reluctance to see black troops participate in Wilson's 
war with Mexico. Yet, he noted, if they did participate in 
that war, he would be proud if they performed well; and he was 
not inclined to oppose the NAACP's efforts to expand black
69"Dr. Spingam's Explanation," Cleveland Gazette. March 
10, 1917, p. 2.
70Untitled editorial, Cleveland Gazette. June 9, 1917, p.
2 .
710n Smith's cheerleading Ohio recruitment and pushing war 
stamps, see Cleveland Gazette. May 11, 1918, p. 2. On
comparison of loyal blacks with disloyal socialists and 
members of the Industrial Workers of the World, see "Patriots 
Disfranchised," ibid.. April 13, 1918, p. 2. Smith also
endorsed the governor of North Carolina's statement that "'in 
this crucial hour,'" the African American could be "'counted 
upon to do his full part.'" See "Patting 'Ham' on the Back" 
Cleveland Gazette. April 14, 1917, p. 2.
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participation in the Army.72 In fact, the Gazette came to 
accept and support the camp once established, calling it
"historic" and predicting it would give each participant a 
"proud heritage to pass down to one's children's children."73
Another initial opponent of the camp, the Baltimore Afro- 
American. reconciled opposition to it with national loyalty by 
comparing opponents to patriots of the Revolutionary War, who 
were loyal citizens until "England disfranchised her colonies, 
so to speak and treated them in much the same way that Uncle 
Sam treats his colored citizens." At that moment, the
Revolutionary generation proclaimed:
'We have no duties where we have no rights, it were 
cowardly to believe otherwise. ' ... In the spirit 
of those same patriots, whose children we are, we 
say the Negro who speaks of duties where he has no 
rights, places himself in the position where he may 
deserve the name--a moral coward.
Until they got their rights, blacks' only duty would be to 
fight for their own freedom.74 Like the Defender and the 
Gazette, the Afro predicted that when the nation needed blacks 
badly enough, it would be forced to give them equal
opportunity in the military service.75 However, once the
72"Army Enlistment Barrier," Cleveland Gazette. April 1,
1916, p. 2.
73Cleveland Gazette. June 2, 1917, p. 1.
74"We Have No Duties Where We Have No Rights," Baltimore
Afro-American. March 17, 1917, p. 4.
7S"0n Compromisers," Baltimore Afro-American. March 31,
1917.
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separate training camp became a reality, the Afro, too, began 
to support it. If black officers fought for democracy in 
France and then returned home to fight for it in the South, 
"then the 'Jim Crow' camp will not have been tolerated in 
vain, " a May editorial conceded. Again, the real problem with 
the camp had been that blacks and their advocates had asked
for it themselves: "Better to be forced into it than to ask
for it. The people will accept this sub-citizenship, not
because they want to, but because they must."76
Similarly, the Washington Bee. the New York News, the
Appeal. the Indianapolis Freeman, and the New York Age
objected less to the camp itself than to the fact that blacks 
themselves or their white friends would advocate segregation. 
"We do not deem it wise on our part to voluntarily segregate 
ourselves or permit our white friends to segregate us," the 
Age explained. A recent War Department bulletin on military 
training had said nothing about segregated training and
neither should the NAACP. Those opposed to the camp seemed to 
fear that if they asked for segregated officer training
themselves, it would legitimize the practice of "Jim Crow." 
Opposing the camp rhetorically, while supporting it in
76"O.R.T.C. Now a Fact," Baltimore Afro-American. May 19, 
1917, p. 4. On the newspaper's support of the camp, see 
"O.R.T.C," ibid.. May 26, 1917, p. 4.
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practice, these black writers sought to protest segregation 
while maintaining their loyalty as American citizens.77
By May of 1917, 470 black college men had applied for 
admission to the black officer training camp, located in Des 
Moines, Iowa. Prominent black colleges like Hampton Institute 
and Fisk University cooperated with the call for volunteers, 
and the camp opened in Des Moines in July with 1,250 
candidates.78 Like the Afro, most opponents seemed to come 
around to the camp after it had become a reality. Even 
William Monroe Trotter's newspaper, the Guardian. for example, 
proudly announced later in the war that 107 colored men, one 
from nearly every state, had received commissions.79 Even 
Spingam had to admit that the black press' s "bold and manly" 
denunciation of the camp was necessary. "I should not want 
the first reaction to be anything else than what it is," he 
told Du Bois. The critical response let America know blacks 
did not accept unequal status and opposed the principle of 
segregation and that the segregated camp was no favor of 
America to blacks, but rather the other way around. In light
77"The Summer Military Camp," Washington Bee. March 24, 
1917, p. 4; "Speak for Yourself," ibid.. April 17, 1917, p. 4; 
New York Age. March 22, 1917, p. 4; ibid.. March 1, 1917, p. 
4; ibid.. March 15, 1917, p.4; and Appeal. March 3, 1917, p. 
2 .
78Savannah Tribune. March 31, 1917, p. 4; Washington Bee. 
May 19, 1917, p. 4; Norfolk Journal and Guide. May 12, 1917, 
p. 4; Ross, J. E. Spingam and the Rise of.-the NAACP. 84-97; 
Barbeau and Henri, The Unknown Soldiers. 56-59.
79Boston Guardian fragment. Oct. 31, 1918, Trotter Papers.
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of this stated opposition, their eventual support of the camp 
highlighted the self-sacrificing nature of black loyalty to 
the nation.
Houston!
Soon after the training camp controversy faded, events 
again tested the black press's ability to find just the right 
balance between militancy and loyalty. On the evening of 
August 23, about 100 black soldiers marched in formation from 
Camp Logan toward downtown Houston, Texas, intent on 
revenge.80 Since they had arrived in the city on July 28 to 
guard the camp during a construction project, the 654 black 
members of the Third Battalion, Twenty-fourth Infantry had 
chafed at racist epithets hurled by workers at the camp, Jim 
Crow restrictions in streetcars and other public facilities, 
and, especially, police brutality. On the afternoon of the 
twenty-third, a black soldier was badly beaten and arrested 
after he tried to rescue a black woman from an assault by a 
notorious police officer, Lee Sparks. When Corporal Charles 
w. Baltimore, a provost guard and a "model soldier," inquired 
about the arrest, Sparks struck him over the head and then
80On the Houston riot, see Robert V. Haynes, A Night of 
Violence: The Houston Riot of 1917 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana 
State University Press, 1976).
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fired his gun as the soldier tried to run away (Sparks denied 
striking Baltimore and said he had fired into the ground) .Sl
The story of the two soldiers' arrests--embellished by 
rumors that Baltimore had been killed--quickly filtered back 
into camp and ignited resentments that had been smoldering for 
weeks. After Corporal Baltimore had been returned to camp, 
the officer in charge, Major Kneeland S. Snow, ordered the men 
confined to camp until morning. When Snow ordered the men to 
turn in their weapons, some refused, seized supplies of 
ammunition, and began firing in the air. Fearful that a mob 
of white rioters was approaching, the soldiers fell in line 
behind Sergeant Vida Henry and marched out of camp.
Unlike the white rioters in East St. Louis a month 
earlier, the soldiers did not wantonly destroy property, but 
marched deliberately into town with a specific purpose in 
mind--to take revenge on police officers and street car 
conductors.82 Before the march finally ended in disarray and 
with the deaths of several unintended victims, including a 
teenage boy and two white soldiers mistaken for uniformed 
police officers, the rioters killed four police officers, 
including Sparks' partner, Rufus Daniels, and two civilians 
who were acting as police. In two hours of marching and 
shooting, the soldiers killed 15 whites and seriously injured
81Haynes, A Night of Violence. 96.
82Haynes, A Night of Violence. 140-41.
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12 others, one of whom, another policeman, later died.63 
When the mutineers disbanded, some slipped back into camp 
while others found shelter in black homes or otherwise sought 
cover. Eventually, authorities rounded up all the soldiers 
and sent the entire battalion by train to a camp in Columbus, 
New Mexico, to await courts martial.
Some of the soldiers were unrepentant. Anonymous notes 
dropped from the train on its way to Columbus, picked up by 
dutiful citizens and passed on to military authorities, 
express righteous satisfaction at having shot up Houston. 
"We done our part in Houston and are on our way to Columbus, 
New Mexico,1 read one note, picked up by a resident of Fort 
Bend and passed along to the military. Another such note 
warned:
The people of Houston--Remember the 23rd of August,
1917. At 8:30 the Twenty-fourth Infantry gave 
Houston their first military blowout. The citizens 
didn't know what a volley was until that night.
They didn't know that a 30 U.S. magazine rifle 
could shoot so hard. Volley fire! Volley fire!8*
It is easy to imagine that African Americans throughout the 
country, accustomed to reading in sickening detail about white 
attacks on blacks or regularly subjected to the same kinds of 
insults that Camp Logan soldiers encountered in Houston, might 
share the satisfaction expressed in these notes.
83Haynes, A Night of Violence. 167-8.
84Quoted in Haynes, A Night of Violence. 193.
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At the same time, however, most of the white American 
media condemned the soldiers actions. Even nominal allies of 
African Americans saw Houston as "one of the most disgraceful 
mutinies of American troops in our history." The Outlook. 
"Theodore Roosevelt's editorial spokesman," urged that the 
offending soldiers be executed swiftly so as to obtain the 
maximum deterrent effect.85 The journal also advised "Negro 
leaders" to speak out forcefully in condemnation of the 
mutiny, to "visit upon these Negro mutineers the same 
unanimous condemnation which the white race, North and South, 
visited upon the white rioters of East St. Louis." If black 
leaders failed to so "vindicate their loyalty," America might 
decide against entrusting the defense of the nation to black 
officers and soldiers.86 Even Oswald Villard's Nation 
asserted that the conduct of local authorities did not justify 
the Houston mutiny and called for the "severest 
punishment.1187 Lamenting that "innocent persons were 
slaughtered," the New York Times advised the government to 
show "no sign of leniency" toward the mutineers. While the 
Times offered mild criticism of the South for persecuting 
black soldiers, it recommended avoiding the problem by sending
8S0n the Outlook as Theodore Roosevelt's spokesman, see
Link, Wilson; Campaigns for Progressivism and Peace. 1916-
1917. 391.
86"The Houston Mutiny," Outlook. 5 Sept. 1917, 10-11.
8'Nation. 30 Aug. 1917, 212-13.
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black troops to camps in the North, a solution frequently- 
offered by whites and sometimes by blacks.86
In formulating a response to Houston, black newspapers
encountered one of the most excruciating dilemmas of the war. 
"It is difficult for one of Negro blood to write of Houston," 
Du Bois agonized. On one hand, black soldiers had 
demonstrated in practice the kind of defiant militancy that 
many newspapers had advocated in theory. On the other hand, 
their actions seemed to belie the papers' persistent claim 
that the loyalty of black citizens in general and black 
soldiers in particular could be utterly relied upon. Du Bois 
dared to suggest only obliquely that African Americans might 
approve of the mutiny. "Our hands tremble to rise and exult,
our lips strive to cry," he wrote. But to exult at the mutiny
of a battalion of American soldiers would certainly undermine 
the image of loyalty Du Bois and others wanted to foster. 
Thus he added: "And yet our hands are not raised in 
exultation; and yet our lips are silent."69
Most editors in the black press knew that commenting on 
Houston was for them a dangerous proposition and so treated it 
gingerly. After the execution of 13 of the mutineers in
66"The Houston Outbreak," New York Times. Aug. 25, 1917, 
p. 6. See also, House Resolution 131, by Rep. McLemore, which 
asked the secretary of war to return the mutineers to Houston 
for trial and protested against sending black soldiers to the 
South, in Congressional Record 65th Cong., 1st sess., 1917, 
55, pt. 6-8:
""Houston," Crisis 14 (Oct. 1917), 284-5.
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December in San Antonio, Texas, Harry Smith expressed what 
must have been the sentiment of many African Americans: "We 
simply dare not start to try to express our feelings and those 
of our people as a result of that terrible affair."90 It was 
a wise choice. When the Baltimore Afro-American referred to 
the soldiers executed in December of 1917 as martyrs, the 
Justice Department called editor John H. Murphy into a local 
office where he promised to "eliminate such stuff hereafter 
from his paper."91 The only case of a black publisher jailed 
under the Espionage Act came as a result of an article on the 
Houston affair. In the Nov. 24 edition of the San Antonio 
Inquirer. editor G. W. Bouldin published a letter from a black 
Austin, Texas, woman in support of the soldiers. C. L. 
Threadgill-Dennis, a student and some-time instructor in 
domestic science at Tillotsen College in Austin, urged the 
soldiers to "rest assured that every [Negro] woman in all this 
land of ours . . . reveres you, she honors you." The letter 
continued:
We would rather see you shot by the highest 
tribunal of the United States Army because you 
dared protect a Negro woman from the insult of a 
southern brute in the form of a policeman, than to 
have you forced to go to Europe to fight for a 
liberty you can not enjoy.
Negro women regret that you mutinied, and we 
are sorry you spilt innocent blood, but we are not
"Cleveland Gazette. Dec. 15, 1917, p. 4.
"Quoted in Mark Ellis, "America's Black Press, 1914-18," 
History Today. 41 (Sept. 1991), 20-27, esp. 25.
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sorry that five southern policeman's bones now 
bleach in the graves of Houston, Tex.
It is far better that you be shot for having 
tried to protect a Negro woman, than to have you 
die a natural death in the trenches of Europe, 
fighting to make the world safe for a democracy 
that you can't enjoy. On your way to the Training 
Camps you are jim-crowed. Every insult that can be 
heaped upon you, you have to take, or be tried by 
court-martial if you resent it.
The author went on to list a number of recent instances when 
blacks were insulted by whites in Austin and could have used 
the protection of the 24th Infantry. She reassured the 
condemned soldiers that they were dying for "the most sacred 
thing on earth to any racet, ] even the southern white man, his 
daughter's, his wife's, his mother's[,] his sister's[,] his 
neighbor's sister's [, ] protection from insult."92 Like other 
blacks who commented on the riot, Threadgill-Dennis expressed 
regret at the loss of innocent life. Unlike them, however, 
she ignored Du Bois's warning against exultation. Crossing 
this boundary proved too much for the authorities. The 
newspaper's editor, Bouldin, was found to have made "an 
unlawful attempt to cause insubordination," a violation of 
Title I, Section 3 of the Espionage Act, and was eventually 
sentenced to two years in Leavenworth Federal penitentiary. 
His plight likely served as a warning to other black 
editors .93
92See report by Willard Utley, "In re San Antonio 
Inquirer," San Antonio, Texas, Nov. 27, 1917, in Federal 
Surveillance 9:903-4.
93Ellis, "America's Black Press," 26.
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For the most part, the black press suppressed the impulse 
to praise the mutineers, or to laud their actions. Nor did 
black writers unanimously condemn the mutineers. Instead, 
they walked a narrow line, condemning the mutiny while also 
explaining it.
A few, including the Chicago Broad Ax and the Cleveland 
Gazette, declined to condemn the mutiny, but most echoed the 
white press's denunciation of it. As Du Bois put it, "We ask 
no mitigation of their punishment. They broke the law. They 
must suffer."94 The Chicago Defender, so eager to praise 
blacks who fought back against lynchers or rioters, condemned 
the soldiers' actions and counseled blacks in general to turn 
the other cheek. "Because a white man stoops to throw mud at 
us is no reason why we should roll in the mire with them, " an 
editorial advised. In a foreshadowing of Du Bois's "Close 
Ranks" editorial, the Defender called on blacks to "put our 
whole heart and soul into the task of aiding our government to 
crush the enemy."95 Unlike most of the black press, the
94"Houston," Crisis 14 (Oct. 1917), 284-5.
9STo confuse matters more, the same editorial concluded 
with an oblique warning to whites who provoke mob violence: 
"what the white man starts, the Colored man unquestionably 
will finish." See "In the Enemy's Camp," Chicago Defender. 
Sept. l, 1917, [p. 12] . The Cleveland Advocate said every
colored man in America regretted the mutiny, but at the same 
time was "tired" of the "wholesale" executions of black 
soldiers who allegedly participated. "Yet," an editorial 
added, "we are standing and will continue to stand by the 
flag, ready to protect its graceful folds with the last drop 
of our blood. . . . Was there ever a more sublime patriotism?" 
See "That Texas Affair," Cleveland Advocate Sept. 1, 1917, p. 
6; and "Tired of Wholesale Killing," ibid.. Jan. 12, 1918 p.
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Pittsburgh Courier did not object to the execution of 13 of 
the accused mutineers that December. "Mutiny and murder are 
crimes that merit death upon conviction," an editorial 
proclaimed. "Soldiers who participate in lawlessness must 
take the consequences."96 Even the militant, socialist 
Messenger, while arguing that "taunts, insults and abuses" had 
been "unsparingly heaped upon" black soldiers, added: "We do 
not advocate or condone criminality or lawlessness among 
Negroes. We condemn it."97
But the obligatory condemnations of the mutiny were 
scarce compared to the explanations of how the soldiers were 
provoked. Editorialists and reporters sought to show that the 
soldiers had been pushed to a point where any normal person 
would have retaliated. While it was "regrettable that the 
soldiers so far forgot themselves as to spill innocent blood," 
the Afro-American conceded, "yet there is another side to the 
controversy.” The participation of so many soldiers 
illustrated "how great the provocation must have been."98 A 
Gazette reporter felt the need to invent more provocations
8.
96In the same editorial, the Courier also criticized 
"crackers" for abusing black soldiers in every southern town. 
Quoted in Andrew Buni, Robert L. Vann of the Pittsburgh 
Courier: Politics and Black Journalism (Pittsburgh: University 
of Pittsburgh Press, 1974), 105.
97"The Rioting of Negro Soldiers," Messenger (Nov. 1917),
p. 6.
98"The Houston Uprising," Baltimore Afro-American. Sept. 
1, 1917, p. 4.
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than actually existed by claiming that the mutiny had been 
preceded by the killing of a black soldier by a white mob.59 
The Chicago Defender speculated that, if white soldiers had 
suffered the same insults as blacks soldiers in Houston, the 
response would have been much more "horrible and ghastly." 
Blacks could tolerate more because of "a bigger and more 
generous heart" than most men. But despite the Defender1 s 
attempt to reassert the press's claim of black tolerance and 
almost superhuman loyalty and patriotism, that paper and 
several others had to concede that African-Americans were 
"just human" after all, and that their national loyalty and 
tolerance of indignities had limits. "A man," the Age pointed 
out, "whether he be black or white, is a human being before he 
is a soldier."100
If black soldiers had been so mercilessly provoked, 
greater condemnation should be heaped on the provokers than on 
the soldiers. Black newspapers tried to pin the guilt for the 
mutiny on racist Southerners--not only in Houston, but all
"Cleveland Gazette. Dec. 15, 1917, p. l.
100"In the Enemy's Camp," Chicago Defender. Sept. 1, 1917, 
[p. 12] . James Weldon Johnson, "Houston," New York Age. Aug. 
30, 1917, p. 4. See also, "The Rioting of Negro Soldiers," 
Messenger (Nov. 1917), 6. On the Pittsburgh Courier's use of 
"human" in this context, see Andrew Buni, Robert L. Vann of 
the Pittsburgh: Politics and Black Journalism (Pittsburgh: 
University of Pittsburgh Press, 1974) , 105. The Defender used 
"human" in a similar context, see "Our Responsibilities," 
Chicago Defender. April 4, 1918, p. 16. Other references to 
the provocations suffered by the soldiers include Broad Ax. 
Sept. 1, 1917, p. 1; Cleveland Gazette. Sept. 8, 1917, pp. 1, 
2; and "That Texas Affair," Cleveland Advocate. Sept. 1, 1917,
p. 6.
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over the South. They opposed the calling up of black soldiers 
and had goaded black troops in a number of places.101 In its 
long editorial on Houston, the Defender linked Houston's 
provocateurs to those in the South who had failed to reconcile 
themselves to the Union's victory in the Civil War. These 
Southerners were not only hostile to blacks' rights, but also 
lacked loyalty to the Federal government. "The true patriots 
are found in the north; the south has a handful." It was this 
lack of true patriotism that led Southerners to goad into 
mutiny "one of the most efficient and orderly forces in the 
regular service."102 The Pittsburgh Courier argued that 
black soldiers suffered "unbearable abuse" in every Southern 
town in which they were stationed.103 The Gazette, one of 
the least apologetic of the papers in responding to the riot, 
blamed it on a "Texas mob of lynch-murderers." Editor Smith 
even blamed the executions, carried out by the Federal 
government, on the South, which was "determined to drive every 
bit of loyalty and patriotism from us with all these 'military 
hangings.'"104 "Quartering Negro troops in the South is 
equivalent to sending them into the enemy's country with the
101On tensions between black soldiers and civilians, see 
Barbeau and Henri, Unknown Soldiers. 38ff.
102"In the Enemy's Camp," Chicago Defender. Sept. 1, 1917, 
[p. 12] .
103See Buni, Robert L. Vann of the Pittsburgh Courier.
105.
io«„pive More Sentenced to Die," Cleveland Gazette. Jan. 
1, 1918, p. 2.
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difference that they are forbidden to exercise the right of 
self-protection," the Age editorialized. Persecution of black 
soldiers came as a result not only of the South's hatred of 
blacks but also of its lingering hatred, dating back to the 
confederacy, of the Federal government.
There is no use in seeking to disguise the fact 
that the United States uniform is not held in high 
favor in all parts of the South. Despite recent 
protestations of patriotism there remains a remnant 
of the spirit of Secession, carefully fostered, 
which cannot abide the flavor of Federal authority. 
When that authority is embodied in the black 
soldier, the combination brings to the surface all 
the venom and bitterness of the unreconstructed 
rebel and domineering slave driver of the past 
assiduously instilled into the present 
generation.105
Clearly, the South had not sacrificed "every interest" to the 
national good, as Wilson had demanded in the presidential 
campaign of 1916. Thus, Houston became not an attack of black 
soldiers on American citizens, but an attack by the 
unreconstructed and disloyal South simultaneously on the Union 
and African Americans. As they sought to reinterpret the war 
to show black loyalty, the black press sought to reinterpret 
Houston to show the disloyalty of the South.
Editors and writers in the black press who selectively 
assimilated the words of American wartime loyalty sometimes 
managed to turn that language to their own uses and against
105 it Fix the Responsibility," New York Age. Aug. 30, 1917,
p. 4.
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the racist South. They highlighted a long tradition of black 
loyalty to the Federal government which contrasted sharply 
with the South's longstanding opposition to it. At the same 
time, the use of words which implied unconditional loyalty 
shaped the "ideological becoming" of editors' in ways 
sometimes contradictory (or at least extraneous) to the 
pursuit of racial justice. It led some to back the war 
despite principled opposition to it; to assert that all blacks 
would be loyal though they may have little reason to be; to 
underplay signs of growing black militancy; to call for 
participation of African Americans in every aspect of the war, 
no matter how ill treated they were in the process; to hedge 
in their defense of black soldiers who struck out at Southern 
racism.
The more extreme examples of accommodation and the more 
unequivocal proclamations of loyalty, especially after 1917, 
were likely the result not simply of editors' freely choosing 
to display black loyalty, but also of the government's 
coercive censorship program (which will be discussed in 
chapter 6) . But even in the face of coercion, the black press 
continued to use such weapons as it could to bend the war to 
black purposes. As the threat of black disloyalty became an 
increasingly untenable lever for demanding racial justice 
during the war, another important strategy--one which carried 
fewer dangers and caused less ambiguity--remained feasible and 
useful. When America entered the war in 1917, President
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Woodrow Wilson defined the conflict as a crusade for human 
rights and gave black journalists a new set of words to 
assimilate into their own ideology of racial equality. If 
America wanted to be taken seriously as world guardian of 
humanitarian values, black editorial writers argued, it could 
not continue to deny basic human rights to its own people. By 
the summer of 1918, Wilson himself would have to admit that 
they had a point.
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CHAPTER 5
MAKING THE WORLD AND AMERICA SAFE FOR DEMOCRACY
If America defeats the south, the world will 
believe what we are preaching, a world made safe 
through democracy.
--William A. Byrd1
As America moved toward war in January of 1917, Woodrow 
Wilson appeared before the Senate to outline his vision of 
what would become his stated war aim: "Peace without victory." 
Speaking "on behalf of humanity" and a nation that had been 
established to "show mankind the way to liberty," he outlined 
a path to a just and lasting peace, a peace between equals, 
not one imposed by victors on the vanquished. Underlying 
Wilson's vision of a new world order was the principle that 
"governments derive all their just powers from the consent of 
the governed." Wilson saw in these "American principles" "no 
breach in either our traditions or our policy as a nation, but 
a fulfillment, rather, of all that we have professed or 
striven for." Three months later he asked Congress to wage a 
war "for the ultimate peace of the world and for the 
liberation of its peoples. . . . The world," he said, in
perhaps the most memorable phrase of the war, "must be made
l"Why Democratic Party Should be Defeated Now and in 
1920," Cleveland Gazette. Oct. 5, 1918, p. 1.
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safe for democracy."2 It was a phrase the black press would 
make ample use of.
Despite serious Republican opposition to the notion of 
"peace without victory" and Wilson's plans to establish a 
League of Nations, most Americans reacted favorably to both 
speeches. "Never before, it seemed, had a single speech 
evoked such overwhelming and almost unanimous praise in the 
United States," Wilson's biographer, Arthur S. Link, wrote of 
the first speech. "Never before, it seemed, had a single 
speaker succeeded so well in enunciating the political ideals 
and principles by which the American people in their better 
moments had tried to live."2
Though the black press did not join in the "unanimous 
praise" of Wilson's vision, black writers came to embrace the 
idea that in better moments Americans could champion 
democratic principles. At the same time, black writers did 
not lose sight of Americans' worse moments, when they mocked 
these principles with their treatment of African Americans. 
Still, the act of fighting a war for democracy might force 
America to see the contrast between its better and worse
2"An Address to the Senate," Jan. 22, 1917, The Papers of 
Woodrow Wilson, ed. Arthur S. Link (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1982), vol. 40, 533-39. "An Address to a 
Joint Session of Congress," April 2, 1917, ibid.. vol. 41, 
525.
3Arthur S. Link, Wilson: Campaigns for Progressivism and 
Peace (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), 269-70. 
See also, Ray Stannard Baker, Woodrow Wilson. Life and 
Letters: Facing War. 1915-1917 (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 
Doran & Co., 1937), 430.
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moments and the contradictions between its ideals and its 
racial practices. In short, like other groups, including 
progressives, conservative organizations, "and special 
interest groups of all kinds," in David M. Kennedy's phrase, 
the black press "sought to invest America's role in the war 
with their preferred meaning, and to turn the crisis to their 
particular advantage."4 Wilson had given black writers, 
publisher, and editors a powerful weapon for doing so. They 
were able to highlight the gap between Wilson's wartime 
rhetoric and the treatment of African Americans; conflate the 
war against autocracy in Europe with their war against racism 
at home; paint the oppressors of blacks--especially white 
Southerners--as enemies of America no less than Germany and 
the Central Powers; and lay claim to being part of that 
America which upheld true democratic principles and was the 
source of Wilson's war aims. Thus, the war could 
simultaneously defeat Prussians in Europe and wipe out 
"Prussianism" in the South.
The enthusiastic response of so many Americans to 
Wilson's humanitarian idealism encouraged blacks in their hope 
that the war would awaken the dormant spirit of justice in 
America. Then again, few white commentators connected 
democracy and self-determination in Europe with justice for
4David M. Kennedy, Over Here: The First World War and 
American Society (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), 
50, 53.
165
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
blacks in America. Theodore Roosevelt, who had thought a 
peace without victory would "set back the march of 
civilization, " called the war declaration "unanswerable" and 
on a par "with the great state papers of Washington and 
Lincoln."5 Conservative Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, also an 
opponent, in January, of both peace without victory and the 
League of Nations, now thought Wilson had "expressed in the 
loftiest manner possible the sentiments of the American 
people." Only six senators and fifty representatives voted 
against the declaration of war, despite opposition among the 
general population that Link described as "deep and wide."6
White editorial writers ignored or glossed over the 
contradictions--which were painfully obvious to black 
writers--between America's war aims and its treatment of 
African Americans. The New Republic, in proclaiming in the 
wake of Wilson's war address that "the cause of the Allies is 
now unmistakably the cause of liberalism," conceded that the 
allied nations "have much to do before their own houses are 
put in order, and democracy is by no means secure among those 
who proclaim it." But the editorial did not dwell on or 
specify the Allies' faults--much less America's. Instead, it 
predicted that the entry of the United States along with the 
participation of a now Czar-free Russia would "be a stimulus
5Nathan Miller, Theodore Roosevelt: A Life (New York: 
William Morrow & Co., 1992), 554-55.
6Link, Wilson: Campaigns for Proaressivism and Peace.
269, Lodge quoted, 426, 430, 429 n. 103.
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to democrats everywhere" and called Wilson the world's "most 
liberal statesman in high office"--notwithstanding his 
regressive race policies.7 The liberal Nation agreed that the 
President was qualified to make the world "a fit place for 
civilized man to live in."8 The New York Tribune, usually a 
critic of Wilson, praised the address lavishly as coming near 
to "the ideal of the American people, the ideal of a President 
who should lead."9 The World' s Work compared the World War 
to the American Civil War--both were struggles for human 
freedom. But the magazine did not address the incomplete 
nature of the humanitarian aspects of the North's victory in 
that earlier struggle.10
Democracy for Whom?
African Americans, on the other hand, saw the supreme 
irony in the prospect of the United States fighting a war for 
democracy. The failure of the Civil War to provide full 
freedoms for blacks, along with Wilson's own dismal record on
7"The Great Decision," The New Republic. 7 April 1917, 
279-80.
""The Decision for War," Nation. 5 April 1917, 388.
’Quoted in Link, Wilson: Campaigns for Progressivism and
fisasa» 428.
10"America in the Battle Line of Democracy, " World's Work. 
April 1917, 581-86. See also, "Why-This is America's War," 
ibid.. May 1917, 9.
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race, made the administration's war aims dubious. Even so, 
black newspaper editors, columnists, and reporters did not 
reject outright the idea of an American crusade for world 
justice. Instead, they sought to expand the scope of Wilson's 
aims to include democracy for all peoples, especially for 
blacks in America. Black newspapers' editorials exposed the 
irony of Wilson's messages by pointing out the hypocrisy of 
exporting to Europe democratic freedoms that Wilson himself 
had a hand in denying to African Americans at home. Further, 
they seized on Wilson's language of rights and equality, 
appropriating it and the war itself for their own interests.
After Wilson's January "peace without victory" speech, 
the Chicago Defender and the Baltimore Afro-American noted the 
discrepancy between Wilson's pledge to bring government by 
consent of the governed to Europe and the disfranchisement of 
blacks in the American South. Wilson himself held office 
"because in more than a dozen states colored men [who could be 
expected to vote Republican] were prevented from casting their 
ballots," the Afro claimed, and added "'physician heal 
thyself.'"11 The Defender seized the language of both Wilson 
and the American Revolution, by pointing out that because they 
were denied the right to give "their consent to the way that 
they are governed, " African-Americans in the South were
“"Consistency Thou Art a Jewel," Afro-American Ledger. 
Jan. 27, 1917, p. 4.
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victims of "taxation without representation." The author 
called attention to the difference between pledging democracy 
to peoples in foreign lands and applying it "locally," where 
Wilson actually had the power to enforce it. "Somehow it 
doesn't seem quite consistent to wash someone else's clothes 
and leave your own soiled." The practice of lynching in the 
South also made dubious any claim that America could represent 
the forces of justice and democracy on the world stage.12
Developing the lynching theme, the New York Age pointed 
out that Wilson's claim to speak for "humanity" rang hollow in 
light of his failure to "utter one word against this outraging 
of humanity within the territory over which he presides." Not 
just Wilson, but all Americans deserved censure for "their 
smug hypocrisy," in expressing "horror at German 
'atrocities,'" or the Turks' "treatment of the Armenians" 
while they ignored the lynchings of blacks in the South. A 
month later, the Aae noted that in order to fulfill his 
"desire to be known as the 'President of Humanity,'" Wilson 
would have to "show that his definition of 'Humanity' is broad 
enough to cover the submerged tenth of the citizenship, who 
are striving to reach their full status as American 
citizens. "l3
12"Talk Is Cheap," Chicago Defender. Feb. 3, 1917, p. 10. 
For a similar analogy, see "Who Are the Autocrats?" Baltimore 
Afro-American. May 5, 1917, p. 4.
13"Well Worth Thinking About," New York Age. Feb. 15, 
1917, p. 4; "The President's Opportunity," ibid.. March 8, 
1917, p. 4. For a similar critique of Wilson's role as
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After the declaration of war on April 2, black papers 
continued to express skepticism about the "humanitarian" 
nature of Wilson's motives. "When President Wilson uses fine 
words about going to war for the protection of humanity 
abroad, thinking Americans recall the humanity at home that 
craves protection," the Afro sniped.14 Yet black writers now 
began to embrace the Wilsonian idea of a war for democracy-- 
not because America could credibly make such a claim, but 
because blacks could use such a war to their own benefit. 
Three weeks after its initial response to the war message, the 
Afro-American called Wilson's promise to fight a war to 
establish democracy in Europe "a beautiful theory."
It is well that [at] the close of the nineteenth 
and the beginning of the twentieth century such 
noble words should be uttered, and that the fetters 
of those people who have been bound hand and foot 
for centuries should be stricken off and that the 
reign of freedom should begin; that every man 
should have the chance to be an[d] to do and to 
assist in the government under which he lives; that 
all men should have the "inalienable right to life, 
liberty and the pursuit of happiness."
But from all appearances, the editorial continued, Wilson did 
not believe this theory should be applied to the United 
States. To credibly carry this fight to Europe, America 
itself must practice "real democracy," and for those unclear
humanitarian, see "No Time Now for Rebellion," Baltimore Afro- 
American. April 7, 1917, p. 4.
14"No Time Now for Rebellion," Baltimore Afro-American. 
April 7, 1917, p. 4.
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on the concept, the Afro printed a lengthy definition from the 
dictionary.15
The New York Aoe began to print a picture of the American 
flag on the editorial page each week. Editor James Weldon 
Johnson called Wilson's war message a "convincing" and 
"inspiring" document, one that, if followed up with action, 
could heal racial and ethnic divisions. "We, as a race, might 
take the President up on some of the references to 'humanity, ' 
and point out their inconsistencies, as we so well know them; 
but, for the present, we pass that over." Wilson's message 
struck "a responsive chord in the great American public," 
Johnson argued, and the war would provide a "great trial" for 
the nation, to determine if it could live up to its democratic 
ideals .IS
The Crisis embraced the war effort enthusiastically, 
urging blacks to "join heartily in this fight for eventual 
world liberty." An editorial, drafted by an NAACP conference 
of May 17-19, claimed that "permanent peace" depended on 
"extension of the principle of government by the consent of 
the governed, not simply among the smaller nations of Europe 
but among the natives of Asia and Africa, the Western Indies 
and the Negroes of the United States." The editorial 
acknowledged that blacks, of course, had a right to resent
“"Democrat," Baltimore Afro-American. April 28, 1917, p.
4 .
“James W. Johnson, "The Duty of the Hour," New York Age. 
April 5, 1917, p. 4.
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their treatment in America and to feel ambivalent about
participating in the war, but they should "never forget that 
this country belongs to us even more than to those who lynch, 
disfranchise, and segregate."17
These writers warmed to Wilson's war message as they 
realized that they could redirect its principles for use in 
the cause of black civil rights at home. Wilson had provided 
the black press with an effective yardstick by which to 
measure the humanitarian record of America and even the 
administration itself.18 The South, they found, was not safe 
for Negroes, who did not enjoy self-determination because they
17"Resolutions of the Washington Conference," Crisis. 14 
(June, 1917), 59-60. Editor Harry Smith printed Roosevelt's 
praise of Wilson's war address in the Cleveland Gazette. Even 
Rev. William A. Byrd's scathing editorial, which pronounced 
America unfit to promote democracy in Europe, pledged black 
loyalty in the fight. Smith himself offered no direct comment 
on the war message. The Defender hoped America's stated war 
aims would stimulate foreigners to ask America embarrassing 
questions about the status of African Americans. See 
"Roosevelt Praises Wilson's Document," Cleveland Gazette. 
April 7, 1917, p. l; Rev. William a. Byrd, "The War," ibid.. 
p. 2; and "A Pertinent Question," Chicago Defender. May 12, 
1917, [p. 10] .
18In 1913, Wilson had overseen the segregation of federal 
offices by race and the wholesale firing and demotion of black 
political appointees and civil service workers in the South. 
When William Monroe Trotter led a delegation to the White 
House in 1914 to protest the segregation, he exchanged heated 
words with Wilson, who "affirmed his belief that the total 
separation of the races was the policy that would bring the 
greatest benefit to the Negroes." See Arthur S. Link, Wilson: 
The New Freedom (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956), 
243-54, esp. 252. On Trotter's meeting with Wilson, see also 
Stephen R. Fox, The Guardian of Boston: William Monroe Trotter 
(New York: Atheneum, 1970), 179-85; and Christine A.
Lunardini, ed. "Standing Firm: William Monroe Trotter's
Meetings with Woodrow Wilson, 1913-1914," Journal of Negro 
History. 64 (Summer 1979), 244-60.
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could not vote. Throughout the war, the black press continued 
to point out the fundamental contradiction between America1s 
war aims and its actual practice of democracy. It sought 
persistently to remind America of the "finer objects of this 
world battle," which included "world peace and self- 
government” and the elimination of lynching and 
disfranchisement in America.19
The Real Enemy
At the same time that black editors sought to fuse the 
cause of democracy in Europe with democracy for blacks at 
home, they also attempted to conflate the enemy in Europe with 
the enemy of blacks in America. Southern "Huns" undermined 
the American war effort by lynching blacks, thus hurting the 
morale of loyal blacks who were crucial to the war effort and 
nurturing national divisions at a time when national security 
required solidarity. "Kaiserism" in the South also hurt 
American's ability to credibly fill its self-appointed role as 
guardian of world democracy. Southern racism, according to 
black newspapers, was disloyal because it hindered the war 
effort.
19"Resolutions of the Washington Conference," Crisis. 14 
(June, 1917), 59-60.
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At a time when the national mood tolerated only utter 
loyalty to the Federal government, the black press sought to 
point out the white South's inherent disloyalty and un- 
Americanness. Black writers sought to show the South was 
disloyal and un-American in four ways: first, by recalling 
that the South had once rebelled against the Federal 
government and still opposed it in many ways; second, by 
pointing out examples of Southern opposition or indifference 
to the current war; third, by drawing parallels between the 
South and the European enemies; and fourth by showing that the 
South was eroding the morale of blacks and otherwise hindering 
black contributions to the war effort.
Black newspapers sometimes recalled or alluded to the 
fact that the former slave states had once rebelled against 
the Federal government. The Age suggested that the " spirit of 
succession, " still reigned in the South, where "fossils of the 
rebellion" sought to help the German cause by attacking loyal 
blacks.20 The Defender claimed that Southerners hated 
president Lincoln; the Afro called anti-Negro politicians 
"Southern copperheads"; and the Gazette repeatedly returned to 
the theme of the rebel South.21
20"Bourbonism and Progress," New York Age. Sept. 6, 1917,
p. 4.
21 "This Is No Soldier!" Chicago Defender. May 4, 1918, p. 
16; see also, "Mr. Phillips of Memphis Would Like to Know," 
ibid.. Jan. 5, 1918, p. 12.
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Black newspapers pointed out the South's failure to 
fulfill recruitment or liberty loan quotas, and cited evidence 
of the region's low enthusiasm for the war. One editorial 
writer classified Southern politicians who opposed black 
recruitment "with the anti-conscriptionists and anti-draft 
agitators."22 Others highlighted any opposition to measures 
deemed necessary for the war effort. The Afro criticized as 
"obstructionists" Southern Congressmen James K. Vardaman, John 
Sharp Williams, and J. Thomas Heflin when they opposed a 
measure which President Wilson "regarded as necessary for the 
quicker winning of the war." "Usually it is the Negro problem 
in the national Congress that so inflames Southern copperheads 
that they cease to be patriotic. " This time it had to do with 
women's suffrage.23 The Gazette found Southern states' 
recruitment of soldiers to be lagging behind.24 The Defender 
noted that though they were outnumbered by white boys, blacks 
in many Southern towns had enlisted in greater numbers than 
white Southern "loafers."25
Black newspapers attacked the South perhaps most 
effectively by drawing parallels between the former slave
22Savannah Tribune. Sept. 1, 1917, p. 4.
23"Heflin With the Bunch," Baltimore Afro-American. Nov. 
1, 1918, p. 4. Wilson quoted in Kennedy, Over Here. 284. See 
also, New York Age. May 18, 1918, p. 4.
24Cleveland Gazette. May 4, 1918, p. 2; ibid.. May 11, 
1918, p. 2.
25"Although Outnumbered," Chicago Defender. May 12, 1917, 
p. 10.
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states and the European enemy. Black newspapers connected the 
two, first by simply applying to the South the words that the 
nation had used to dehumanize the enemy. "American 1 Huns'" 
committed violence against blacks in the South. Harry Smith 
conflated "southemism" with "' Prussianism, ' " as if they were 
equally damning labels.26 The Chicago Defender called Jim 
Crow railroad cars the "KAISER ON WHEELS" and Southern 
politicians the "Kaisers of America." The "mailed fist and 
iron heel of crazed southerners have borne down just as 
mercilessly on our women and children" as the "mailed fist and 
iron heel of the kaiser, " a columnist argued.27 Several 
newspapers described Southerners as "mobocrats," a play on 
"autocracy," the term often used to describe Central Power 
governments.28
Black editorialists found numerous examples to support 
this comparison. The South practiced autocracy by denying 
blacks a say in their own government. Editors borrowed 
language from both the American Revolution ("taxation without 
representation") and Wilson (rule without "consent of the
26"Some More American 'Huns, Cleveland Gazette. June 8, 
1918, p. 2; ibid.. Sept. 7, 1918, p. 2. For another use of 
"Hun," see "The Hun Still Unleashed in America," Savannah 
Tribune. Nov. 16, 1918, p. 4.
27"The Jim Crow Car or the Kaiser on Wheels," Chicago 
Defender. Nov. 3, 1917, p. 12. Ben Baker, "Our Political and 
Economic Status," ibid.. April 6, 1918, p. 16.
28See for example, "Bourbonism and Progress," New York 
Age. Sept. 6, 1917, p. 4.
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governed") to condemn this practice.29 Southern governments 
imposed autocratic controls on individuals by mandating racial 
segregation in public places. And Southern mobs committed 
atrocities against blacks in the South worse than those 
committed by Germans against the Belgians or the Turks against 
the Armenians.
In condemning the autocracy of the South, black editors 
did not always let the North off the hook. Northerners shared 
the blame for refusing to act against Southern "Hunnishness." 
As the Gazette1 s William A. Byrd wrote, "Race prejudice and 
bias have warped our national conscience." But Byrd and most 
writers in the black press pinpointed the source of that 
prejudice in the South. In "THE WAR," a decidedly anti-war 
response to Wilson's war address in April, Byrd argued that 
America had been "un-American toward our race for hundreds of 
years" and was clearly unqualified to fight a war for world 
democracy: "America, having learned to be unjust toward
colored people with impunity is now ready to follow its habit 
with other nationalities." America should make one of its war 
aims the democratization of the South, Byrd argued in a July 
editorial. He called the Southern white man "America's worst 
enemy." In his pre-election page-one editorial of 1918, Byrd 
catalogued the South's un-American qualities and equated a
29In an untitled editorial, Harry Smith said "The South 
favors a maximum of representation with a minimum of taxation 
and it comes pretty near getting it." See Cleveland Gazette. 
July 27, 1918, p. 2.
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defeat of the Southern-based Democratic Party with a defeat of 
the European enemy. The South must be repudiated in the
election, he argued, because it did not respect the 
Constitution, was "the most barbarous spot in Christendom," 
had opposed the administration's war effort, had a poor grasp 
of governmental and legal matters and was "unfit to govern a 
country that is now the ruling nation of the world." Byrd now 
placed the South outside the pale of what he considered
"American." "If America defeats the south," he argued, "the 
world will believe what we are preaching, a world made safe 
for democracy."30
Gazette publisher Harry Smith similarly conflated the 
enemy with the South, and called for a simultaneous defeat of 
both. "A little 'democracy' is sadly needed these days, in 
Georgia, Alabama, Tennessee and indeed the entire south," he 
wrote. In response to a presidential speech calling for
social justice in America, Smith wrote:
It will indeed be a happy day for America when the 
territory south of Mason and Dixon's line, as well 
as foreign territory, is made safe for its down­
trodden Democracy, a Democracy of humble, long-
suffering, patient and patriotic people.31
30William A. Byrd, "The War," Cleveland Gazette. April 7,
1917, p. 2; Byrd, "A Southern Man Flays the South," ibid.. 
July 7, 1917, p. 2; Byrd, "Shall We Have a Real Democracy," 
ibid.. Dec. 1, 1917, p. 1; and "Why Democratic Party Should Be 
Defeated Now and in 1920!" ibid.. Oct. 5, 1918, p. 1.
31 "Humanity and the Negro," Cleveland Gazette. April 6,
1918, p. 2.
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Adapting Wilson's words, Smith and Byrd depicted the South--no 
less than Germany--as foreign territory and the object of 
American war aims.
Other newspapers similarly tried to place the South 
outside the pale of American civilization, equating it with 
German autocracy. The Afro argued that "real democracy" 
existed in the South for only a brief time (presumably during 
Reconstruction), and that the leadership of individuals from 
this section in the Federal government created the nation's 
poor record on race.32 An Age editorial argued that the 
South had "no civilized order of government", was "ruled by an 
oligarchy or mob," and "gravitates between a state of 
autocracy or anarchy."33 The Defender, perhaps more
critical of the South than any other black newspaper, 
constantly urged black readers to leave the South for the more 
hospitable North.34 An editorial called the South "the land
32 "Roosevelt' s Opportunity, " Baltimore Afro-American. July 
14, 1917, p. 4. The Afro also aimed the charge of
"unpatriotic and un-American" against the mayor of Baltimore 
when he signalled his support of a new residential segregation 
ordinance. The mayor, the Afro suggested, should "lose sight 
of caste and autocracy for a while and get into his system a 
mite of the kind of democracy we are trying to beat into the 
Huns." See "Segregation Fever Again in the Air," Baltimore 
Afro-American. July 5, 1918, p. 4.
33"White Labor in the South," New York Age. Oct. 11, 1917,
p. 4.
34Yet in the context of the war, the paper often blamed 
the nation as a whole for race problems, thereby highlighting 
the hypocrisy of the war effort. See, for example, "A 
Pertinent Question," Chicago Defender. May 12, 1917, p. 10; 
"Not Belgium--America, " ibid.. Sept 8, 1917, p. 1; and "And a 
Lady Applauds," Chicago Defender. March 2, 1918, p. 12.
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of the barbarians" whose greatest contribution to world
civilization was "'Jim Crow,1 disfranchisement, and 
lynching. "3S
Southern racial practices placed the region on the side
of the enemy not only because they resembled the enemy's
autocratic ways, but also because they hindered black support 
of the war effort. African Americans subscribed to the
liberty loan, volunteered for the Red Cross, and enlisted in 
the Armed forces often at higher rates than white 
Americans.36 Not only did Southerners sometimes hinder these 
efforts, they also threatened to weaken the morale of blacks 
and even turn them against the war effort. Every time a black 
person was lynched, Jim Crowed, or otherwise discriminated 
against during the war, it weakened black enthusiasm for the 
war effort and thus weakened America's fighting force, black
35"The Jim Crow Car or the Kaiser on Wheels," Chicago 
Defender. Nov. 3, 1917, p. 12.
360n black contributions to the liberty loan and other 
voluntary war work, see Henry Lewis Suggs, P. B. Young. 
Newspaperman: Race. Politics, and Journalism in the New South. 
1910-1962 (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia,
1988), 37; Andrew Buni, Robert L. Vann of the Pittsburgh
Courier: Politics and Black Journalism (Pittsburgh: University 
of Pittsburgh Press, 1974), 103. On enlistment in the
military, see Jane Lang Scheiber and Harry N. Scheiber, "The 
Wilson Administration and the Wartime Mobilization of Black 
Americans, 1917-18," Labor History. 10 (Summer 1967), 433-58, 
esp. 440-42.
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editors argued.37 Thus, anti-black activity turned out to be 
anti-war and anti-American.
It was unpatriotic and it certainly discouraged black 
participation in the war, according to the Gazette, when black 
contributors to the Liberty Loan drive, and heroes on the 
battle field--including Sgt. Henry Johnson, who became the 
first American to be awarded the French croix de guerre after 
almost single-handedly fighting off a German raiding party-- 
were treated as second class citizens in the South.38 
Despite winning the highest honors for bravery, men like 
Johnson still "cease to be citizens when they cross Mason and 
Dixon's line going South," the Gazette lamented.39 Not all 
blacks could be expected to continue to act as patriots under 
such circumstances, and in fact, the Chicago Defender noted, 
Southern blacks were right to remain aloof from the Jim-Crow
37"German Propaganda," Cleveland Gazette. July 27, 1918, 
p. 2. The Gazette also argued that the Birth of a Nation 
should be banned during the war because of its "baneful effect 
upon the enthusiasm, patriotism and loyalty of the Afro- 
American whom it harms greatly wherever it is exhibited." See 
Cleveland Gazette. Feb. 16, 1918, p. 2.
380n Johnson, see Arthur E. Barbeau and Florette Henri, 
The Unknown Soldiers: Black American Troops in World War I 
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1974), 116.
39A black physician attending a liberty loan meeting in 
Houston Texas was punched in the head by a white man. "Police 
refused to arrest the brutal and cowardly Texan . . . and yet 
this country is helping to fight for world democracy and 
calling on the Afro-American to help." See "Southern 
Democracy," Cleveland Gazette. May 4, 1918, p. 2.
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Red Cross there.40 The Baltimore Afro-American proclaimed 
that the "SOUTH OPPOSES NEGRO SOLDIERS. . . . Despite the fact 
that Uncle Sam will need the services of the colored men, as 
well as white . . . , certain Southern Congressmen say they 
will bitterly oppose any bill that includes the Negro."41 
Such a stand by the South clearly hampered the country's war 
effort.
James Weldon Johnson saw treason in South Carolina Rep. 
Samuel Nicholls' promise of a war on the home front if the 
government tried to integrate Southern white soldiers with 
black men from the North.42 Johnson and another Age 
editorialist also argued that the South placed preservation of 
"'Jim Crow' Democracy" ahead of pro-war measures; that white 
Houstonians demonstrated the disloyalty of the South when they 
goaded black soldiers into mutiny; that a Southern Colonel 
made "seditious utterances" when he claimed blacks were unfit 
for military duty and should be drafted solely for manual 
labor; and that ridicule of black soldiers amounted to German
propaganda.43 Johnson argued that lynching "and other
40"Mr. Phillips of Memphis Would Like to Know, " Chicago 
Defender. Jan. 5, 1918, p. 12.
41 "South Opposes Negro Soldiers," Baltimore Afro-American. 
April 14, 1917, p. 1.
42James Weldon Johnson, "The Danger of Treason, " New York 
Age. May 3, 1917, p. 4.
43James Weldon Johnson, "Taking Their Measure," New York 
Age. Jan. 19, 1918, p. 4; "Fix the Responsibility," ibid..
Aug. 30, 1917, p. 4; "Bourbonism and Progress," ibid., Sept.
6, 1917, p. 4; and "Ridicule for Our Soldiers in France,"
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aggravated forms of hatred and prejudice against the Negro" 
were "nothing less than a certain degree of treason" because 
such actions caused divisions within the nation's fighting 
forces and threatened to deny the service of blacks for the 
war effort.44
The Afro accused the South of diverting black labor from 
useful war work. The war and the northward migration of 
blacks had led to a shortage of agricultural labor and in some 
localities, including Memphis, Tennessee, "work or fight" 
vagrancy laws imposed fines and imprisonment or military 
service on people without work. Though the laws supposedly 
applied to both blacks and whites, the black press noted that 
Southerners enforced them only against blacks. Even worse, 
the Afro charged, the laws were being used to force black 
women to work as domestics for white Southern women. "There 
is only one name for a woman who considers her own convenience 
ahead of winning the war," the Afro concluded. "She is a 
traitor of the rankest kind."45
ibid.. Sept. 7, 1918, p. 4.
44James Weldon Johnson, "The First Six Months," New York 
Age. July 13, 1918, p. 4.
45Baltimore Afro-American. Sept. 27, 1918, p. 4. On the 
work or fight laws, see also, James Weldon Johnson, "'Work or 
Fight' Laws for Women," New York Age. Nov. 2, 1918, p. 4;
Barbeau and Henri, Unknown Soldiers. 9-10. An Arkansas law 
aimed at forcing women to work in cotton fields was 
unpatriotic, Defender columnist W. Allison Sweeney suggested, 
because it was aimed only at black women. If cotton is 
necessary for the war effort, then white and black Arkansas 
women should get together and pick the crop to "prove that 
patriotism is not onesided," Sweeney argued. See "The Last
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True North
While black newspapers found many ways to show the South 
did not live up to American ideals, it often overlooked or 
excused the North's significant lapses, creating a picture of 
a nation divided between a good North and a bad South. The 
North seems to have functioned as a stand-in for the "real 
America," against which the autocrats, mobocrats, and 
Prussians of the South might be judged. Thus, the syndicated 
column "Afro-American Cullings" could quote without irony 
Kelly Miller's characterization of the North as "a section of 
complete public and civil freedom."46 In reality, however, 
racial problems plagued both North and South, and the race 
riots in East St. Louis, Illinois in the spring and summer of 
1917 reflected long-simmering racial tensions in Northern 
cities .47
In May and June of 1917, the resentments of white 
unionized laborers in East St. Louis broke out in scattered 
violent incidents against the city's black population, which 
had been growing during the war as rural Southerners migrated
Straw," Chicago Defender. Oct. 5, 1918, p. 16.
46"Afro-American Cullings," Cleveland Gazette. Oct. 7, 
1916, p. 1.
470n deterioration of race relations in Chicago, see Allan 
H. Spear, Black Chicago: the Making of a Negro Ghebto,. _l£3_0_- 
1920 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967), 20-49, 201- 
222 .
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North--pushed by the declining cotton economy of the South and 
pulled by a boom in Northern war-time manufacturing. When the 
Aluminum Ore Company broke a strike in April, workers blamed 
blacks for having crossing picket lines. Though most of the 
strike-breakers had been white, the blacks provided a 
convenient scapegoat. Tensions continued to mount until the 
early morning hours of Monday, July 1, when two police 
officers were killed in their squad car as they drove through 
a black neighborhood. Local news reports depicted the 
shooting as an act of naked aggression by a crowd of "200 
rioting negroes." In fact, a car resembling the squad car had 
earlier driven through the black neighborhood firing shots 
into homes along the way and those who fired at the police car 
thought they were acting in self defense. Parked in front of 
city hall, the bullet-ridden police car served as a rallying 
point the next morning for an angry mob of white laborers.48
For more than twelve hours that day, bands of marauding 
rioters attacked, beat, and shot black residents, burning 
others out of their homes. An estimated 39 blacks and nine 
whites (some killed by errant shots from white rioters) died 
in the rioting; well over 100 were injured. The rioters 
destroyed 312 buildings, most by fire, and burned 44 freight
480n May and June riots, see Elliott M. Rudwick, Race Riot 
at East St. Louis. July 2. 1917 (Carbondale: Southern Illinois 
University Press, 1964), 27-36. On labor problems, ibid.. 16- 
26. On killing of police officers, ibid.. 38-40.
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cars.49 Even some white observers could not help but notice 
the irony of the riot, coming as it did merely three months 
after Wilson had launched his war for democracy and the rule 
of law in Europe. A cartoonist for the New York Evening Mail 
asked: "Mr. President, Why Not Make America Safe For
Democracy?" while the New York Evening Post saw parallels 
between the riot and alleged German atrocities.50 The Nation 
concluded from the affair that Americans must "show that when 
they say democracy, they mean it."51
Black newspapers sounded this theme also. "We sympathize 
with the Belgians and with the Armenians, then proceed to 
lynch and burn at the stake one or more of the most loyal 
citizens the country affords, simply because of color," the 
Defender complained.52 But the black press also struck a 
surprisingly optimistic note after the riot. Editors seemed 
to believe the riot would force white America to confront the 
contradictions between the war aims and the treatment of black 
citizens here at home. They were bolstered in their optimism 
when Congress agreed to hold hearings on the riot, Theodore 
Roosevelt denounced the "brutal infamies imposed on colored
49Rudwick, Race Riot at East St. Louis. 50-53.
50Rudwick, Race Riot at East St. Louis. 59.
si"The Negro and the Nation," Nation. 26 July 1917, 86.
52"The white Man's Burden," Chicago Defender. July 14, 
1917. "Can we base our armed forces on democracy and liberty 
as against a background so replete with the heritage of 
barbarism and slavery?" another newspaper asked. See the 
Savannah Tribune. July 7, 1917, p. 4.
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people" at a much-publicized meeting in Carnegie Hall, and 
various white newspapers made the connection between the riot 
and the democratic war aims. The Age proclaimed:
Public sentiment, under the stimulus of the public 
utterances of Theodore Roosevelt, has been roused 
as seldom before to the growing spirit of 
lawlessness in this country. The necessity for the 
enforcement of law and order at home, while 
fighting for the democracy of the world abroad, is 
realized by most thinking people.
The Afro praised "thoughtful men" who had come to see that 
"'America must be made safe for Americans.'"53
Nor did the East St. Louis riot cause the black press to 
lose faith in the North. Rather than view the riot as 
evidence of racism there, black editors blamed the catastrophe 
on the South. Harry Smith said "southern sympathizers" who 
wanted to discourage "the exodus of our people from the South
53"Roosevelt Scores Gompers," Cleveland Gazette. July 14, 
1917, p. l. "Will Congress Act," New York Age. July 26, 1917, 
p. 4; see also, Philip G. Peabody, "Hypocrisy and 
'Democracy,'" ibid.. July 26, 1917, p. 4. "Must Settle Race 
Issue," Baltimore Afro-American. July 14, 1917, p. 4. Du Bois 
was willing to forget Roosevelt' s previous sins against blacks 
because of his "strong word" on East St. Louis. The Defender 
focused on less enlightened responses of whites to the riot in 
a July 28 editorial, but had earlier expressed faith that the 
American legal system ultimately "cannot fail" to redress 
black grievances and that "surely the good people must 
predominate." See "East St. Louis Aftermath," Chicago 
Defender. July 28, 1917, p. 12; and "The White Man's Burden," 
ibid.. July 14, 1917. During a congressional inquiry into the 
riot, a Defender reporter wrote: "The St. Louis papers keep a 
watch on these things and give them much needed publicity and 
it all adds to the justice which the Negro may get out of the 
thing." See ibid.. Nov. 3, 1917, p. 1.
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to this section of the country" started the riot.54 The 
Defender alleged the riot was caused by a "southern cracker" 
who taunted a black resident about a lynching in Memphis.55 
James Weldon Johnson defended the North and white Northerners 
against an attack by an ailing Sen. Ben Tillman of South 
Carolina, who saw the East St. Louis riot as evidence of the 
same unity depicted in the Birth of a Nation--of all whites 
against blacks. Johnson disagreed, pointing to "the thousands 
of northern communities in which colored people are not 
abused" and the "mutual respect and kindly feelings" that have 
existed between northern whites and Southern blacks. Johnson 
was not so much interested in the facts of the East St. Louis 
Riot as in the contest for the soul of the North. He was not 
ready to concede defeat to the Tillmans of the South.56
Writers like Johnson depicted a true America represented 
by ideals of liberty and democracy, which were embodied in 
sacred documents like the Declaration of Independence and the 
Constitution, and must be upheld by decent Americans of the 
North against the threats posed by an undemocratic and un- 
American South. Thus, the complex and intractable nature of 
American race relations was reduced to a simple morality tale
“Cleveland Gazette. June 2, 1917, p. 2.
“"Memphis Lynching Real Cause of Illinois Riot," Chicago 
Defender. June 2, 1917, p. 1.
S6James Weldon Johnson, "Senator Tillman Not Yet Dead," 
New York Age. July 26, 1917, p. 4. "The Negro and the
Nation," Nation. 26 July 1917, 86.
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of democratic versus autocratic, North versus South. But the 
accuracy of the tale did not matter--it was not meant to 
describe reality so much as mold opinion, win allies, and spur 
action against racism.
But to what extent did such strategies, and the 
strategies associated with loyalty, have an effect on white 
Americans? Did white Americans receive these messages and, if 
so, how did they interpret them? In fact, during World War I, 
white people paid more attention to black newspapers than 
usual. They often interpreted them in ways not sympathetic to 
the editors' intentions and responded in ways antithetical to 
their aims. On the other hand, in the summer of 1918, the 
highest officials of the Federal administration--including the 
president himself--would conclude that the demands of the 
black press should be addressed.
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CHAPTER 6
A "FINE PHILOSOPHY OF DEMOCRACY": 
WHITE AMERICA RESPONDS TO THE BLACK PRESS
"They are a little too subtle perhaps to object 
to."
--L. How, postal censor1
In most times the white response to the black press was 
sporadic, broad, and diffuse, but during World War I, the 
Federal government organized a concerted, concentrated reply 
to black newspapers. Feds monitored the black press, punished 
some publishers for "seditious" statements, and warned others. 
But most black newspapers could not be classified as 
seditious. Censors thought the "bitter tone" of many 
newspapers indicated a lack of patriotism, but they had to 
concede that these newspapers supported the national 
government and the war effort and that their criticisms were 
usually "too subtle" to warrant censorship. As one critic of 
the Defender put it, black newspapers pushed their case right 
to "the limit," but it was difficult to tell whether they went
to U.S. Asst. District Attorney, March 22, 1918, in 
Federal Surveillance of Afro-Americans (1917-1925): The First 
World War, the Red Scare, and the Garvey Movement, ed. 
Theodore Komweibel, Jr., (Frederick, Md. : University
Publications of America, 1986, microfilm) , reel 13, frame 
1125. Sources are cited as marked on the original documents. 
Evidence suggests that LH and L. How were the same person and
I have assumed this to be the case in the discussion that 
follows.
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over it or not. In most cases, officials decided they did 
not.
Thus, most black newspapers continued to protest for 
their rights during the war, yet avoided the kind of wholesale 
repression that put many socialist publications out of 
business, by neither caving in to government demands for 
unconditional participation in the war, nor by refusing to 
accede to those demands at all. As shown in the previous 
chapter, black newspapers generally straddled the line between 
capitulation and unequivocal protest. They emphasized the 
loyalty and patriotism of black folks, yet stressed the 
volatility of the black population; they praised American 
ideals and criticized continuing racial injustice not as a 
failure of those ideals, but as a betrayal of them by one 
unrepresentative, un-American segment of the nation. Though 
it offended many white Americans, this approach seems to have 
succeeded not only in heading off government persecution of 
African Americans and the black press, but also in forcing the 
nation to take their demands seriously. Worried about the 
unrest of African Americans, the Federal government called a 
conference of three dozen black editors designed to address 
their demands and assure their continued loyalty. The editors 
represented black unrest as a demand for Federal action and 
the government responded. Though the early end of the war 
prevented the government's fully carrying out its promises, 
high level officials, including Secretary of War Newton Baker
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and the president himself, accepted the notion that the 
loyalty of black Americans required some acts of good faith by 
the nation and that lynching hurt America's credibility as 
self-professed guardian of world democracy. The editors, 
understandably, thought their strategy had succeeded.
Thus, in a dangerous time, the black press served as a 
mediating forum between blacks and the white-controlled 
government. Black editors and writers used it to present 
black demands and arguments and to interpret black "unrest" to 
white America in the ways most likely to be heard and 
responded to positively. And government officials sought to 
promote loyalty to the war among the black population by 
censoring and prosecuting black newspapers, by delivering 
verbal and written warnings to publishers, and by calling 
black publishers to Washington.
This chapter examines the tug-of-war between the 
government, trying to use the black press as a means of 
domination, and African Americans, attempting to use it as a 
tool of resistance. I will begin by looking at the most 
coercive government actions and move toward the most 
accommodating. As government efforts became less coercive, I 
argue, black editors, publishers, and writers, had a greater 
chance to bend the war to their own purposes. Finally, with 
the editors' conference, the government seemed actually to 
give in to black demands.
192
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
The Censor's Heavy Hand
All publishers faced the dangers of censorship during the 
war. Under the Espionage Act, which became law on June 5, 
1917, persons convicted of interfering with the prosecution of 
the war could be fined up to $10,000 and sent to prison for up 
to 20 years. More significantly, those convicted of using the 
mails for seditious purposes could receive fines of up to 
$5,000 and up to five years imprisonment. An amendment, known 
as the Sedition Act, broadened the scope of governmental 
powers to enforce loyalty in May of 1918. This act prohibited 
"any disloyal, profane, scurrilous, or abusive language about 
the form of government of the United States, or the 
Constitution of the United States, or the flag of the United 
States, or the uniform of the Army or Navy."2 Armed with 
these laws, United States Postmaster Albert Burleson, the man 
who initiated racial segregation in Federal offices in 1913, 
ordered the surveillance of all publications suspected of 
disloyalty, especially immigrant newspapers, socialist 
publications, and the black press. The socialists fared the 
worst at the hands of the censors. In the summer of 1917, the 
Post Office banned more than a dozen socialist publications 
from the mails. Although some socialists supported the war,
2David M. Kennedy, Over Here: The First World War and 
American Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), 80.
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the effect of government repression devastated the movement.3 
Meanwhile, although they were suspected of disloyalty, few 
black publications lost second class mailing privileges, and 
the publishers of only two black periodicals spent any time in 
jail as a result of the Espionage and Sedition Acts.
Black newspapers faced several different kinds of 
censorship. The Justice Department could arrest and prosecute 
editors for violation of the Espionage or Sedition Acts; the 
postal service could revoke second-class mailing privileges, 
a devastating blow to monthly and weekly publications that 
relied on the mails for distribution; local postal officials 
could temporarily delay the mailing of a publication deemed 
disloyal, awaiting a ruling on its mailability; and military, 
postal and Justice officials could issue verbal or written 
warnings to African-American editors to try and control the 
content of their newspapers. Most black newspapers did not 
encounter censorship directly in any one of these ways, yet 
all knew of the danger of censorship.4
30. A. Hilton, "Public Opinion and Civil Liberties in 
Wartime, 1917-1919," Southwest Social Science Quarterly. 28 
(Dec. 1947), 201-24; and "Freedom of the Press in Wartime,
1917-1919," ibid.. (March 1948), 346-61.
4"We simply dare not start to try to express our feelings 
and those of our people as a result of that terrible affair," 
wrote Harry Smith after the execution of 13 Houston mutineers. 
Gazette. Dec. 15, 1917, p. 4. On editors' awareness of
censorship, see also, William Jordan, " 'The Damnable Dilemma' : 
African-American Accommodation and Protest during World War 
I," Journal of American History. 81 (March 1995), 1562-83, 
esp. 1578
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Only two black newspapers faced serious legal 
consequences for their position on the war. San Antonio 
Inquirer editor G. W. Bouldin received a jail sentence after 
the war for printing Mrs. C. L. Threadgill-Dennis1 s praise of 
the Houston mutineers. According to prosecutors, she went too 
far when she excused the actions of the soldiers, called on 
other black soldiers to imitate them, and derided the notion 
that blacks should defend Europe. According to the Justice 
Department, her letter "advocated insurrection and forceful 
resistance to the laws of the United States" while attempting 
to "cause insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny and refusal of 
duty in the military forces."5
Like many other socialist publications, the Messenger 
forthrightly opposed the war, criticized America's motives, 
and called for peace. It criticized military spending and war 
profiteers; printed statistical evidence that blacks opposed 
conscription; and said that black leaders, like Du Bois and 
Kelly Miller, who supported the war, should sign up for 
service themselves. "We would rather make Georgia safe for 
the Negro," than fight for democracy in France, the Messenger 
concluded. Thus, unlike most black editorialists, A. Philip 
Randolph and Chandler Owen opposed the war and supported and
sSee Willard Utley, report on San Antonio Inquirer. Nov.
27, 1917, in Federal Surveillance of Afro-Americans (1917-
1925) . ed. Komweibel, reel 9, frames 903-4; and B. C. 
Baldwin, report on San Antonio Inquirer. Nov. 25, 1917, in
ibid.. reel 9, frame 902.
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encouraged black opposition to it without equivocation.6 
Unlike other black newspapers which embraced the war and 
connected it to the elimination of racism, Randolph and Owen 
used racism as a reason for blacks to oppose the war and even 
questioned the legitimacy of the war machine's methods. 
Agents broke into the Messenger1s Harlem offices, confiscated 
back issues, and ransacked files. During a speaking
engagement on Aug. 4, 1918, Justice department officers seized 
Randolph and Owen and charged them with violating the 
Espionage Act. After they had spent two days in jail, a judge 
inexplicably released the pair and dropped the charges. When 
they finished their speaking tour, the Army drafted Owen into 
service and the Post Office revoked the Messenger1s second 
class mailing privileges. Only the end of the war prevented 
Randolph's being drafted that fall.7 Ultimately, the 
Messenger's suppression may have had more to do with its being 
a socialist than a black publication.
The Messenger explicitly opposed black participation in 
the war effort. But support of the war--the policy of most 
other black newspapers--did not guarantee immunity from 
government surveillance and coercion, as several editors found 
out, most conspicuously, W. E. B. Du Bois.
6See various articles and editorials in Messenger. Nov. 
1911, pp. 7, 9, 10, 11, 20, 31.
7Jervis Anderson, A. Philip Randolph: A Biographical
Portrait (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1972), 104-9; 
and Mark Ellis, "America's Black Press, 1914-18," History 
Today. 41 (September 1991), 20-27, esp. 26.
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Closing Ranks at the Crisis
Government attention to Du Bois's Crisis. combined with 
his own patriotic enthusiasm, led him to abandon his defense 
of protest in June of 1918. Du Bois perhaps faced greater and 
more persistent pressure to moderate his approach than any 
other black editor. He faced not only military censors, but 
an internal NAACP censorship committee as well. His famous 
"Close Ranks" editorial, in the July 1918 Crisis, advised 
blacks to quit agitating for their own rights and concentrate 
on winning the war. "It is necessary in the time of war to be 
careful of one's utterances," Du Bois confessed to a 
correspondent that summer. "THE CRISIS will never say 
anything that it does not believe: but there are a great many 
things which it does believe which it cannot say just now."8
The War Department kept a detailed file of Crisis 
editorials dating back to 1916. The file included material 
that might have come from any black weekly: criticisms of 
Wilson administration policies; denunciations of lynching; 
pleas for equal treatment of blacks during the war; a 
comparison of Wilson's eloquent denunciations of German 
atrocities with his silence on lynchings of African Americans 
in the South. Even immediately after Du Bois published "Close
8W . E. B. Du Bois to F. E. Young, Aug. 8, 1918, in W. E. 
B. Du Bois Papers, W. E. B. Du Bois Library, University of 
Massachusetts, Amherst.
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Ranks," the official who assembled the file held the Crisis 
"responsible for a great deal of the present negro unrest and 
disaffection." The magazine, he concluded, aimed at "exciting 
the colored races to acts of violence against the whites."9
Others also accused the journal of inciting blacks to 
violence against whites. YMCA officials at Camp Gordon, 
Georgia, banned the magazine for allegedly inciting a riot 
between black and white soldiers there in the spring of 1918. 
A Justice Department investigator in Waco thought the 
publication had had something to do with the Houston Riot the 
previous year. Assistant U. S. Attorney Earl B. Barnes said 
he intended to "prevent propaganda" in the magazine that was 
"calculated to create a feeling of dissatisfaction among 
colored people, " and asked to be sent a complete run of the 
Crisis since the previous April, as well as all future 
issues.10 Despite Du Bois's decidedly pro-Allied slant, the
’"Quotations from Several Issues of the Crisis," in 
Federal Surveillance of Afro-Americans (1917-1925). ed. 
Komweibel, reel 19, frames 667-78; Harry A. Taylor, 
"Memorandum for Colonel Coxe," July 19, 1918, in ibid.. frame 
679.
10Howell B. Jackson, "'Crisis,1 Possible Pro-German 
Publication," May 10, 1918; and Albert Neunhoffer to A. Bruce 
Bielaski, May 10, 1918, in Federal Surveillance of __Af.ro-
Americans (1917-1925) . ed. Komweibel, reel 19, frame 640; and 
reel 9, frame 111. See also, James L. Bruff, "Memorandum re. 
Officers and Directors of the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People," July 13, 1918, p. 3, in ibid.. 
reel 19, frames 802-04.
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chief of Justice's Bureau of Investigation, A. Bruce Bielaski, 
hinted that the Crisis was a tool of German propagandists.11
Pressure on the journal became greatest just around the 
time Du Bois composed "Close Ranks." Both the Department of 
Justice and the military met with NAACP officials in May of 
1918, threatening censorship if the rhetoric of Crisis 
editorials were not toned down.12 Col. Marlborough Churchill 
warned white executive board member Charles Studin that the 
government would "not tolerate carping and bitter utterances 
likely to foment disaffection and destroy the morale of our 
people for the winning of the war." NAACP officials agreed to 
appoint Studin to review each issue before it went to press 
"to eliminate all matter that may render the paper liable to 
suppression in the future."13 " [N] o pains will be spared to 
make all future issues of this magazine comply with the wishes 
of the Government," Studin assured Churchill on June 12. 
Helping to win the war had become the Crisis1 s "paramount 
purpose."14 Around the same time, NAACP board chairman Joel
“A. Bruce Bielaski to Charles DeWoody, June 4, 1918, in
Federal Surveillance of Afro-Americans (1917-1925). ed.
Komweibel, reel 19, frame 646.
“Charles H. Studin to W. E. B. Du Bois, May 1, 1918, Du
Bois Papers.
“Marlborough Churchill to Charles H. Studin, June 3, 
1918, in Federal Surveillance of Afro-Americans (1917-1925). 
ed. Komweibel, reel 9, frame 636; Minutes, NAACP Board of 
Directors meeting, June, 10, 1918, Du Bois Papers.
“Charles H. Studin to Marlborough Churchill, June 12, 
1918, in Federal Surveillance of Afro-Americans (1917-1925). 
ed. Komweibel, reel 9, frame 637.
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Spingam had offered Du Bois a job as captain working with him 
in the Army intelligence service. Spingam and Du Bois 
believed that in that capacity they would be able to work from 
within the government to bring about measures for the 
improvement of racial conditions.
Accordingly, Du Bois composed his "Close Ranks" editorial 
for the July Crisis:
We of the colored race have no ordinary 
interest in the outcome. That which the German 
power represents today spells death to the 
aspirations of Negroes and all darker races for 
equality, freedom and democracy. Let us not 
hesitate. Let us, while this war lasts, forget our 
special grievances and close our ranks shoulder to 
shoulder with our white fellow citizens and the 
allied nations that are fighting for democracy. We 
make no ordinary sacrifice, but we make it gladly 
and willingly, with our eyes lifted to the hills.
When the editorial hit the newsstands in late June, Spingam 
sent a copy to Churchill as "evidence of the effect of M.I.B. 
policy." Churchill found it "very satisfactory."15 The 
government managed to affect a change at the Crisis without 
using direct force. A combination of friendly persuasion and 
implied threats did the trick. In the cases of the Messenger 
and the Crisis. government officials managed to silence black 
demands that the war be accompanied by fulfillment of black 
rights. In the former case, they simply made it impossible to 
publish the journal, in the latter, they convinced its editor,
“Joel E. Spingam to Marlborough Churchill, July 6, 1918, 
in Federal Surveillance of Afro-Americans (1917-1925). ed. 
Komweibel, reel 9, frame 767.
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through a combination of threat and enticement, that he should 
stop agitating. Among black publications, the Crisis was 
unique because of the control of white NAACP executives and Du 
Bois's close personal relationship to the super-patriot 
Spingam.16
A Little Too Subtle
Censorship did not have such dramatic effects on other 
black newspapers. Most did not, like Du Bois, forget their 
"special grievances." Instead, they made a case for black 
rights that was just provocative enough to raise concerns 
among government officials that blacks might not participate 
fully in the war, yet not quite provocative enough to warrant 
censorship. Postal, Justice, and military officials responded 
to and argued with what they read in the black press, 
literally entering a dialogue about race, America, and the
16For an interpretation which argues that Du Bois wrote 
"Close Ranks" as a condition for receiving a commission as 
captain in the Army, see Mark Ellis, "'Closing Ranks' and 
'Seeking Honors' : W. E. B. Du Bois in World War I, " Journal of 
American History. 79 (June 1992), 96-124. For an opposing 
view, which argues that "Close Ranks" was in keeping with Du 
Bois' s accommodationist approach to the war and that he would 
not have required a quid pro quo to write it, see William 
Jordan " 'The Damnable Dilemma' : African-American Accommodation 
and Protest during World War I, " ibid.. 81 (March 1995) , 1562- 
83. Ellis's rebutal is in Mark Ellis, "W. E. B. Du Bois and 
the Formation of Black Opinion in World War I: A Commentary on 
'The Damnable Dilemma,'" ibid.. 1584-90.
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patriotic duty of black citizens.17 This dialogue reveals 
the nature and size of the gulf dividing dominant white 
conceptions from subordinate black conceptions. What may seem 
to late 20th century eyes like reasonable comments on racism, 
lynching, and the unreconstructed South, seemed "vile, 
nefarious," and seditious to white censors in 1918.18 Thus, 
most of the black press seems to have tested the limits of 
acceptable racial discourse in America, while at the same time 
generally avoiding suppression and prosecution.
The Postal Service's New York "translation bureau" 
watched closely over the New York Age and another black 
weekly, the New York News. Offended by the "unbridled 
bitterness" of the papers, bureau readers passed along to the 
local United States Assistant District Attorney and Post 
Office Solicitor William H. Lamar a series of memos making the 
case that these two newspapers were disloyal, had violated the
17The act of participating in this dialogue likely 
modified the view of censors. "One is required to take 
account of the positions of others in discussing an issue or 
subject-matter with them. Here, even if one holds to one's 
initial point of view one has nevertheless to deal with the 
objections, considerations and counter-examples that others 
introduce. In the end, whether one changes one's position or 
maintains it, the view that results is more developed than the 
one with which one began." Georgia Wamke, Gadamer:
Hermeneutics. Tradition and ReasPU (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1987), 169-70.
l8LH to Asst. U. S. District Attorney, June 27, 1918, in
Federal S.Ui^ eilJ-JUlce <?£ Afr.g-AmehiCflhS (1917-1925) , ed.
Komweibel, reel 13, frame 1158.
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sedition Act, and ought to be "suppressed."19 But these 
officials were frustrated in their attempts to find a smoking 
gun--statements that clearly amounted to sedition and 
justified censorship. Censors like Robert A. Bowen and L. How 
seem to have been offended by black newspapers which 
challenged their own attitudes about race. Bowen objected to 
a page-one Age article on the barring of black soldiers' wives 
from sleepers on Pullman railroad cars, saying "the matter 
boils itself down to the degree of reluctance or its reverse, 
one may feel in sleeping with and after negroes. Chacun a son 
gout!" ("every man to his own taste") . Another New York 
censor sympathized with those who "do not relish" the 
"contiguity" of African Americans.20 Comments like these 
suggest that the New York censors shared the racist 
assumptions of most white men of the day. Their memoranda on 
the Age and the New York News read like defenses of those 
assumptions combined with a generally hostile attack on the 
black press, and by extension, the African-American 
population.
The feelings of How, Bowen and some other censors toward 
the black press were clearly antagonistic and their statements
19LH to U.S. Asst. District Attorney, May 16, 1918, in 
Federal Surveillance of Afro-Americans (1917-1921) ed. 
Komweibel, reel 13, frames 1132-33.
20RAB to U. S. Asst. District Attorney, June 13, 1918, and 
[LH] to U. S. Asst. District Attorney, Aug. 22, 1918, in
Federal Surveillance of Afro-AmericahS (1.9.17--19231, ed.
Komweibel, reel 13, frames 1136, 1142-3.
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often dripped with sarcasm. "I do not often have the pleasure 
of reading the negro papers," Bowen wrote, "and the denial is 
the greater pleasure."21 Bowen described the attitude of the 
black press toward the South as "very offensive" and one Age 
editorial on the subject as "preposterous, " another as full of 
"sweeping assertions."22 How said the News was "bitter and 
vicious on the race question" and he could condescendingly 
reduce its advocacy of basic justice and human rights to a 
wish to be "treated more politely."23 If the newspapers did 
not violate the law, they could be shown as simply inferior 
and ridiculous. In one letter, How penciled the letter "u" 
over an "i" in "insidious, " which he had inadvertently spelled 
correctly with his own typewriter, so the word could appear as 
"insiduous (sic) " in his report quoting the News.24 Under the 
crisis conditions of wartime, it is striking that he would 
take the time to make this minor adjustment. How was no 
neutral observer making objective reports on his subject, but
21RAB to U. S. Asst. District Attorney, June 13, 1918, in 
Federal Surveillance of Afro-Americans (1917-1925). ed.
Komweibel, reel 13, frame 1136.
“Robert A. Bowen to Wm. H. Lamar, July 18, 1918; and RAB 
to U. S. Asst. District Attorney, June 6, 1918 in Federal
Surveillance of Afro-Americans (1917-1925) . ed. Komweibel, 
reel 13, frames 1141, 1135.
23LH to United States District Attorney, May 2, 1918, in
Federal Surveillance of Afro-Americans_(1917-1925) . ed.
Komweibel, reel 13, frames 1150-1.
24LH to U. S. Asst. District Attorney, June 13, 1918, in
Federal. Surveillance of Afro-Americans_(1917-1925) . ed.
Komweibel, reel 13, frame 1155.
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a combatant in hostile dialogue with the black press, using 
any weapon at his disposal. Yet, despite his generally 
negative view of these newspapers, How referred once to the 
Age as "reasonable enough" and another time as "decidedly 
patriotic."25 At least in comparison to the readers of the 
New York News, he added in another letter, Age readers tended 
to be "rather decent."26 Bowen had to admit he agreed with 
black newspapers that lynching was "a very lamentable 
situation."27 Such statements suggest a tone of reluctant 
concession, not hearty agreement.
Despite their hostility, How, Bowen, and others were 
never able to build a case of sedition against either of these 
papers, hard as they tried. One censor, for example, tried to 
argue that the New York News acted seditiously when it 
suggested the Federal government act against lynching "as a 
measure for winning the war." The plea implied that blacks 
would not give their full support to the war "except under 
certain conditions" the censor wrote. "This is no time for
2SLH to U. S. Asst. District Attorney, Oct. 17, 1918; and 
LH to United States District Attorney, May 2, 1918, both in
Federal Surveillance of Afro-Americans (1917-1925). ed.
Komweibel, reel 13, frames 1145, 1130.
26Letter to U. S. Asst. District Attorney, Aug. 22, 1918 
in Federal Surveillance of Afro-Americans (1917-1925). ed. 
Komweibel, reel 13, frame 1142.
27RAB to U. S. Asst. District Attorney, June 13, 1918, in
Federal Surveillance of Afro-Americans (1917-193.5J , ed.
Komweibel, reel 13, frame 1136. See also, LH to U. S. Asst. 
District Attorney, June 13, 1918, and Aug. 15, 1918, in ibid.. 
frames 1155 and 1163.
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bargains. This is the time for suppressing newspapers that 
maintain such an attitude. "2B In reading the News, censors 
occasionally found veiled encouragement of black retributive 
violence or rebellion. An August 14 editorial suggested that 
on returning home from the war, "BRAVE BLACK BAYONET FIGHTERS" 
would be ready to fight more boldly for their rights at home. 
Such "incendiary" statements were deemed "legally 
objectionable" by How, Assistant U. S. District Attorney 
George L. Thompson, and others, but no action was taken. The 
black press's talk of retribution was indirect enough to avoid 
censorship, but it continually piqued the white censors. A 
few months later, Robert A. Bowen told the solicitor's office 
that two black papers were "deserving of censure if not 
suppression" because of "their covert threat of violence when 
the negro soldiers return." He continued: "I know that they 
[black newspapers] are very influential among their readers, 
and I wish there might be found some way in which their 
entirely wrong attitude could be rectified." Yet Bowen did 
not "hold" them up in the mails because so much other more
28L to U. S. Asst. District Attorney, July 4, 1918, in
Federal Surveillance of Afro-Americans (1917-1925) , ed.
Komweibel, reel 13, frame 1159. The same censor made a 
similar criticism of the New York Age on the same date. See 
L to U. S. Asst. District Attorney, July 4, 1918, in ibid.. 
reel 13, frames 1138-9. See also, L. How to U. S. Asst. 
District Attorney, May 23, 1918, in ibid.. reel 13, frame
1154. How believed the Age's mention of the Navy's 
discriminatory treatment of blacks "would tend directly to 
discourage Negroes from enlisting in the Navy," and was 
therefore objectionable. See LH to U. S. Asst. District 
Attorney, March 22, 1918, in ibid.. reel 13, frame 1125.
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"obnoxious . . . Bolshevik-revolutionary stuff" required
immediate action.25 Bowen's comments reflect the sentiment 
common among government monitors who were rubbed the wrong way 
by black newspapers and thought they were disloyal. 
Ultimately, however, black newspapers were not only loyal, but 
were unassailably loyal.
Usually, complaints about the News and the Age came down 
to the vague notion that they were "stirring up race 
antagonism," which interfered with the war effort, and 
therefore should be censored. Emphasizing the racial element 
of news stories tended to perpetuate antagonistic feelings 
between the races, according to L. How, as did reprinting 
racist screeds by white Southerners; describing the war for 
democracy as a two-front campaign in Europe and the South; 
portraying black people as better than whites; equating 
Southern whites with the "Hun"; dwelling on the horrors of 
lynching; and criticizing Bulletin 35, a general's order that 
his black troops should not challenge Jim Crow accommodations 
outside their training camp.30
29New York News. Aug. 14, 1918, p. 8, quoted in WS to JEE, 
Aug. 28, 1918, in Federal Surveillance of Afro-Americans
(1917-1925) . ed. Komweibel, reel 13, frame 1166. Robert A. 
Bowen to J. Bond Smith, Jan. 2, 1919, both in ibid.. reel 13, 
frame 1175. On the threat of militant returning black 
soldiers, see also, LH to U. S. Asst. District Attorney, March 
28, 1918, ibid.. reel 13, frame 1148.
30See, respectively, LH to U. S. Asst. District Attorney, 
June 13, Oct. 17, March 28, and April 25, 1918; RAB to U. S. 
Assistant District Attorney, June 13, 1918; LH to U. S. Asst. 
District Attorney, July 26, May 16, May 23, and Aug. 29, 1918, 
all in Federal Surveillance of Afro-Americans (1917-1925) . ed.
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Even in weeks when the New York News was "less blatantly 
objectionable," How wrote, its editors continued "to adopt an 
attitude which cannot but nourish the [bad] feelings between 
white races and the colored race." He worried that "some 
chance white readers of these papers might have their feelings 
against the colored people vividly stirred up," if by nothing 
more than the papers' habit of "contemptuously ignoring the 
white race."31 A story about a crowd of white onlookers who 
were unable and unwilling to assist a black man who had 
collapsed at an elevated train station was "calculated to 
irritate" because it implied "that the non-colored crowd was 
both heartless and incapable.1,32 How even argued that the 
newspaper's attacks on lynching, which stirred "feeling[s] of 
hatred and envy" might "almost directly" have caused the 
recent rise in lynchings.33 Even more troubling to How was 
the black press's potential for arousing black "prejudice" 
against whites. The New York Age. for example, printed a 
story on page one about a white soldier's attack on a black
Kornweibel, reel 13, frames 1155, 1145, 1148-9, 1129, 1136, 
1160-61, 1132-33, 1154, 1167.
31Here, How was referring the practice of "race angling," 
by which black papers emphasized the racial aspects of the 
news by paying particularly close attention to the doings of 
African Americans.
32LH to U. S. Asst. District Attorney, June 20, 1918, in 
Federal Surveillance of Afro-Americans (1917-1925). ed. 
Kornweibel, reel 13, frames 1156-7.
33LH to U. S. Asst. District Attorney, June 13, 1918, in
Federal Surveillance of Afro-Americans (1917-1925), ed.
Komweibel, reel 13, frame 1155.
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girl and boy, "purely for the purpose of arousing race 
prejudice.1,34
In some cases, censors were clearly grasping at straws in 
searching for reasons to ban the two newspapers. One censor 
even listed the biennial lynching statistics (merely a state- 
by-state accounting with no commentary) from R. R. Moton, 
Booker T. Washington's successor at Tuskegee Institute, as a 
potentially seditious item, though he didn't say how.35 
Other censors filed reports on items they admitted did not 
violate the law, but were "of interest."36 Often, they 
seemed to suggest that black newspapers were speaking in some 
kind of code, hiding disloyal sentiments behind patriotic 
words. How wanted to suppress the March 22, 1918, New York 
Age on the basis of three objectionable editorials, which 
violated the Espionage Act in spirit, he said, if not in fact. 
In one of them, James Weldon Johnson said blacks had "never 
lost faith in . . . the Government of the United States." Its 
spirit had been "often thwarted and defeated, " but could never 
be destroyed. On the other hand, "our faith in the spirit of
34LH to U. S. Asst. District Attorney, April 25, 1918, in 
Federal Surveillance of Afro-Americans, ed. Komweibel, reel 
13, frame 1129. See also, LH to U. S. Asst. District 
Attorney, May 30, in ibid.. frame 1134.
3SL to U. S. Asst. District Attorney, July 4, 1918, in
Federal Surveillance of Afro-Americans (1917-1925) , ed.
Komweibel, reel 13, frame 1138.
36Robert A. Bowen to Wm. H. Lamar, July 18, 1918, in
Federal Surveillance of Afro-Americans L1917-19.2.5J,, ed.
Komweibel, reel 13, frame 1141.
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the country will not deter us from pointing the accusing 
finger at those individuals and groups of individuals who are 
striving to defeat and destroy that spirit," Johnson 
continued. No one should doubt the Negro's loyalty during the 
present crisis, but they should know that he would do "his 
duty with his eyes wide open; and when that duty is done he 
will demand that this nation live up to the protestations of 
democracy that it is now making." How quoted the last
sentence disapprovingly, but had to admit Johnson's editorials 
were "a little too subtle perhaps to object to."37
Comments of the censors about the Chicago Defender and 
some other black newspapers reveals still more ambivalence. 
Army intelligence officer Roy F. Britton defined a May 3, 1918 
editorial in the St. Louis Arous as "insidious and dangerous 
propaganda" because it sowed "seeds of discontent" and 
"coupled" the buying of liberty bonds with support for a 
Federal anti-lynching bill. But Britton had to admit that the 
editorial also advocated only "legitimate, legal and patriotic 
means" of protest. Britton visited Arcms city editor Herbert 
Meadows and "warned him about saying anything in his paper 
that would make the negroes discontented or make them want to 
avoid service." Meadows asserted the Argus's "loyalty and 
patriotism" and assured Britton "that his paper was behind the
37James Weldon Johnson, "Faith and Works," New York Age. 
March 23, 1918, p. 4. LH to U.S. Asst. District Attorney, 
March 22, 1918, in Federal Surveillance of Afro-Americans
(1917-1925) . ed. Komweibel, reel 13, frame 1125.
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government."38 Britton may have been persuaded by the 
arguments that appeared in the newspaper. In June, he 
responded to an article about a black draftee ejected from a 
train in Arkansas by suggesting an investigation of the 
incident to his superior.39
Government officials called the Chicago Defender "the 
most dangerous of all Negro Journals," yet could not agree on 
whether it needed to be censored or not.<0 Distribution of 
the first mass circulation black newspaper reached deep into 
the South and was credited with helping to inspire--or at 
least influence--the migration of hundreds of thousands of 
blacks from South to North during the war. According to 
government estimates, Abbott sold 92,000 issues in Chicago 
each week by mid-1918 and thousands more throughout the 
country, including 2,000 in New Orleans alone.41 Abbott may 
have been somewhat less vulnerable to threats of lost mailing 
privileges because he distributed many of his newspapers
38Roy F. Britton to Chief, Military Intelligence Branch, 
May 6, 1918, in Federal Surveillance of Afro-Americans (1917- 
1925) . ed. Komweibel, reel 19, frame 684. See also, Britton 
to E. J. Brennan, May 27, 1918, in ibid.. frame 697.
39Roy F. Britton to Chief, Military Intelligence Branch, 
June 25, 1918 in Federal Surveillance of Afro-Americans (1917- 
1925) . ed. Komweibel, reel 19, frame 700.
40W. H. Loving to Chief, Military Intelligence Branch, May 
10, 1918, in Federal Surveillance of Afro-Americans (1917-
1925) . ed. Komweibel, reel 19, frame 611.
41R. H. Van Deman to W. H. Loving, May 3, 1918, in Federal 
Surveillance of Afro-Americans (1917-1925) . ed. Komweibel, 
reel 19, frame 617.
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through a network of black Pullman Porters who dropped bundles 
of papers off at railroad stations for local agents.
Most of the critiques of Abbott' s paper came not from 
postal censors in Chicago, but from Southerners who thought 
the Defender was stirring up trouble in their neighborhoods. 
M. E. Nash, postmaster of Belcher, Louisiana, told the Post 
Office solicitor in Washington that every issue of the 
Defender "contains a libel on the South. . . . The sentiments 
expressed in it were unknown in this section previous to its 
appearance, " and threatened to "inflame" a "heretofore 
peaceful section" where "the negroes have always been well and 
equitably treated." Just as the black press portrayed 
Southern racism as unpatriotic, these white Southerners 
portrayed the black press as hindering the war effort. The 
newspaper's advocacy of migration threatened to deplete the 
South's supply of agricultural labor, Nash wrote, and 
"anything that interferes with the agriculture of the South is 
a menace to the whole Nation and such influences should be 
closely watched."42 Whites from Denison, Texas; Tucson, 
Arizona; Little Rock and Pine Bluff, Arkansas; New Orleans; 
Jacksonville, Florida; Memphis, Tennessee; and Mobile, 
Alabama, argued that the Defender had threatened wartime 
national unity by poisoning otherwise harmonious race
42M. E. Nash to Solicitor, U. S. Post Office, June 22, 
1918, in Federal Surveillance of Afro-Americans (1917-1925). 
ed. Komweibel, reel 13, frame 769. On the threat to Southern 
agriculture, see also, E. J. Kerwin to A. Bruce Bielaski, May 
2, 1918, in ibid.. reel 9, frames 70-71.
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relations.43 The Denison postmaster tried to convince the 
Solicitor that not only did the Defender inspire "rank race 
hatred" and show signs of a "German conspiracy" and "anti- 
Americanism, " it was also plain wrong in its interpretation of 
racial violence. "Inhumanities," he wrote, did not occur 
"only between the white race and the negro race" but among 
people of the same race as well. Thus, "the occurrence of 
trouble occasionally between the two races is no special sign 
of exclusive inhumanity from one or the other."44
Officials of the government were sympathetic to the 
Southern view of reality and the Defender. A Federal postal 
official agreed with M. E. Nash that the June 1 and 22 issues 
of the paper should be barred from the mails because they
43See, in order, Denison, Texas, Postmaster to Solicitor, 
U. S. Postoffice Department, June 8, 1918; [F.] B. [Z]ock,
Justice Department report, Dec. 28, 1917; D. Whipple to A. M. 
Briggs, July 5, 1917; E. J. Kerwin to A. Bruce Bielaski, May 
2, 1918; F. Pendleton, Justice Department report, [April
1917]; Edward S. Chestalb, Justice Department report, April 
24, 1917; Bolton Smith to W. D. Kyser, Jan. 14, 1918; T. M. 
Diskin to Chief Inspector, Post Office Department, Jan. 29, 
1918; Justice Department report, Mobile Alabama, Sept. 14, 
1918; and Charles F. Lorenzen to A. Bruce Bielaski, Oct. 3, 
1918; in Federal Surveillance of Afro-Americans (1917-1925). 
ed. Komweibel, reel 13, frame 755; reel 9, frames 57-8, 49, 
70-71, 50, 39; reel 13, frames 764 and 766; and reel 9 frames 
66 and 67.
44Denison, Texas, Postmaster to Post Office Solicitor, 
June 8, 1918, in Federal Surveillance of Afro-Americans (1917- 
1925) . ed. Komweibel, reel 13, frame 755. On other 
Southerners who accused the Defender of being part of a German 
conspiracy, see memorandum re: Chicago Defender. April 24, 
1917; D. Whipple to A. M. Briggs, Little Rock, Ark., July 5, 
1917; memorandum on German activities, Tucson, Ariz., Dec. 28, 
1917 in Federal Surveillance of Afro-Americans (1917-1925). 
ed. Komweibel, reel 9, frames 39, 49, 57-58.
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interfered with the supply of Southern labor and intensified 
"racial prejudices and animosities."45 In the military, Col. 
R. H. Van Deman regarded the Defender as "undoubtedly disloyal 
in most of its utterances" because it contained "repeated 
attacks on the Government," and tended to encourage "disloyal 
acts" among blacks. Yet he did not recommend any particular 
actions against the paper.46
Most other officials concluded the Defender, however 
objectionable, had done nothing illegal and, like Van Deman, 
could find no particular reason to censor it. The Post Office 
ruled that the page-one story "SOUTHERN STUNTS SURPASS HUN, " 
which the Denison, Texas, postmaster had criticized, did not 
warrant suppression, though it did tend to "stir up race 
hatred and race prejudice" and encourage mob violence.47 The 
Justice Department investigated charges that Germans were 
conspiring to distribute the newspapers to all the Negroes in 
Tucson, Arizona, and concluded that "since the war began, [the 
Defender! has been loyal to the core. There is nowhere
45Post Office Department report on Chicago Defender. July 
6, 1918, in Federal Surveillance of Afro-Americans (1917-
1925). ed. Kornweibel, reel 13, frame 771.
46R. H. Van Deman to W. H. Loving, May 3, 1918, in Federal 
Surveillance of Afro-Americans (1917-1925) . ed. Komweibel, 
reel 19, frame 617.
<7CEB to Editor, Chicago Defender. June 13, 1918, in
Egflazal Surveillance of Afro-Americans (1917-1925) . ed.
Komweibel, reel 13, frames 756-7.
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connected with it the slightest evidence of German 
influence.1,48
Even two Southerners who hoped to silence the journal had 
to admit it generally stayed within (or at least did not go 
far beyond) the bounds of acceptable discourse. Bolton Smith, 
a white Tennessee banker who had formed a pro-war, anti- 
lynching Law and Order League in his state, said the Defender 
should be suppressed because it stirred up "violence and 
strife," but admitted there was probably "no harm" in the 
newspaper. He could not decide whether the newspaper stayed 
within or went "a little beyond the limit."49 Mississippi's 
segregationist senator, John Sharp Williams, conceded that his 
quarrel with the Defender amounted to conflicting views of the 
truth. He complained to postmaster Burleson that the 
Defender1s "tissue of lies [were] all intended to create race 
disturbance and trouble. . . .  If there is any provision of 
law whereby you can exclude a paper from the mail on the 
ground that it is a liar, of course, you can exclude this one, 
but I don't know of any such provision.1,50
49Justice Department report, Dec. 22, 1917, in Federal 
Surveillance of Afro-Americans (1917-1925) . ed. Komweibel, 
reel 9, frames 55-6.
49Bolton Smith to W. D. Kyser, Jan. 14, 1918 in Federal
Surveillance of Afro-Americans (1917-1925) . ed. Komweibel, 
reel 13, frame 764.
50John Sharp Williams to Albert S. Burleson, June 22, 
1918, in Federal Surveillance of Afro-Americans (1917-1925). 
ed. Komweibel, reel 13, frame 768.
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Although the government did not take official action 
against the Defender, several government officials met in 
person with Abbott between April of 1917 and the summer of 
1918. Abbott assured Justice Department agents just after the 
start of the war that he was actively supporting the war 
effort and that "the colored people throughout the country" 
would be loyal.51 An employee of the postal solicitor's 
office warned Abbott to avoid printing material that tended to 
"cause friction between the two races" or which suggested that 
blacks had "no part in the struggle against the Imperial 
German Government."52 He also, however, expressed "no doubt 
as to the loyalty of" the Defender and certainty that Abbott 
would perform his patriotic duties in the prescribed manner.
Major Walter H. Loving, a black intelligence official, 
met with Abbott in person to inform him "officially that the 
eye of the government is centered upon his paper" and that "he 
would be held strictly accountable."53 In a remarkable reply 
to Loving, Abbott cast himself as absolutely loyal to the 
Federal government and supportive of the war effort, and 
explained that the Defender had been outspoken only "from a
51J. E. Hawkins, memorandum on Chicago Defender. April 15, 
1917, in Federal Surveillance of Afro-Americans (1917-1925). 
ed. Komweibel, reel 9, frame 41.
52C. E. B. [to Robert Abbott], June 13, 1918, in Federal 
Surveillance of Afro-Americans (1917-1925). ed. Komweibel, 
reel 13, frames 756-57.
53W. H. Loving to Chief, Military Intelligence Branch, May 
10, 1918, in Federal Surveillance of Afro-Americans (1917-
1925) . ed. Komweibel, reel 19, frame 611.
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southerner's point of view." Abbott pointed out that he was 
vigorously supporting the war by subscribing to the Liberty 
Loan to the tune of $12,000, speaking for the Committee on 
Public Information, and contributing a regimental flag to the 
365th infantry division. Second, "in exposing the injustices 
done our race in" the South, the Defender had tried "in every 
case . . .  to avoid placing our criticism on the national 
administration." Abbott said he had "more than once advised 
my staff writers to refrain from expressing their views on 
problems that would precipitate national strife, or inculcate 
in the heart of any member of my race the spirit of revolt 
against the laws of the national or state governments."54 
Clearly, Abbott concluded, his enemies were "taking undue 
advantage" of his delicate wartime position.
Abbott's strategy generally followed that of the entire 
black press from the beginning of the war. Though the 
pressure of censorship may have reduced the Defender1s 
criticism of the Federal government, his staunch and active 
support for the war was a natural and uncoerced response. 
Meanwhile, he continued to equate the South with the enemy, to 
demand civil rights for African Americans, and to advocate 
migration out of the South. Government officials who actually 
read the Defender and other black newspapers may not have 
agreed with them, but they found little basis for suppression.
54Robert S. Abbott to W. H. Loving, May 11, 1918, in
Federal Surveillance of Afro-Americans (1917-1925) , ed.
Komweibel, reel 19, frame 612.
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Indeed, a few seem to have been swayed ever so slightly by 
black newspapers' arguments. More importantly, their reports 
on black newspapers reached the highest levels of government 
where officials were persuaded to respond--partly out of 
anxiety over the unrest among the black population and partly 
in response to the legitimate demands of the black press.
The Washington Conference and its Fruits
On May 28, 1918, Major Loving told Argus publisher J. E. 
Mitchell that "the officials at Washington are being daily 
acquainted with facts of the real grievances of the American 
negro [sic] through the colored press, private letters and 
such a great journal as the New York World."55 The war, it 
seemed, had created an opportunity for black concerns to be 
heard by major press outlets and in the halls of power, and 
the key channel was the black press. Eight days after Loving 
penned his letter to Mitchell, Joel Spingam and Emmett Scott 
met to plan a conference of black editors in Washington D. C. 
to impress on them the importance of leading "Negro public 
opinion . . . along helpful lines rather than along lines that 
make for discontentment and unrest." But this statement, in 
a letter to George Creel, chairman of the wartime Federal
5SW. H. Loving to J. E. Mitchell, May 28, 1918, in Federal 
Surveillance of Afro-Americans (1917-1925). ed. Komweibel, 
reel 19, frame 687-8.
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propaganda agency, the Committee on Public Information, did 
not reveal the whole purpose of the conference. Scott and 
Spingarn, both advocates of African American equality, hoped 
not to silence the black press, but give it a hearing with the 
Federal government. They hoped to make the press more pro­
war, but also to alter Federal policies on race. Spingarn 
explained to the head of the Military Intelligence Branch, 
Col. Marlborough Churchill, that "constant complaints from 
Intelligence Officers and others" had indicated "that the 
colored press was spreading disaffection among negroes." The 
conference would modify the "bitter tone" of the newspapers 
while at the same time stimulating "negro morale." It would 
also obtain "information [from the editors] in regard to the 
negro situation and the means of improving it."ss Had black 
newspapers been militant enough to warrant outright 
censorship, Spingarn's and Scott's strategy would have been 
unnecessary, the conference would not have taken place, and 
this channel to white America would never have been opened.
The government paid traveling expenses for thirty-one 
editors and ten other black leaders to come from all over the 
country to meet in the Federal Interior Building at 18th and 
F Streets from June 19 to 21 for three secret four-hour 
sessions. Participants included Fred Moore of the Age. John 
Murphy of the Afro. Harry Smith of the Gazette. Robert Abbott
56J. E. Spingarn, memorandum to Colonel Churchill, June
22, 1918, in Federal Surveillance of. Afro-Americans (_19_1_7_-
1925) . ed. Komweibel, reel 19, frames 733-35.
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of the Defender. W. E. B. Du Bois of the Crisis. George Knox 
of the Indianapolis Freeman. Calvin Chase of the Washington 
Bee. George Harris of the New York News, and J. E. Mitchell of 
the St. Louis Argus. Trotter was invited but did not come, 
and the publishers of the California Eagle and the Chicago 
Broad Ax were not invited.57 The editors listened to 
speeches by Secretary of War Newton Baker, CPI Chairman George 
Creel, Assistant Secretary of the Navy Franklin D. Roosevelt, 
a general and two majors from the French Army, and 
representatives of the Shipping Board and the Food 
Administration. Clearly, the government succeeded in scoring 
propaganda points with the editors. Simply holding the 
conference and giving the editors a chance to "'let off 
steam,'" as Spingarn put it, may have siphoned off some of 
their anger. Baker presented evidence to disprove rumors that 
black soldiers were being sacrificed to save white soldiers in 
France. The presentation by the French officers on the 
treatment of African troops by their country "made a very deep 
impression" and generated "enthusiasm" among the editors. 
Spingarn concluded that the conference "conformed" to the 
military's "original plan," that the demands of the editors
57 "Members of the Great Race Conference," Cleveland 
Gazette. July 6, 1918, p. 1; and "Conference of Colored 
Editors: List of Conferees," in Federal Surveillance of Afro- 
Americans (1917-1925) . ed. Komweibel, reel 19, frames 739-41.
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required no "fundamental social readjustments," and predicted 
"an excellent effect on the colored press."58
At a "Liberty Congress," held later that week by William 
Monroe Trotter, Hubert Harrison, and other mavericks, 
participants scorned the government-sponsored conference as an 
attempt to buy off the black press. Editors were "wined and 
dined at the government1 s expense for the sole purpose of 
muzzling them," said one Liberty Congress speaker.59 But the 
more conciliatory editor's conference undoubtedly accomplished 
more. Harry Smith, who was sympathetic to the Liberty
Congress, said there was "no possibility of comparison" 
between the two in terms of results.80
The participants of the editor's conference were not 
simply dupes. Their pledge of national loyalty and support 
for the war did not contradict their general stand on the war. 
In Spingarn's and Churchill's reports to superiors, in the 
conference's official declaration, and in press accounts, the 
editors' wartime themes came through: African Americans were 
loyal and patriotic citizens, yet the failure of government to
58Spingam, memorandum to Colonel Churchill, in Federal 
Surveillance of Afro-Americans (1917-1925). ed. Komweibel, 
reel 19, frames 733-35. Newton D. Baker to Woodrow Wilson, 
July 1, 1918, in The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, vol. 48, ed. 
Arthur S. Link (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), 
475-6.
59Excerpts from addresses at colored liberty congress, 
[July 1, 1918] , in Federal Surveillance of Afro-Americans
(1917-1925) . ed. Komweibel, reel 19, frame 720-21.
s°"The Two Washington Conferences," Cleveland Gazette. 
Aug. 3, 1918, p. 2.
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address legitimate grievances, particularly over lynching, 
could prevent blacks from giving their best effort. In a 
masterful statement, drafted by W. E. B. Du Bois, the editors 
began by expressing their "belief that the defeat of the 
German government . . . is of paramount purpose" and recalling 
African Americans’ "untarnished record" of national loyalty. 
Their goal at the conference, they said, was to find a way to 
keep black patriotism "at the highest pitch, not simply of 
passive loyalty, but of active, enthusiastic and self- 
sacrificing participation in the war." The editors were 
deftly solving the problem of how to affirm black patriotism 
while at the same time illustrating the need of government to 
address black grievances. The editors said:
We believe today that justifiable grievances of the 
colored people are producing not disloyalty, but an 
amount of unrest and bitterness which even the best 
efforts of their leaders may not be able always to 
guide unless they can have the active and 
sympathetic cooperation of the National and State 
governments.
"German propaganda among us is powerless," the editors 
continued, making a telling point, "but the apparent 
indifference of our own Government may be dangerous."
The statement then enumerated three ongoing problems, 
which they wanted the Federal government to address. "First 
and foremost, " they urged "a strong, clear word on lynching 
from the President of the United States, " and legislation that 
would allow the Federal government to use its war powers "to
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stamp out this custom which is not only holding our Nation up 
to just criticism, but is seriously affecting the morale of
12,000,000 Americans." Second, the editors called for an end 
to discrimination against blacks who offered their services to 
the nation as Red Cross nurses and physicians, stenographers 
and clerks in the Federal government, and seamen in the Navy. 
Finally, they sought an end to Jim-Crow travel restrictions on 
the now-government-controlled railroads. All of the demands 
were important, but the plea for action against lynching stood 
out, mirroring the editorial emphasis of black newspapers.61
The head of military intelligence, Colonel Churchill, got 
the message. After the conference, Churchill concluded in a 
memorandum to the Army chief of staff that "the leaders of the 
race are intensely loyal, but feel keenly their inability to 
carry the great mass of their race with them in active support 
of the war unless certain grievances receive immediate 
attention. The most important of these is lynching." 
Churchill also sent along to the Chief of Staff a bill of 14 
"Particulars," a list of all the demands adopted by the 
conference. Attention to them "would stimulate negro morale 
to an extraordinary degree," Churchill wrote. The bill was
“Conference of Colored Editors, "Address to the Committee 
on Public Information," June 21, 1918, in Federal Surveillance 
of Afro-Americans (1917-1925) . ed. Komweibel, reel 19, frames 
736-38.
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"TO BE SUBMITTED PRIVATELY TO BUREAU HEADS IN WASHINGTON."82
It reads, in full:
(1) National legislation on lynching.
(2) Colored Red Cross nurses
(3) Colored able seamen
(4) Colored volunteer soldiers to the extent of 
their volunteering
(5) Colored physicians for colored troops
(6) Training of larger number of colored officers
(7) Unlimited promotion of colored officers 
according to proven efficiency
(8) Utilizing the services of Colonel Charles Young 
(retired)
(9) An attempt to equalize among black and white 
troops the proportion of draftees assigned to 
stevedore regiments, service battalions, etc.
(10) Systematic getting and dissemination of news 
of Negro troops at home and abroad.
(11) Systematic attempt to correct ridiculous and 
misrepresentation [sic] of the Negro and omissions 
of his achievement in the white press.
(12) The consideration of a Government loan to the 
Negro Republic of Liberia, now actively aligned 
with the Allies.
(13) Executive clemency for the Negro soldiers 
recently tried and sentenced at Fort Sam Houston, 
Texas
(14) Condition of travel among colored people.83
News of the conference found its way, finally, to 
President Wilson. George Creel had told the chief executive 
about the conference of "loyal and enthusiastic" editors
“M. Churchill, memorandum for the chief of staff, n.d., 
in Federal Surveillance of Afro-Americans (1917-1925) . ed. 
Komweibel, reel 19, frame 732.
“Punctuation same as in original. See Conference of 
Editors, June 19 to 21, 1918, Bill of Particulars, in Federal 
Surveillance of Afro-Americans (1917-1925) . ed. Komweibel, 
reel 19, frame 742.
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before-hand.64 Recalling "several delegations of negroes" 
who went away dissatisfied from meetings with him, Wilson 
declined Creel's invitation to meet informally with the 
editors. The program, he said, should go on without him until 
he could "act in a way that would satisfy them."*5 After the 
conference, Wilson received letters from Creel and Emmett 
Scott. Scott enclosed the conference resolution and asked for 
"a word from you . . . addressed to colored Americans."66
Around the same time, Newton Baker told Wilson of his growing 
"anxiety" over what he thought to be unprecedented unrest 
among the black population. He passed along the judgement of 
editors' conference participants that the cause of the unrest 
was the increase in frequency and barbarity of lynchings. He 
then asked Wilson to take action. Two weeks later, Baker 
again prodded Wilson to act on the matter, at least by 
replying to Scott.67
In the wake of the conference, black editors were 
guardedly optimistic. Not perhaps since Reconstruction had 
the Federal government devoted so much attention to blacks1
64George Creel to Woodrow Wilson, June 17, 1918, in Papers 
of Woodrow Wilson, vol. 48, ed. Link, 341-2.
65Woodrow Wilson to George Creel, June 18, 1918, in Papers 
of Woodrow Wilson, vol. 48, ed. Link, 346.
66George Creel to Woodrow Wilson, July 5, 1918, and Emmett 
J. Scott to Woodrow Wilson, June 26, 1918, in Papers of
Woodrow Wilson, vol. 48, ed. Link, 528-30.
67Newton D. Baker to Woodrow Wilson, July 1, 1918, and 
Baker to Wilson, July 14, 1918, in Papers of Woodrow Wilson, 
vol. 48, ed. Link, 475-6, 607.
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concerns. Since war had proved the catalyst for black 
progress then, it seemed reasonable to assume that another 
major advance would accompany this war.48 Defender columnist 
Ben Baker called the conference "one of the greatest events in 
the history of the Race" and believed it marked "an epoch in 
Race progress.1,69
Their optimism became a little less guarded a month after 
the conference as some of the editors1 demands began to be 
met. The Baltimore Afro-American reported that the Department 
of War had ordered the employment of black nurses by the Red 
Cross and was about to reinstate Col. Charles Young, the 
highest ranking black officer in the Army, who had been 
discharged because of an alleged health problem at the 
beginning of the war. "Given the continuation of the war 
every possible avenue for the rending of service will be 
opened to all Americans white or black," the paper 
predicted.70
48See, for example, "Well, It Has Happened" Gazette. July 
6, 1918, p. 2.
49Ben Baker, "Must All Work Together to Get Somewhere," 
Chicago Defender. July 6, 1918, p. 16. On the same page, an 
editorial predicted that the experience of fighting in a 
common struggle for democracy would mend the rifts between 
classes and races. "Strange indeed it will be if a new 
society does not emerge from the democratic spirit that is 
being evidenced more and more as the war goes on. Worth and 
not birth will determine one's standing." See "A Common 
Ground," ibid.
10"Red Cross Nurses" and "New Draft Age Limit," Baltimore 
Afro-American. July 26, 1918, p. 4, and "Good Results Already 
Evident from Conference of Editors," ibid.. Aug. 2, 1918, p. 
1. See also, untitled editorial, Cleveland Gazette. July 27,
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Hopes accelerated after July 26 when president Wilson 
issued a long-awaited statement on lynching. Though Wilson's 
statement has been linked to the lynching of a German- 
American, and the President did not mention Negroes 
specifically nor single out the South for special condemnation 
(in fact, he took care not to blame "any single region") , 
Wilson followed black editors' practice of comparing lynching 
to lawlessness in Germany and depicting lynching as a threat 
to "the honor of the Nation, " and a contradiction of the 
principals America was fighting for in Europe.71
We are at this very moment fighting lawless 
passion. Germany has outlawed herself among the 
nations because she has disregarded the sacred 
obligations of law and has made lynchers of her 
armies. Lynchers emulate her disgraceful example.
. . . We proudly claim to be the champions of
democracy. If we really are, in deed and in truth,
1918, p. 2.
71In an editorial on Wilson's lynching speech, the New 
York Times called the lynching of German-American Robert 
Prager in St. Louis in April "the most conspicuous example of 
the mob mind." On the other hand, a news report on the speech 
asserted that although Wilson did not mention the lynchings of 
Southern blacks, "it is known that he included them in his 
characterization of mob spirit." See "Mr. Wilson on the Mob 
Spirit," New York Times. July 27, 1918, p. 8; and "President 
Demands that Lynchings End," ibid.. p. 7. Wilson had been 
urged by William B. Hale shortly after that lynching to form 
a special commission to safeguard the lives of Americans of 
Eastern European heritage. Wilson promised to give the matter 
his serious attention. See William Bayard Hale to Woodrow 
Wilson, April 6, 1918, Papers of Woodrow Wilson, vol. 47, ed. 
Link, 275-6, 276 n. 4. For an historical account which
emphasizes the fact that Wilson's statement contained no 
reference to race, see Jane Lang Scheiber and Harry N. 
Scheiber, "The Wilson Administration and the Wartime 
Mobilization of Black Americans, 1917-18," Labor History. 10 
(Summer 1967), 433-58, esp. 457.
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let us see to it that we do not discredit our own. 
I say plainly that every American who takes part in 
the action of a mob or gives it any sort of 
countenance is no true son of this great Democracy, 
but its betrayer. . . . How shall we commend
democracy to the acceptance of other peoples, if we 
disgrace our own by proving that it is, after all, 
no protection to the weak? Every mob contributes 
to German lies about the United States what her 
most gifted liars cannot improve upon by the way of 
calumny. They can at least say that such things 
cannot happen in Germany except in times of 
revolutions, when law is swept away.
Had a black editor made this statement, Post Office monitors 
might well have classified it as seditious for the way it 
likened the United States to Germany. Wilson went on to 
"earnestly and solemnly beg" state governors and local law- 
enforcement officials and all Americans to work "to make an 
end of this disgraceful evil."72
It is not clear how much Wilson's statement was 
influenced, directly or indirectly, by the black press. But 
in a letter written a week after the lynching speech, Wilson 
said he had been impressed by the "fine philosophy of 
democracy" expressed by editors at the conference and conceded 
that the problems they enumerated were "grave and weighty" and 
should have the "frank and calm consideration" of the American 
people.73 A week later he told a white correspondent that he 
hoped his "colored fellow citizens" were "beginning to
72Woodrow Wilson, "A Statement to the American People," 
[July 26, 1918,] in Papers of Woodrow Wilson, vol. 49, ed. 
Link, 97-98.
73Woodrow Wilson to Emmett J. Scott, July 31, 1918, in 
Papers of Woodrow Wilson, vol 49, ed. Link, 139.
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believe" that he was glad to "serve" them.74 At the end of 
August, Wilson made another move aimed at winning the loyalty 
of African Americans. He commuted ten of the Houston 
soldiers' death sentences to prison terms as "a recognition of 
the splendid loyalty of the race to which these soldiers 
belong and an inspiration to the people of that race to 
further zeal and service to the country."75 He had accepted 
the contradictory assertions of the black press, that African 
Americans were loyal, but that the government had to do 
something for them to assure their full cooperation in the war 
effort.
Black editors were convinced that Wilson had been moved 
to speak out against lynching by them. The Afro reported that 
the statement had "grown directly out of the recent conference 
of editors." Columnist William H. Weaver assumed a 
connection. "If the conference had effected no more than 
this, it would have" done enough to "justify its assembling," 
he wrote.76 In the Cleveland Gazette Harry Smith noted that 
Wilson had not simply condemned the lynching of opponents of 
the war, or the lynching of Prager, (as the Associated Press
74Woodrow Wilson to George Foster Peabody, Aug. 7, 1918, 
in Papers of Woodrow Wilson, vol. 49, ed. Link, 204.
75Woodrow Wilson, statement, Aug. 31, 1918, in Papers of 
Woodrow Wilson, vol. 49, ed. Link, 400-402, esp. 401.
76 "Good Results Already Evident from Conference of 
Editors," Baltimore Afro-American. Aug. 2, 1918, p. 1; and
Rev. William H. Weaver, "Weekly Views and Comments," ibid.. 
Aug. 9, 1918, p. 4.
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predicted he would) but "mob action of all sorts." Thus, 
Smith asserted, the statement must have pertained to and been 
inspired by blacks. Smith marveled that "a southern 
Democratic president, surrounded in the two other coordinated 
branches of government by men of the same political faith and 
place of residence" (the South) could make such a statement. 
It surprised "even the most sanguine members of that great 
Race Conference that brought it about."77
The New York Acre and the Chicago Defender portrayed 
Wilson as having been persuaded by them to speak out. Just 
seven weeks earlier, the Defender had printed on page one an 
open letter from a black soldier asking Wilson to speak out 
against lynching.78 "The Chicago Defender deserves the 
conscientious thanks of all liberty-loving members of our Race 
for its continual and unceasing fight to secure an expression 
from the chief magistrate of the nation against mob violence," 
wrote reporter A. N. Fields. "Embodied in the President's 
appeal to the country can be found the principles enunciated 
by this paper for the past twelve months." The Defender. 
Fields said, had consistently "laid down one fundamental 
principle" (which Wilson now accepted) , that to carry
77"Mob Rule Helps Kaiser, " and "Great Anti-Lynch-Murder 
Plea," Cleveland Gazette. Aug. 3, 1918, pp. 1 & 2.
78Andy Dawson, "We Second the Motion," Chicago Defender. 
July 6, 1918, p. 1.
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democracy to other nations, "we must cease to bum men and 
women at the stake."79
The New York Age said it had "taken this position ever 
since the war began and has sought to open the eyes of those 
in authority to this view of the case," an editor for that 
paper wrote.80 James Weldon Johnson reiterated this point a 
week later. "For the past year The Age has been pointing out 
that the torturing and lynching of black Americans by 
Americans laid the country liable to the charge of hypocrisy 
in its pronouncements about democracy; and here President 
Wilson has said the same things."81 These comments, by 
Fields, Johnson, and the other Age editorialist, reveal the 
way they conceived of the role of the black press--not simply 
to communicate with other blacks, but "to open the eyes of 
those in authority." In this case, with the help of the 
conference, it worked.
79A. N. Fields, "President Wilson Against Mob Rule," 
Chicago Defender. Aug. 3, 1918, p. 1. See also, "Editors' 
Conference Yields Big Results," ibid.: and "Our President Has 
Spoken," ibid.. p. 16.
so "The President Speaks," New York Age. Aug. 3, 1918, p.
4 .
81Johnson noted that when he had earlier led a delegation 
to the White House to plead for clemency for some of the 
convicted Houston soldiers he had taken that occasion to ask 
Wilson to speak out against lynching. Though Wilson at first 
"demurred," he finally agreed that "he would 'seek an 
opportunity' to say something." Johnson believed the July 26 
statement was the fulfillment of that pledge. See James 
Weldon Johnson, "The President on Mob Violence," New York Age. 
Aug. 10, 1918, p. 4, and James Weldon Johnson, Along This Way; 
The Autobiography of James Weldon Johnson (1933; New York: 
Viking, 1968), 324-5.
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Wilson's speech led to a moment of high optimism among 
black editors. After all, the St. Louis Argus editorialized, 
Americans had "responded nobly" to every other request Wilson 
had made of them during the war. Surely they would respond to 
this plea, too.82 Even before Wilson's statement, some 
Southerners had spoken out against lynching. Tennessee Law 
and Order League secretary, Bolton Smith, a self-proclaimed 
liberal from Memphis who had read the Chicago Defender, 
publicly stated that lynching could prolong the war effort and 
his fellow Southerners should exhibit "self-control" by 
allowing accused Negroes to be tried in court.83 Similarly, 
the Conference on Charities and Corrections, the Atlanta 
Constitution, the Houston Post, the Little Rock Gazette, the 
Christian Science Monitor. Outlook magazine, and the 
University Commission on Southern Race Relations had all 
recently condemned lynching. The Little Rock newspaper had 
said that barbaric lynchings in the South did not "fit" with 
"Our battle cry 'A World Safe for Democracy.'" The Baltimore 
Afro-American quoted the article at length. "This is just 
what almost every Negro newspaper in the country has been 
saying all the time," the Afro commented. "When the editor of
82"The President' s Appeal, " St. Louis Argus. Aug. 2, 1918, 
in Federal Surveillance of Afro-Americans (1917-1925) . ed. 
Komweibel, reel 19, frame, 704.
83James Weldon Johnson, "The First Six Months," New York 
Aae. July 13, 1918, p. 4. On Bolton Smith, see Lester C.
Lamon, Black Tennesseans. 1900-1930 (Knoxville: University of 
Tennessee Press, 1977), 242.
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an Arkansas newspaper comes to the same conclusion we look 
forward in hope that . . . our Southern white friends will be 
able to see the error of their ways and repent."84
After the president's statement, more white newspapers 
began to come out against lynching. Wilson had "awaken[ed] 
the conscience" of the Chicago Tribune. according to 
Fields.85 And Johnson noted that the Florida Times-Union, 
which had defended lynching a few weeks earlier, now praised 
and supported Wilson's statement.86 By the end of the year, 
even white Mississippians had formed a group, the Mississippi 
Welfare League, which opposed lynching.87 The combination of 
the president's statement and the fulfillment of a few of the 
14 particulars, including the appointment of a black war 
correspondent, Ralph W. Tyler, in September, along with the 
perception of a groundswell of mainstream anti-lynching 
sentiment, understandably fed the hopes of black editors,
84"Seeing the Light Slowly, " Baltimore Afro-American. June 
28, 1918, p. 4. See also, Rev. William H. Weaver, "Weekly 
Views and Comments," ibid. : "Lynching," ibid.. July 5, 1918, 
p. 4; and "Anti-Lynching Movement," New York Age. June 22, 
1918, p. 4. On the University Commission, see James Dillard 
to Woodrow Wilson, June 28, 1918, in Papers of Woodrow Wilson, 
ed. Link, vol. 48, 462-3.
85A. N. Fields, "President Wilson Against Mob Rule," 
Chicago Defender. Aug. 3, 1918, p. 1.
86James Weldon Johnson, "The President on Mob Violence," 
New York Age. Aug. 10, 1918, p. 4.
87Nan Elizabeth Woodruff, "African-American Struggles for 
Citizenship in the Arkansas and Mississippi Deltas in the Age 
of Jim Crow, " Radical History Review. 55 (Summer 1993), 33-51, 
esp. 40.
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reporters, and publishers. "Perhaps after all," the Chicago 
Defender dared hope, "we are on the eve of true democracy. 
Who knows?"88
At that moment, late in the summer of 1918, the war 
seemed to be evolving in a way that black leaders had hoped it 
would. Though lynchings and other extralegal violence against 
black individuals had sharply increased, the Federal 
government was beginning to act in the interests of black 
Americans, and it seemed that public opinion might finally 
turn against lynching. Most importantly, African Americans 
had apparently convinced the man in the bully pulpit to speak 
out against lynching. They had won all this not through 
passive accommodation nor through extreme militancy, but with 
a measured approach combining militant demands with 
accommodating assurances. In short, they wielded what power 
they had in the safest way possible. "All things come to him 
who will but wait," the Afro1 s publisher, John Murphy 
concluded after Wilson's statement. But Harry Smith corrected 
him: "All things do come to him who will but wait but fights 
for them in a proper way while he waits."89
Wilson's war for democracy had come full circle. Black 
editors had seized his rationale for war and applied it to the
88"Our President Has Spoken," Chicago Defender. Aug. 3, 
1918, p. 16.
89"Contend While You Wait!" Cleveland Gazette. Aug. 3, 
1918, p. 2.
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situation of blacks, particularly in the American South. Now 
the president himself had been forced to admit that his own 
principles were unfulfilled here at home. Though Wilson did 
not single out the South as perpetrator, or African Americans 
as victims, the statement certainly encompassed within its 
view the lynching of blacks in the South. Prodded by his top 
advisers, Wilson had come to see the need to recognize black 
loyalty and undermine black unrest. The black press did not 
bring this about single-handedly. Leaders like Scott, 
Spingarn, and Robert R. Moton also had major influence within 
the government and, in the case of Scott and Moton, directly 
on Wilson.90 More importantly, however, the black population 
acted in ways that concerned those mobilizing for war. 
Houston was only the most extreme example of black soldiers 
lashing out against racism. In several cases, black soldiers 
retaliated against white soldiers and civilians who were 
trampling on their rights.91 Southern blacks began rebelling 
against restrictions in the South by standing up to white 
oppressors, migrating to the North, and joining militant 
organizations. Some black men resisted conscription.92
90Moton corresponded with Wilson on lynching a month 
before the president's statement. See Robert Russa Moton to 
Woodrow Wilson, June 15, 1918, Papers of Woodrow Wilson, ed. 
Link, 323-24.
91Barbeau and Henri, Unknown Soldiers. 71ff.
920n black resistance to the war, see Theodore Komweibel, 
Jr., "Apathy and Dissent: Black America's Negative Responses 
to World War I," South Atlantic Quarterly 80 (Summer 1981), 
322-38. On black militancy during the war, see Stephen A.
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The black press did not create this wave of "unrest," as 
government officials called it, but rather interpreted and 
placed it in the context of the loyal actions of African 
Americans. When Creel and Baker sought to understand black 
unrest, they monitored black newspapers, and then called black 
editors to Washington. The black press became a channel 
through which black America reached the highest levels of 
authority. It portrayed African Americans in a favorable 
light, made known their demands, and made a convincing case 
that those demands had to be met. Though many readers 
resisted the black press's approach, top Federal officials 
became convinced that lynching was to blame for black unrest. 
In actuality, lynching had been going on for decades. Its 
increase during the war may have aggravated black feelings, 
but other conditions certainly played a greater role in 
generating unrest. But by convincing Wilson that lynching was 
the main cause, and also that African Americans were generally 
loyal, the black press got him to make his statement of 
condemnation, in which he endorsed the notion that lynching 
contradicted the nation's war aims.
Ultimately, Wilson's statement on lynching stopped far 
short of true effectiveness. He never supported Federal anti- 
lynching legislation, and in the following year, the number of 
lynchings rose again, as it had during both war years. In
Reich, "Soldiers of Democracy: Black Texans and the Fight for 
Citizenship, 1917-1921. " Journal of American History 82 (March 
1996), 1478-1504.
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addition, with the end of the war in November, the 
government's willingness to address the 14 particulars, most 
of which had to do with the war anyway, evaporated.93 Yet, 
the anti-lynching sentiment which had begun to emerge in the 
South during the war did not vanish. Public opinion now 
sustained organized opposition to lynching. The first major 
organization of the white South to oppose lynching--the 
Southern Commission on Interracial Cooperation--was formed in 
1919 and during the 1920s, the number of annual lynchings 
declined significantly.94 But the end of the war by no means 
meant the end to lynching, interracial conflict, or white 
interest in the black press. In fact, during the tumultuous 
year following the war, white interest reached its height.
93Col. Young was reinstated, but only after the Armistice. 
Particulars 10 and 11, had to do with wartime press coverage. 
And the federal Government relinquished its control of the 
railroads before abolishing Jim Crow on them.
94William L. Ziglar, "The Decline of Lynching in America, " 
International Social Science Review. 63 (Winter 1988), 14-24, 
esp. 21-23. On the interracial commission, see Jacquelyn Dowd 
Hall, Revolt Against Chivalry: Jessie Daniel Ames and the 
Women's Campaign Against Lynching (New York, 1979), 60-65;
George Brown Tindall, The Emergence of the New South. 1.9.1-3--
1945. (Louisiana State University Press, 1967), 177ff; and 
Morton Sosna, In Search of the Silent South: Southern Liberals 
and the Race Issue (New York: Columbia University Press,
1977), 20-41.
237
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER 7
THE NEW NEGRO'S MESSAGE TO AMERICA
America must be told. The time is at hand for the
people--all the people--to know the truth, and the
whole truth, about our condition and our 
aspirations and our demands. . . .  AGAINST A 
SOLIDLY UNITED, GENERAL, NATIONAL, UNCEASING 
CAMPAIGN OF PUBLICITY IN ALL FIELDS AND 
DEPARTMENTS, PREJUDICE AND ITS KINDRED IMPS WILL 
RUN LIKE A SCARED HOUND. AMERICA MUST BE TOLD.1
After the end of the war, government surveillance did not 
end, but was continued and expanded, and matched by increasing 
interest among white citizens, ranging from a former president 
to the white residents of Longview, Texas. During 1919, the 
black press became the subject of a speech on the floor of
Congress and of a book by a professor of English in Virginia.
Major dailies editorialized on the threat of "radical" black 
publications, and local, state and national law enforcement 
officials watched them carefully. The rise in interest in the 
black press coincided with one of the most turbulent years in 
American history. It was marked by the signing of the Peace 
treaty in Europe, growing fear of radicalism all over the 
world, a devastating influenza epidemic, a dramatic rise in 
lynchings, and a series of bloody race riots in twenty-five 
American cities and towns. While the increasing scrutiny of
^ahum Daniel Brascher, "Getting America Told," Chicago 
Defender. June 7, 1919, p. 20.
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black newspapers presented some significant dangers, their 
publishers welcomed the opportunity to continue to lecture 
white America on the moral implications of racism for the 
nation and to plead with northern whites to align themselves 
with justice, democracy, and American ideals, while shunning 
the evil, racist ways of the South. Most importantly in 1919, 
however, they had new messages to convey about black loyalty 
to the country during the world war, about blacks' rising self 
respect and willingness to stand up for their own rights, and 
about the dangers white hooligans faced when they initiated 
violence against this "New Negro." All this and more, they 
believed, "America must be told."
America's View of the New Negro
Federal officials continued to monitor black publications 
after the Armistice, believing they were particularly 
susceptible to the radicalism that seemed to threaten every 
Western nation after the devastation of world war and a 
Bolshevik revolution in Russia in 1917. In America, workers 
organized 3,630 strikes in 1919, including a general strike in 
Seattle and a police strike in Boston, and terrorists sent 
mail bombs to a U. S. Senator and the Attorney General. 
Government and corporate leaders retaliated by brutally 
suppressing strikes, deporting Russian aliens, and harassing
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radical organizations like the Industrial Workers of the World 
(I. W. W., or "Wobblies") and the Socialist Party. Repression 
culminated in the so-called Palmer Raids of January 2, 1920, 
when Federal marshals and local police raided the headquarters 
of allegedly radical organizations in 32 cities, arresting
4,000, of whom 550 were eventually deported.
Officials in the government lumped African Americans with 
Wobblies, socialists, anarchists, and labor agitators as 
dangerously prone to radicalism. Woodrow Wilson himself 
believed African Americans would be the "greatest medium in 
conveying bolshevism to America."2 A Federal agent felt Negro 
radicals were "the most radical of all radicals."3 Officials 
were especially concerned about New York city's new crop of 
militant journals, including the Messenger; Marcus Garvey's 
mass-circulation daily, the Negro World; and two short-lived 
incendiary monthlies, the Challenge and the Crusader. But 
white observers often tended to lump socialist journals with 
generally conservative weeklies like the Age or the Defender, 
which either opposed or ignored radical ideologies while 
focusing on racial issues. In a report dated July 2, 1919,
2"From the Diary of Dr. Grayson," March 10, 1919, in The 
Papers of Woodrow Wilson. vol. 55, ed. Arthur Link, 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 471.
3"Unrest Among the Negroes," Oct. 7, 1919, pp. 5-6, in 
Federal Surveillance of Afro-Americans (1917-1925) ; The First 
World War, the Red Scare, and the Garvey Movement, ed. 
Theodore Komweibel, Jr. (Frederick, Md. : University
Publications of America, 1986, microfilm), reel 13, frames 
982-1003.
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Robert A. Bowen singled out the Age as he warned that the 
black press in general "increasingly employed the tone of 
menace and the threat of violent resistance" and had become 
aligned "with the most destructive forces of our political 
life today."4 Another report blamed the Chicago riot on 
"vicious and well-financed propaganda."5
The most widely circulated government report on the black 
press, the Attorney General's "Radicalism and Sedition among 
the Negroes as Reflected in Their Publications," listed 
several characteristics, common to many black periodicals, 
which made the black press a "persistent source of a radical 
opposition to the government, and to the established rule of 
law." These included advocacy of retaliation against mob 
violence; demands for social equality; strong opposition to 
the Wilson administration, the South, and the League of 
Nations; and an emphasis on "race consciousness." A fifth 
characteristic, identification with radical organizations and 
Bolshevism, applied only to a minority of black publications .s
Perhaps the most prominent criticism of the black press 
in the wake of the riots came in late August, when Rep. James
4Robert A. Bowen, "Radicalism and Sedition Among the 
Negroes as Reflected in Their Publications," July 2, 1919, in 
Federal Surveillance of Afro-Americans (1917-1925). ed. 
Komweibel, reel 13, frames 806-11.
5"Unrest Among the Negroes," p. 14.
sQuoted in Chicago Commission on Race Relations, The 
Nearo in Chicago; A Study of Race Relations and a Race Riot 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1922), 476-77.
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F. Byrnes of South Carolina interrupted a debate on teacher 
pensions in the House of Representatives to blame the recent 
race riots on "incendiary utterances of the would-be leaders 
of the [black] race now being circulated through negro 
newspapers and magazines." Though Byrnes quoted mostly 
William Monroe Trotter and articles from the Crisis and the 
Messenger, he repeatedly denounced the "negro press" as a 
whole, and indeed, the sentiments he found so objectionable-- 
like advocacy and praise of armed self defense--characterized 
the better part of the black press. Byrnes said he read 
"these quotations from the negro press" in Congress to warn 
"the white men of America ... of the efforts that are being 
made to induce the negro to resort to violence." He 
attributed immense power to black newspapers, saying they were 
stirring up an otherwise contented black population, inciting 
them to violence and rebellion. He also hoped to convince 
black leaders to "tell their people that in seeking political 
and social equality they are cherishing false hopes that are 
doomed to disappointment." In essence, Byrnes thought white 
people should read more of the black press and black people 
should read less of it.
He also refuted the black press's claim to pure 
Americanism. He interpreted criticisms of racism and the 
South as applying to the government, the flag, the nation as 
a whole and "alike to the white man of the North and of the 
South"; he used militant statements of black soldiers as
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evidence of black disloyalty and blacks' lack of fitness for 
military duty; he warned that the "Bolsheviki of Russia" might 
be "using the negro press of America to further their 
nefarious purposes." Byrnes sought to dash black people's 
hopes for a racially just America lurking somewhere in the 
North or in the national government. He asserted that blacks 
were doing better in the South than in the North, he quoted 
Abraham Lincoln's opposition to social equality of the races, 
and he predicted that now that blacks had moved North, all 
whites would unite in opposition to equality for blacks. For 
these reasons, he said, black people must know that violence 
would not further their cause. They must "realize that there 
are in this country 90,000,000 white people determined not to 
extend political and social equality to the 10,000,000 
negroes, and a resort to violence must inevitably bring to the 
negro greater suffering."7 This, of course, flew in the face 
of the black press's optimism about armed self-defense and 
retaliation.
Byrnes and other critics accused the black press of 
driving black readers to interracial violence. Yet, in the 
one case where a black newspaper most directly helped provoke 
a riot in 1919, the Chicago Defender drove white readers to 
violence. A July 5 Defender article claimed that a married 
white woman had declared that she loved and wanted to marry
722 August 1919, Congressional Record 66th Cong., 1st 
sess., 4302-5. See also, "Blames Race Riots on Negro 
Leaders," New York Times. Aug. 26, 1919, p. 14.
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Lemuel Walters, a black man who was lynched on June 17 in 
Longview, Texas. On July 10, three white Longview men 
confronted S. L. Jones, the Defender's local agent, accused 
him of authoring the article, and beat him to the ground with 
a wrench. Jones escaped, but later that night, a mob marched 
to his house, intent on lynching him or driving him out of 
town. In an ensuing riot whites killed one black man and 
burned several black homes and stores, while the sheriff 
destroyed copies of the Defender and banned its future 
circulation. After Jones and some of his allies had fled the 
state and order was restored, leading white citizens condemned 
the Defender1s "scurrilous article" and pledged they would 
never again "permit the negroes of this community and country 
to in any way interfere with our social affairs or to write or 
circulate articles about the white people of our city or 
country."8 To these whites, the black press mattered, not 
merely for the way it affected black readers, but also for 
what it said about whites.
Longview denizens were not the only whites to keep their 
eyes on the Defender and other black publications. White 
readers from all over the South registered complaints about 
the Defender and other black newspapers. Five-hundred
"Their statement also condemned the white mob for burning
blacks' homes. William M. Tuttle, Jr., "Violence in a Heathen
Land: The Longview Race Riot of 1919," Phylon. 33 (Winter,
1972), 324-33. "The Riot at Longview, Texas," Crisis. 18
(October 1919), 297-98. Arthur I. Waskow, From Race Riot to
Sit-In. 1919 and the 1960s (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1966),
16-20.
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citizens of Atlanta unanimously approved a resolution 
denouncing the Defender and the Atlanta Independent, another 
black newspaper, for "abuse of our citizens, civilization and 
its institutions" and for "engender[ing] bad feelings and an 
evil spirit in the hearts and minds of the Colored People of 
this City toward their White neighbors."9 Again, they felt 
a need to set the record on white people straight. Whites 
from Pine Bluff, Monticello, and Helena, Arkansas; Greenville, 
North Carolina; Macon, Missouri; Marks, Mississippi, and 
Baldwin, Louisiana, among others, asked the postal service to 
ban from the mails the Defender, and/or the Pittsburgh 
Courier. the New York Age. the Boston Guardian and the 
Indianapolis Freeman.10 A Justice Department agent stationed
9Resolution, City of Atlanta, Georgia, April 1, 1920, in 
Federal Surveillance of Afro-Americans (1917-1925). ed. 
Komweibel, reel 13, frame 905. The individual listed as 
secretary of this meeting also wrote to the Post Office asking 
that it ban the Defender and the New York Age. the 
Indianapolis Freeman, the Boston Guardian, and the Crisis from 
the mails. See W. H. Rossman to W. H. Lamar, June 28, 1919,
in Federal Surveillance of Afro-Americans (A912rlS25L, ed.
Komweibel, reel 13, frame 783.
l°0n Pine Bluff, see A. Smith to Postmaster General, Feb. 
23, 1920, in Federal Surveillance of Afro-Americans (1917- 
1925) . ed. Komweibel, reel 13, frames 975-6. On Monticello, 
see anonymous to U. S. Postal Solicitor, Aug. 7, 1919, in
ibid.. reel 13, frame 868. On Helena, see Committee of Seven 
in Charge [of the Race Trouble in this County] to W. L. 
Jarman, Oct. 9, 1919, ibid.. reel 13, frame 889. On
Greenville, see John H. Small to William H. Lamar, August 12, 
1919, ibid.. reel 13, frame 1034. On Macon, see Aucil Milam 
to First Assistant Postmaster, Aug. 2, 1919, ibid.. reel 13, 
frame 866. On Marks, see Thirza I. Clarke to Pat Harrison, 
Aug. 7, 1919, ibid.. reel 13, frame 869. On Baldwin, see John 
B. Sewell to [U. S. Postmaster], April 27, 1920, ibid.. reel 
13, frame 909.
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in Memphis, Tennessee, reported that he heard a "good deal of 
criticism" of the Defender in the South during the summer of 
1919.11 Letter-writers accused the black press of printing 
"wild and exaggerated" accounts of the whites' crimes against 
blacks.12 Two of the Defender1s Southern agents were killed, 
according to Robert Abbott's biographer, and more than a dozen 
others were driven from their homes. The state of Mississippi 
made it a misdemeanor "to print or circulate or publish 
appeals or presentations or arguments or suggestions favoring 
equality or marriage between the white and Negro race," and 
one county in that state banned the Defender1s circulation 
altogether. Some communities reportedly charged prohibitively 
excessive licensing fees to distributors of black newspapers; 
in Birmingham, Alabama, the Ku Klux Klan warned the black 
Baptist Leader to stop criticizing the Klan; in Houston, 
Texas, the Klan allegedly stole the circulation list of the 
black Houston Informer: a correspondent for a black newspaper 
was lynched in Athens, Georgia; and all over the South, 
according to the New York Age, white authorities scanned black 
newspapers "with a critical eye."13
“Special Agent in Charge to Chief, Bureau of 
Investigation, July 14, 1919, in Federal Surveillance of Afro- 
Americans (1917-1925). ed. Kornweibel, reel 9, frame 76.
“William D. Upshaw to J. C. Koons, Washington, D.C., July
2, 1919, in Federal Surveillance of Afro-Americans (191,7^
1925). ed. Kornweibel, reel 13, frame 852.
13Roi Ottley, The Lonely Warrior; The Life and Times of 
Robert S. Abbott (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1955), 144-46.
Tuttle, "Violence in a 'Heathen' Land," 326. Chicago
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White Arkansans, including Gov. Charles H. Brough and the 
Arkansas Gazette. based in Little Rock, thought black 
newspapers had incited blacks in Phillips County to plot a 
massacre of local white plantation owners. As it turns out, 
whites in Phillips County massacred perhaps hundreds of poor 
blacks that fall. On the first of October, a posse rounded up 
and killed members of the Progressive Farmers and Household 
Union of America, recently formed by poor black tenant farmers 
and sharecroppers to demand fair treatment from landowners. 
In a letter to Postmaster General Albert Burleson, Gov. Brough 
claimed the posse had thwarted a plot incited by the Chicago 
Defender, which had molded "the sentiment out of which this 
recent conspiracy" emerged. The Defender, the Crisis, "and 
all other similar publications should be suppressed" in order 
to preserve racial harmony, he concluded.
In a second letter, this time to the Postal Solicitor, 
H. L. Donnelly, Brough attempted to further prove the 
"incendiary and misleading character of" the Defender. He 
enclosed a copy of the Nov. l issue, which published NAACP 
investigator Walter White's report on the Arkansas riot. 
After conducting his own investigation in Phillips County, 
White had formulated a version of events totally at odds with 
the version advanced by Brough, the Arkansas Gazette, and the
Commission on Race Relations, Negro in Chicago. 564. New York 
Age. April 5, 1919, p. 4. The Athens lynching was reported in 
the Feb. 19, 1921 Philadelphia American; see Frederick G.
Detweiler, The Negro Press in the United States (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1922), 20.
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"Committee of Seven" (whites who had investigated the riot) . 
Walter White's report, which also appeared in several Northern 
dailies, described the exploitative plantation system which 
kept black farmers in a state of virtual peonage by forcing 
them to purchase supplies from plantation stores, denying them 
itemized account statements, and paying them well below fair 
market prices for their crops. Sixty-five black farmers had 
contacted a sympathetic local attorney, 0. S. Bratton, about 
challenging elements of this peonage system in the courts, and 
others were planning to refuse to harvest cotton unless the 
landowners agreed to pay market prices. White found "no 
basis" for claims that the farmers had planned a massacre of 
plantation owners and he claimed that two white men who were 
shot by blacks, precipitating the riot, had first fired into 
a black church without provocation.14
According to Brough, Arkansas had no peonage system, 
black farmers were treated fairly, and the union's demands 
were unreasonable. Further, the governor claimed to possess 
"documentary evidence" of a plot to massacre white planters.
14Walter F. White, "Expose Arkansas Peonage System," 
Chicago Defender. Nov. 1, 1919, p. 1. On the Phillips County 
riot, see Richard C. Cortner, A Mob Intent On Death; The NAACP 
and the Arkansas Riot Cases (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan
University Press, 1988), 5-47; William M. Tuttle, Jr., Race 
Riot: Chicago in the Red Summer of 1919 (New York: Atheneum,
1970), 246-48; Waskow, From Race Riot to Sit-In. 121-42; Nan 
Elizabeth Woodruff, "African-American Struggles for 
Citizenship in the Arkansas and Mississippi Deltas in the Age 
of Jim Crow," Radical History Review. 55 (Winter 1993) , 33-51, 
esp. 41-51; and Steven A. Reich, "Soldiers of Democracy: Black 
Texans and the Fight for Citizenship-, 1917-1921," Journal of 
American History. 82 (March 1996), 1478-1504, esp. 1501.
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Investigators had found "twenty-one highpowered rifles and 
several thousand rounds of ammunition" in the office of a 
black dentist thought to be a leader of the conspiracy, and 
the two white men had not shot into the church, he claimed. 
Brough went beyond refuting White's story, however, and 
attempted to counter the black press's portrayal of African 
Americans as discontented and increasingly militant. Except 
for the unionists, black Arkansans were peaceful, law-abiding, 
and "thrifty." He praised their "splendid patriotic services 
to our government," and cited a resolution that some black 
citizens presented to him after the riot, "deploring the 
attitude of the rioters of their race" and asserting that "the 
Governor of Arkansas and the white people generally, are 
giving them a square deal."15
Given the content of the Defender and the fact that no 
massacre of whites ever took place, Brough's claim that the 
newspaper led blacks to plan a bloody attack seems unlikely to 
say the least. And yet, the Defender and other black 
publications probably did contribute to a more militant 
attitude among black readers in Phillips County, thus 
nurturing labor actions and encouraging armed self defense. 
At the same time, assertive black newspapers may have spurred 
whites to launch their massacre, of dozens of African
15Charles H. Brough to A. S. Burleson, Oct. 17, 1919, in 
Federal Surveillance of Afro-Americans (1917-1925). ed. 
Kornweibel, reel 13, frames 894-5; Charles H. Brough to H. L. 
Donnelly, Nov. 4, 1919, in ibid. reel 13, frames 901-2. See 
also, Cortner, A Mob Intent on Death. 5-47.
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Americans.16 The combination of the organization of black 
tenant farmers and the inflammatory rhetoric in black 
newspapers, of which white Arkansans were apparently aware, 
might well have contributed to escalating fears of rebellion 
in a county where blacks outnumbered whites by three to one. 
One white reader from the county warned the Defender that its 
rhetoric led whites to kill blacks.
You are agitating a proposition through your paper 
which is causing some of your good Bur heads to be 
killed and the end is not in sight yet, but you 
have not got sense enough to see it. . .  . [Y]ou
think you have won but the price is being paid 
still, and will continue so long as you Bur heads 
keep this . . . propaganda up.17
Not all Southerners who commented on the black press 
opposed it. Between July and November, Robert T. Kerlin, a 
white professor of English at the Virginia Military Institute, 
read black newspapers avidly in an effort to understand 
African Americans. He published a compilation of editorials 
and articles from 80 different black publications early in 
1920 under the title, Voice of the Negro. 1919. Kerlin hoped 
to understand the Negro version of the year's race riots and 
"present it to the white public, if that public would accept 
it." The book includes chapters on "The New Era," the "The 
Negro's Reactions to the World War," "The Negro's Grievances
160n estimates of deaths, see Cortner, A Mob Intent on 
Death. 30.
17Detweiler, Negro Press in the United States. 21.
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and Demands," "Riots," "Lynchings," "The South," and "Labor 
Unionism and Bolshevism." Unlike Rep. Byrnes of South 
Carolina and Robert A. Bowen of the Post Office, Kerlin 
recognized the importance of looking at a wide sampling of 
representative papers rather than a few of the most radical 
ones. The Negro, he said, had a "right to be heard in the 
court of the world" and he believed that helping to bring that 
about "would be a service to the country."18
Some Northern whites were also concerned about the impact 
of the black press on race relations during the year. The 
Chicago Commission on Race Relations identified the 
sensationalism of local black newspapers in reporting 
interracial clashes as one factor precipitating the race riot 
in that city in July.19 The New York state legislature 
launched a high-profile investigation into radical black 
publications. The Lusk Committee's report, filed in April of
18Robert T. Kerlin, The Voice of the Negro. 1919 (New 
York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1920), x-xi. Academic interest in 
African Americans went beyond the black press. Black 
historian Carter Woodson published an essay in the July, 1919, 
Journal of Negro History in which he said that an 
"' enlightened class1 of southern whites was taking an interest 
in black history: 'seeing that a better understanding of the 
races is now necessary to maintain that conservatism to 
prevent this country from being tom asunder by Socialism and 
Bolshevism, they are now making an effort to effect a closer 
relation between . . . blacks and whites by making an
intensive study of the Negro. '" Quoted in Clarence E. Walker, 
"The American Negro as Historical Outsider, 1836-1935," 
Canadian Review of American Studies. 17 (Summer 1986) , 137-54, 
esp. 148.
19Chicago Commission on Race Relations, Negro in Chicago. 
556-57, 650-51.
251
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
1920, actually did focus on the truly radical black 
publications, including the Messenger and the Negro World. 
The committee concluded that, because of the oppression of 
blacks in America, radical propaganda fell on "fertile 
soil. "20
The New York Tribune blamed the Washington race riot on 
"dangerous propaganda" printed in black newspapers, and 
devoted almost a full page to the problem, quoting the Age, 
the Crisis, the Boston Guardian, the Washington Bee. the 
Richmond Planet, and others.21 White soldiers participating 
in that same riot apparently agreed. They seized a bundle of 
40 copies of the Baltimore Afro-American from a distributor 
they accused of pedalling "propaganda."22 Former President 
William H. Taft also assumed the black press had something to 
do with the riots and asked editors to "cease publishing 
articles, however true, having inciting effect."23
20Clayton R. Lusk, Chair, Joint Committee Investigating 
Seditious Activities, New York State Legislature, "Propaganda 
Among the Negroes," in Revolutionary Radicalism. April 24, 
1920, 1476-1520.
“Quoted in New York Age. Aug. 9, 1919, p. 4.
22"Soldiers Try to Terrorize Colored Folk/Afro Agent Held 
Up in Washington, " Baltimore Afro-American. July 25, 1919, pp.
1, 4, esp. 4.
“Taft's remarks, made to the Philadelphia Ledger, are 
quoted in Chicago Commission on Race Relations, The Negro in
Chicago. 556. For a black response to Taft, see "Plea for 
Education of the White Man," New York Age. Aug. 23, 1919, p.
4.
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In Cleveland, Police Chief Frank W. Smith called Harry C. 
Smith to his office to discuss an August 2 Gazette editorial 
advising blacks to keep "a U. S. Army Riot Gun in your home" 
as protection against white rioters. "Cleveland may be the 
next riot-storm center. Who knows?" Smith had written. 
According to the white daily Cleveland News. Chief Smith 
accused the Gazette editor of trying to stir up trouble and 
threatened to charge him with murder if anyone died in a race 
riot in Cleveland. Another local daily, the News-Leader, 
however, reported that Chief Smith denied the remarks. Editor 
Smith described the one-hour meeting which he did have with 
the police chief as a "pleasant chat." He said the two men 
discussed the editorial, recent riots, lynching, and mob 
violence in general. In the next Gazette. Smith reiterated 
his endorsement of armed self defense, while noting his long 
term opposition to mob violence. "The Gazette." he asserted, 
"stands for law and order!"24
To all of these white readers, what appeared in black
newspapers mattered. It mattered, first of all, because they 
believed black newspapers had a major impact on the 
consciousness and actions of the African Americans, whom they 
hoped to control. But sometimes their responses to the black 
press suggest that their concerns went beyond a desire to 
control the flow of information to black people. The
24"The Mob! A Warning," Cleveland Gazette. Aug. 2, 1919, 
p. 2; and "Chief of Police Smith/Refuses to be 'Used' By a
'Cracker' Reporter," ibid.. Aug. 16, 1919, p. 4.
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Defender's suggestion that a white woman could fall in love 
with a black man, for example, contradicted the lynching and 
rape myths that were central to Southern white consciousness. 
Longview rioters who responded to this were not simply 
defending the honor of one white woman. They were defending 
their particular construction of reality and way of life. 
Other readers, particularly Northerners, and Robert Kerlin, 
showed more of an open-minded curiosity about the black press, 
a willingness to listen and learn from it. On such 
individuals, the editors, publishers, and writers of the black 
press pinned their hopes for a more just society.
The New Negro and White America
African Americans seem to have been aware of the rising 
interest in the black press and equally interested in 
projecting their version of reality, not just for other blacks 
but for a wider American public. Editors commented on
editorial notices in the major dailies, government monitoring 
of the black press, the remarks of Rep. Byrnes, and the Lusk 
Committee's discussion of blacks. Indeed, their comments 
suggest an eagerness to use the press to affect white public 
opinion--to counter the "insidious and dangerous propaganda" 
constantly issuing from "Negro-hating Southerners" who sought
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"to poison public sentiment all over the country."25 The
Gazette, for instance, asked readers to call whites' attention 
to an article in the paper on a French general' s praise of 
African American performance in battle during the war.26 The 
Defender reprinted a racist editorial from a Mississippi
newspaper "to show government officials it is in their plain
duty to suppress such trouble-breeding sheets as this."27
The editor-in-chief of the Associated Negro Press, Nahum 
Daniel Brascher, expressed black journalists' interest in 
reaching white readers most directly. He told the Chicago 
Commission on Race Relations that "most of us are proud to 
have them [colored newspapers] seen in the hands of our white 
friends and it is only through them that they can really get 
our viewpoint. ... I am very much interested in having the 
editorial feeling of the newspaper get to the white
people."28 In a June 7 column in the Chicago Defender. 
Brascher revealed his hopes for the effect of the black press 
on white America. "America must be told . . . the truth, and 
the whole truth, about our condition and our aspirations and 
our demands," he wrote. Blacks must fund "the necessary
2sNew York Age. Oct. 18, 1919, p. 4.
26"Ohio Afro-American Heroes of the Old Ninth Battalion," 
Cleveland Gazette. March 1, 1919, p. 1.
27 "Mistakes That Will Continually Happen," Chicago 
Defender. July 5, 1919, p. 20.
2eChicago Commission on Race Relations, Negro in Chicago.
565.
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propaganda to get and maintain the rights of freedom." In the 
face Of such a "NATIONAL, UNCEASING CAMPAIGN OF PUBLICITY IN 
ALL FIELDS AND DEPARTMENTS, PREJUDICE AND ITS KINDRED IMPS 
WILL RUN LIKE A SCARED HOUND," Brascher proclaimed.29
Not coincidentally, as white interest reached its peak in 
1919, so did the black press's effort to create a new image of 
African Americans in the public mind. To be sure, this "New 
Negro" was grounded in social reality. The migration of 
500,000 blacks from the politically and socially repressive 
rural South to the more prosperous and less restrictive urban 
North; the enrollment of 370,000 black men in the military 
(about half of whom served in Europe) ; the contribution of 
blacks at home to a war to make the world safe for democracy; 
and the self assertion of ethnic groups all over Europe made 
many African Americans aware of new possibilities, eager for 
greater freedoms, and optimistic about the efficacy of social 
activism. Membership in protest groups like the NAACP and in 
Marcus Garvey's Universal Negro Improvement Association 
soared.30
29Nahum Daniel Brascher, "Getting America Told," Chicago 
Defender. June 7, 1919, p. 20.
30On the social causes of the New Negro, see Albert Lee 
Kreiling, "The Making of Racial Identities in the Black Press: 
A Cultural Analysis of Race Journalism in Chicago, 1878-1929, " 
Ph.D. diss., University of Illinois, Urbana, 1973, 387ff;
Leroi Jones, Blues People: Nearo Music in White America. (New 
York: William Morrow & Co., 1963), chapter 8; Nathan Irvin 
Huggins, Harlem Renaissance (London: Oxford University Press,
1971), chapter 2; Tuttle, Race Riot. 208-22; Gerald Early, 
"Introduction," My Soul's High Soncr: The Collected Writings of 
Countee Cullen. Voice of the Harlem Renaissance. Early, ed.
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But African American newspapers did not simply reflect 
the social realities of the New Negro. Rather, black 
newspapers constructed a particular version of the New Negro 
in such a way as to affect public opinion, black and white.31 
As the first section of this chapter shows, influential white 
people did look to the black press for an interpretation of 
the New Negro.
The various elements of the black press's New Negro were 
designed to persuade America that black people deserved full 
citizenship and were willing and able to fight for it, and 
that they would no longer stand for mob violence. News 
stories called readers' attention to the praise from French 
generals and other Europeans for the performance of African 
American soldiers, asserting that it "'gives the lie to any
(New York: Anchor Books, 1991), 1-73, esp. 24-55; and Reich, 
"Soldiers of Democracy," 1503.
31Most historical accounts of the connection between the 
black press and the New Negro see the press as one 
manifestation, a cause, or a reflection, of the New Negro 
rather than a representation of it. For accounts which treat 
the black press as a manifestation of the New Negro or an 
institution which both reflected and encouraged the 
phenomenon, see Kreiling, "Making of Racial Identities in the 
Black Press," chapter 9; Theodore G. Vincent, "Preface," 
Voices of a Black Nation: Political Journalism in the Harlem 
Renaissance (San Francisco: Ramparts Press, 1973), 19-38; and 
Tuttle, Race Riot. 208-26. For accounts which are primarily 
interested in how promoters of the New Negro movement sought 
to create a new image of blacks in the popular imagination, 
see Henry Louis Gates, Jr., "The Trope of a New Negro and the 
Reconstruction of the Image of the Black," Representations 24 
(Fall, 1988), 129-55; Houston A. Baker, Jr., "Modernism and 
the Harlem Renaissance," in Modernist Culture in America, ed. 
Daniel Joseph Singal (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth Publishing 
Co., 1991), 107-25; and Early, "Introduction," 24-55.
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who may have declared that Negroes were not fighters.'"32 
Returning soldiers were "bigger and better men than when you 
left us," the Defender said, and "The country that commands 
your service in times of war owes you protection of life and 
property in times of peace." The "fighting spirit" displayed 
by these men in France was not likely to accept second class 
citizenship in America.
WE ARE LOATH TO BELIEVE that the spirit which 
"took no prisoners" will tamely and meekly submit 
to a program of lynching, burning and social 
ostracism as has obtained in the past. With your 
help and experience we shall look forward to a new 
tomorrow, not of subservience, not of meek and 
humble obeisance to any class, but with a 
determination to demand what is our due at all 
times and in all places.33
Other black newspapers put on display returned black soldiers 
who would stand up for their rights. Letters from militant 
soldiers who loved their "race better than life itself" became 
a regular feature.34 "My appeal is for that which we claim
32"New York 15th Has Fine Record," Baltimore Afro- 
American. Feb. 14, 1919, p. 1. See also, W. S. Braddan, "Col. 
Thomas A. Roberts," Chicago Broad Ax. June 28, 1919, p. 1; 
"Ohio Afro-American Heroes of the Old Ninth Battalion," 
Cleveland Gazette. March 1, 1919, p. 1; Daniel T. Brantley, 
"Possibilities Abroad Coming After the War," New York Age, 
Nov. 2, 1918, p. 4; Lester A. Walton, "War Correspondent
Lauds Negro Soldier Fighting in France," New York Age. Nov. 9, 
1918, p. 1; "Brave Deeds of 'Black Devils' Told," Chicago 
Defender. Feb. 22, 1919, p. 1. See also, articles on page one 
of the New York Age on Jan. 11, Feb. 8, and May 3, 1919.
33"Welcome, Eighth!" Chicago Defender. Feb. 22, 1919, p.
24.
34Charles A. Smith, "A Word From a Soldier, " Baltimore 
Afro-American. May 16, 1919, p. 4.
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to have been fighting for, to establish a true and everlasting 
Democracy," Sgt. James P. Webb wrote in the Afro-American.35 
The Gazette reported that when Sgt. James G. Ellis, a 
decorated black war hero who had made friends with white 
soldiers in military hospitals and on the boat ride home from 
France, arrived in Newport News and boarded a local ferry, a 
white southerner tried to prevent him from accompanying his 
friends. The man said that " 1 niggers' had to go upstairs. " 
Ellis threatened the man with a Colt 45 and was urged to use 
it by his comrades. Had not a black minister intervened, 
"there certainly would have been another 'cracker' gone to 
heaven. "3S
The militancy of black soldiers translated to militancy 
among the entire black population. "We take this opportunity 
to say to America that neither in France nor America will 
colored men suffer indignities from southern white brutes 
whether they are in the uniform of the United States or in 
citizen's garb," William A. Byrd warned in the Gazette.37 
The experience of the war, according to James Weldon Johnson, 
had "worked a great change" in the consciousness of all twelve
35"Sergt. Webb Tells of 808th Pioneer Infantry in France, " 
Baltimore Afro-American. March 21, 1919, p. 4.
36Edward Lyon Jones, "A Letter From an Eye-Witness," 
Cleveland Gazette. Feb. 1, 1919, p. 2. In a similar vein, the 
Afro reported that a black sergeant did kill two men in 
Georgia after they tried to Jim Crow him; see "Shabuta, " 
Baltimore Afro-American. Dec. 27, 1918, p. 4.
37William A. Byrd, "Southern American Villain Abroad," 
Cleveland Gazette. Aug. 2, 1919, p. 1.
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million African Americans, and they would no longer "tamely 
submit" to treatment they had "hitherto received."38 "This 
is not a time for our Race to be unassuming," a letter writer 
told the Defender.39
These writers used black participation in the war as a 
rationale for whites to give them their rights, first because 
they had earned and deserved them, and second, because they 
were now capable of fighting for them. No doubt much of this 
writing was directed at African Americans, to encourage them 
to seize the propitious moment soon after their patriotic 
contribution. But writers may also have thought that they 
were reminding white people of what blacks deserved and what 
would happen if they did not get it. In practice, the whites 
in Phillips County, Arkansas, seem to have taken the 
Defender1s threats at face value, but instead of reacting by 
making concessions, they launched a preemptive strike, 
massacring unionizing sharecroppers they feared had read the 
paper.
It is unclear whether the black press contributed to the 
outbreak of the two dozen race riots of 1919. That year 
marked a dramatic shift in the pattern of such disturbances. 
Previously, what historians refer to as "race riots" bore a
38 James Weldon Johnson, "Psychology of the Present 
Situation," New York Age. Aug. 2, 1919, p. 4.
39"Editor's Mail," Chicago Defender. May 3, 1919, p. 20. 
See also, "Justice or Death is Watchword," Baltimore Afro- 
American. April 4, 1919, p. 4.
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greater resemblance to pogroms, in which vengeful whites 
descended on black neighborhoods, killing, maiming, and 
burning. From 1919 on, black residents met violence with 
almost equal force, inflicting comparable losses on whites. 
From April to October, 1919, an estimated 120 people died in 
race rioting in 25 cities, North and South. The largest riots 
occurred in Charleston, South Carolina; Longview, Texas; 
Washington, D. C.; Chicago; Omaha, Nebraska; and Phillips 
County. With the exception, perhaps, of Phillips County, the 
most terrible riot occurred in Chicago, where 500 people were 
injured and 38 killed. Were it not for police, who killed 
seven blacks, the death toll would have been nearly even in 
Chicago: sixteen blacks and fifteen whites.
Black editors and journalists generally condemned the 
lawlessness, but applauded blacks who fought back with force. 
Reports on the riots resembled accounts of sporting events, 
with writers tallying up the casualties on each side of the 
color line. Blacks in Washington defended themselves "with a 
grim determination to exact a life for a life," the New York 
Age reported, and they did it with machine guns, hand 
grenades, and home-made bombs. And in an early report on the 
Chicago riot, a correspondent guessed that "casualties among 
the whites seem to exceed those of the colored."40 The
40On death tolls, see Tuttle, Race Riot. 10; and Tuttle, 
"Violence in a 'Heathen' Land," 324. On riots other than 
Washington and Phillips County, see Waskow, From Race Riot to 
Sit- In. chapters 2, 3, and 6. See also, "Negroes of 
Washington Were Forced to Protect Themselves," New York Age.
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Gazette claimed white newspapers were "HIDING THE TRUTH," 
about the high numbers of dead whites in the Washington riot 
"to keep Afro-Americans afraid to strike back." The Baltimore 
Afro-American also claimed there were more white than black 
casualties, leading its story with an itemized list:
COLORED CASUALTIES 
3 killed--6 wounded--8 beaten 
WHITE CASUALTIES 
4 killed--22 wounded--12 beaten
Like a box score, the graphic told the tale at a glance: "The 
colored population was well armed and able to take care of 
itself.1,41
Though it is impossible to know for sure, it is not 
unreasonable to assume that black editors intended to 
encourage black readers to defend themselves. They also hoped 
to dissuade whites from attacking them in the future. "White 
boys and men in the South should know the havoc wrought among 
their race so that they will shrink from committing a similar 
offense," the Gazette warned. "The truth will end this thing 
sooner than anything else." Harry Smith's editorial advised 
readers to arm themselves with U. S. Army riot Guns. The 
title of this editorial, "A WARNING," suggests it was aimed as
Aug. 2, 1919, p. l; and "More Than a Score Killed and Hundreds 
Wounded Since Sunday Afternoon," ibid.
“ "Soldiers Try to Terrorize Colored Folk," Baltimore 
Afro-American. July 25, 1919, p. 1. In the end, 10 whites and 
five blacks were killed in Washington, according to Waskow, 
From Race Riot to Sit-In. 27.
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much at white would-be attackers as at potential black 
victims. And as we have seen, both the chief of Cleveland 
police and the local newspapers got the message.42
In the midst of the Chicago riot, the Defender began 
downplaying its previous encouragement of black self-defense, 
urging black readers "to do your part to restore quiet and 
order." "THIS," a headline proclaimed "IS NO TIME TO SOLVE 
THE RACE QUESTION!" Roi Ottley, Abbott's biographer, argues 
that the publisher wanted to help restore order by urging 
caution on his black readers. Yet Abbott still wanted to 
drive the lesson of the rioting home to those white Americans 
who might read or hear about his paper. In an editorial in 
the same issue that advised caution, the Defender said that 
America was "reaping the whirlwind" for having so long lynched 
and mobbed blacks with impunity. "The black worm has turned, ” 
the editorial added, "A Race that has furnished hundreds of 
thousands of the best soldiers that the world has ever seen is 
no longer content to turn the left cheek when smitten upon the 
right."43 In a similar vein, the New York Age said that 
blacks’ militant self-defense in the riots "proclaimed to the 
country" that "The Negro will no longer allow himself to be 
mobbed free of cost. Those who indulge in mobbing him now and
42"Hiding the Truth," Cleveland Gazette. Aug. 2, 1919, p. 
1; "Southern American Villain Abroad," ibid. . p. 1; "The Mob! 
A Warning," ibid.. p.2.
43"Reaping the Whirlwind," Chicago Defender. Aug. 2, 1919, 
p. 16.
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hereafter have got to pay the cost, and pay it in lives."44 
These editorialists never took such warnings as far as they 
might have--as far as Richard Wright would in his famous 
novel, Native Son, suggesting that African Americans had been 
driven to indiscriminate and horrible retribution by poverty, 
oppression, and injustice. On the contrary, in all these 
warnings, black writers were careful to point out that African 
Americans never initiated the riots, but were provoked and 
acted in "pure defense." The New Negro was respectable, 
rational, and aligned with the forces of order and justice and 
enlightenment against the forces of disorder, injustice and 
darkness.45
Another aspect of the New Negro was his political 
assertiveness in general and his susceptibility to radical 
ideologies in particular. Black weeklies embraced and made 
much of political assertiveness, but were ambivalent about 
radicalism. Only a few black publications, like the 
Messenger, the Challenge, and the Crusader, all published in 
New York City, embraced the radical ideologies of the moment: 
bolshevism, socialism, anarchism, syndicalism. Marcus 
Garvey's daily Negro World espoused a doctrine of radical 
black nationalism. With the exception of the Negro World. 
circulation of these journals was small, and all of them were
44James Weldon Johnson, "More of the Fruits of 
Lawlessness," New York Age. Sept. 6, 1919, p. 4.
45"Washington Riots," Baltimore Afro-American. July 25, 
1919, p. 4.
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relatively short-lived. Most black weekly newspapers, 
however, used greater care in presenting this aspect of the 
New Negro to white America. The Defender simply denied and 
denounced radical doctrines, arguing that it was Southern 
whites, not Northern blacks who were radical. An editorial 
said Bolshevism sounded the "death knell of law and order," 
and endorsed Federal raids on anarchists and other radical 
"snakes in the grass."46 Elsewhere, the Defender equated 
Southern opponents of black rights with Bolshevists, and 
referred to the Omaha riot as a "fit of semi-bolshevism.1,47 
The Gazette and the Age tended to oppose Bolshevism, too, the 
Age equating it with lawlessness and thus "the white lynchers 
of the South." But they also noted that they could see why 
disfranchised blacks, in their "depth of desperation" might 
grab onto a radical doctrine.48 "If Negroes feel that they 
are justified in being Bolsheviki there is nobody in America 
to condemn them for it, " William A. Byrd wrote. "The greatest 
Reds and I. W. W. in this country are the men in power who are 
exploiting the people for their pockets."49 James Weldon
46"Let 'U.S.' Mean Us," Chicago Defender. May 3, 1919, p. 
20; and "Federal Agents," ibid.. Dec. 13, 1919, p. 20.
47 "Mistakes That Will Continually Happen," Chicago 
Defender. July 5, 1919, p. 20; "That Omaha Affair," ibid., 
Oct. 4, 1919, p. 4.
48"The Bolshevist Movement," New York Age. Feb. 8, 1919,
p. 4.
49William A. Byrd, "Our Bishops1 Riot Views," Cleveland 
Gazette. Aug. 16, 1919, p. 1.
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Johnson's editorials, unlike the unsigned editorials in the 
Age, expressed some sympathy for radicalism, though he 
ultimately rejected it as a viable political strategy. He 
asserted that most blacks could not be classified as radicals, 
since they were contending for rights most people took for 
granted. But he warned that "the treatment they are getting 
will eventually" force them "into the ranks of the radicals." 
Thus, Johnson warned of the possibility of black radicalism 
while attempting to "combat the propaganda that the Negro is 
a 'dangerous radical' because he is demanding the common 
fundamental rights of all other citizens of the country."50
The Baltimore Afro-American came close to endorsing 
radical views, stopping just short of supporting the Socialist 
Party. Carl Murphy, son of the publisher, joined the 
editorial staff in 1918, and his socialist and pacifist views 
soon made an imprint on the journal's editorials.51 During 
1919, the Afro quoted the socialist Messenger sympathetically, 
defended the Rand School, a socialist institution raided by 
the government in July, and predicted rising black support for 
the Socialist Party. But ultimately the editors maintained a 
stand of political independence.52 In August, the Afro noted
50James Weldon Johnson, "Radicalism and the Negro," New 
York Age. Aug. 9, 1919, p. 4. Johnson, "Some More About
Radicalism and the Negro," ibid.. Sept. 6, 1919, p. 4.
“Vincent, "Preface," 25.
52,1'Social Equality, '" Baltimore Afro-American. March 21, 
1919, p. 4; "The Case of the Rand School," ibid.. July 18, 
1919, p. 4; "Listening to Socialism," ibid.. Aug. 8, 1919, p.
266
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
with satisfaction that the Washington and Chicago riots had 
"opened the eyes of the country to the fact that the urban 
Negro will fight back when he has to" and led the New York 
World to see that continued oppression of African Americans 
would drive them into the clutches of radical political 
organizations. Increasing radicalism among African Americans 
would lead the government to do more to bring about racial 
justice, a later Afro editorial asserted: "If white people are 
more willing to listen to reason on the color question today 
than ten years ago, we have to thank the growing radicalism 
among colored people."53 Though radical ideas appealed to 
Murphy, he seems to have valued them most for how they might 
force white people to "listen to reason on the color 
question."
The New Negro and the Redemption of America
Parallel to and inseparable from the black press's 
projection of a New Negro was its ongoing portrayal of the 
old, corrupt, uncivilized South. The two were portrayed as 
locked in battle with each other for the soul of America. In 
the aftermath of World War I, the nation was at an important
4.; "As to Radicals," ibid.. Dec. 5, 1919, p. 4.
“ "Listening to Socialism," Baltimore Afro-American. Aug.
8, 1919, p. 4; and "As to Radicals," Baltimore Afro-American. 
Dec. 5, 1919, p. 4.
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crossroads, facing the choice of the path represented by the 
racist, disorderly, uncivilized South, or of the humanitarian 
soul of the nation exemplified by the Declaration of 
Independence, Northern Abolitionists, Abraham Lincoln, and the 
New Negro. An editorial cartoon depicted a cloud of dark 
black smoke emanating from the scene of a lynching and 
enshrouding the statue of liberty, with the caption "STIFLING 
LIBERTY!"54 The riots and lynchings of 1919 suggested that 
the South was in danger of thus contaminating the entire 
nation with its lack of civilization. But the moment also 
held extraordinary promise for the redemption of America.
Rather than taking the urban rioting in Northern cities 
as evidence that racism was a national rather than primarily 
a Southern problem, black newspapers frequently blamed it, as 
they had with the East St. Louis Riot, on the influx of 
Southern "crackers" and the proliferation of "dirty, criminal 
southern propaganda."55 "No attention has been paid to the 
large numbers of ' crackers1 who came from the South in the 
past three years to work" in Northern factories, the Gazette 
editorialized. Their arrival "explains the great increase in 
prejudice and friction between the races in this city." Smith 
went on to assert that these Southerners caused the Chicago 
and Washington riots and "tried to start a riot in Cleveland
54"Stifling Liberty!" Chicago Defender, May 15, 1920, p.
16.
55"The Mob! A Warning," Cleveland Gazette. Aug. 2, 1919,
p. 2.
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last Monday." He called on his "Brethren of the race press" 
to make this point clear to the "whites of your respective 
communities."5S
In addition to migrating crackers, the anti-black 
propaganda spread by the "bourbon press" also caused the 
riots. A Defender editorial listed anti-black propaganda, 
originating in the South, as the "primary" cause of the 
Chicago riot. The propaganda alleges that blacks must be kept 
in their place through lynching and mob violence or whites in 
the South will be subject to "Negro domination. The result is 
the inculcation of a disregard of law and order in both 
races." This view and the resulting disorder could not be 
confined to the South and was in danger of infecting the whole 
nation and creating a wave of disorder.57
Despite these dangers, some thought the riots illustrated 
conditions were not as bad in the North as in the South. 
They showed that Northern blacks had been less cowed than 
Southern blacks, who generally did not fight back. If Southern 
blacks would learn how to "meet violence with violence" like 
blacks in Washington and Chicago had, the Baltimore Afro-
56"Southern 'Crackers' in the North," Cleveland Gazette. 
Aug. 16, 1919, p. 2. For similar interpretations, see William 
A. Byrd, "The Washington Riot," ibid.. p. 1; James Weldon 
Johnson, "Chicago's Present Need," New York Age. Aug. 9, 1919, 
p. 4; and "Troops Wrest Omaha from Mob," Chicago Defender. 
Oct. 4, 1919, p. 1.
""Seeking the Cause," Chicago Defender. Aug. 9, 1919, p. 
20; and "Another Angle of the Trouble," ibid.. Sept. 6, 1919, 
p. 20. For a similar interpretation, see "The Mob! A 
Warning," Cleveland Gazette. Aug. 2, 1919, p. 2.
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American reasoned, "there would be a riot after every Southern 
lynching."'8 The Southern black man has less chance to 
defend himself when he is attacked by a Southern mob, James 
Weldon Johnson pointed out, because the whole community 
attacks him. In the North, he has more chance for a "fair 
fight. He does not feel that he has the force of the whole
community, the whole county, the whole state, and the whole
section of the country against him."55 Some editors also 
argued that blacks involved in rioting had a chance of getting 
a fair trial in the North. After indicting 50 blacks on riot- 
related charges, Johnson noted, a Chicago grand jury had
refused to indict more Negroes until they received some
evidence against white rioters. "Such an action on the part 
of a grand jury in a Southern community is inconceivable, " he 
concluded.50
Clearly, justice, liberty, and other American ideals were 
not dead for the authors of these editorials and news stories. 
At its core, America was good, its ideals sound. The image of 
a shining city on a hill was not to be ridiculed, but to be 
realized. The Constitution drew no color line, a speaker,
''"North and South," Baltimore Afro-American. Aug. 8, 
1919, p. 4
"James Weldon Johnson, "Justice Toward the Negro, North 
and South," New York Aae. Aug. 16, 1919, p. 4. For an
editorial which argues that the Northern riots were preferable 
to the constant brutal oppression of blacks in the South, see 
William A. Byrd, "Dr. Wm. A. Byrd on Race Riots," Cleveland 
Gazette. Aug. 30, 1919, p 1.
50"A Weak Spot," Chicago Defender. Sept. 6, 1919, p. 20.
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quoted in the Age, could assert, overlooking that document's 
original endorsement of slavery.61 Editorialists could argue 
that African Americans needed no new legislation to ensure 
their rights, just enforcement of the Constitution.62 They 
could define racial divisions as unpatriotic and un- 
American.63 And they could continue to advise Southern 
blacks to migrate to the North.64
But this fundamental goodness was being threatened by the 
nation's dark side, embodied in the ways of the "southern 
'Hun.'" The "one great sin of America" was its "weak and 
vacillating policy . . .  in dealing with southern 
lawlessness, " William Byrd argued.65 Failure to meet the 
Southern threat endangered the very existence of American 
values and institutions. "THE SOUTH is a part of the body 
politic of this country," the Defender warned. "If poison is 
injected into any part of the human system and the same is not 
arrested and eradicated, it will eventually infect the whole
61"Sham of American Democracy Exposed, " New York Age. Oct. 
4, 1919, p. 2.
“Chicago Defender. March 1, 1919, p. 20; Baltimore Afro- 
American. March 21, 1919, p. 4.
“Chicago Defender. Feb. 22, 1919, p. 24.
“William A. Byrd, Cleveland Gazette, Aug. 30, 1919, p.
1 .
“For use of the term "Southern Hun, " see William A. Byrd, 
"The Washington Riot," Cleveland Gazette. Aug. 16, p. 1. 
Byrd, "Dr. Wm. A. Byrd on Race Riots," ibid.. Aug. 30, 1919, 
p. 1.
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system and may result in death."66 The South threatened the 
nation's spiritual health in a number of ways. It spread 
lawlessness, undermined democratic values, and promoted the 
values of the enemy--whether they be autocratic Germans or 
bolshevistic Russians.67 Byrd saw in the summer's riots a 
calculated plan by Southerners to make the rest of America 
like the South--a white man's country--by spreading violence 
against blacks to all comers of the nation.
The New Negro held the key to the defeat of America's 
evil impulses. To save itself, America should follow the 
example of militant blacks in Washington and Chicago who made 
those cities "decent places to live" by standing up to
Southern-influenced ruffians. Since the Federal government 
was unwilling, African Americans would have to lead the fight 
against the "southern 'Hun' who sought to destroy the Union 
and is now seeking to endanger it by his savage traits."68 
By August of 1919, when William Byrd wrote these words,
African Americans seemed to have lost a good deal of the hope 
and optimism they had at the end of the war, when many thought
66"Another Angle of the Trouble," Chicago Defender, Sept. 
6, 1919, p. 20.
67For an example of an article which categorizes racist 
Southerners as "the leading exponents of Bolshevism . . .  in 
the United States to-day," see "Sham of American Democracy 
Exposed," New York Age. Oct. 4, 1919, p. 2.
68William A. Byrd, "Dr. Wm. A. Byrd On Race Riots,"
Cleveland Gazette. Aug. 30, 1919, p. 1. Byrd, "The Washington 
Riot," ibid.. Aug. 16, p. 1. Another editorial which says 
black self defense saved the nation's capital from disgrace is 
"Reaping the Whirlwind," New York Age. Aug. 2, 1919, p. 4.
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that the idealistic crusade in Europe might lead directly to 
the "dawn of real democracy" in America, when a returning 
black soldier could write with eager sincerity: "I truly
believe that this democracy will not be denied us."69 After 
the riots in Washington and Chicago and a dramatic increase in 
lynching--including the lynching of several returned black 
soldiers--it had become clear to most that the Federal 
government would not follow through on Wilson's statement 
against lynching and that the South would not be made safe for 
democracy.
Yet even so, black newspapers did not stop prodding 
America to live up to its ideals and did not completely lose 
hope that someday it would. Black writers continued to 
believe that the North, once the home of abolition and the 
underground railroad, could again become a haven--however 
flawed--for persecuted blacks fleeing the hellish South. They 
continued to hold fast to America's founding ideals and 
institutions, and to the Constitution as a set of principles, 
which, if adhered to, would guarantee their just treatment. 
They continued to believe that many white men of good will 
believed in fairness and justice without regard to race, and 
that many would support black rights if only they were better 
informed. They assumed that if the black press kept on "in 
the same old uncompromising way, asking the white man to live
6SLauney J. Benjamin, "Hopes of the Soldiers," New York 
Age. Dec. 7, 28, 1918, p. 4.
273
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
up to his constitution and laws . . . the so-called 'Race
Problem,' which flies so ghostly before his eyes, will be no 
more."70 Such consistent prodding would do more than benefit 
African Americans, it would redeem the republic itself--make 
it, as one black soldier wrote, "the greatest on the face of 
the earth."71 In the middle of the red summer of 1919, the 
Rev. W. Sampson Brooks encouraged and instructed the black 
press, during a conference on the race riots:
The fundamental principles upon which this nation 
was founded must be ever kept aloft by the colored 
press, and when it achieves their universal 
acceptance for all, it will have made the greatest 
contribution to American ideals and government.72
Though that day was still a distant dream, black newspaper 
people kept believing in its inevitability and in the 
possibility that they could help bring it about.
70A. E. Thompson, "Editor's Mail: South Heard From,"
Chicago Defender. June 7, 1919, p. 20.
71Launey J. Benjamin, "Hopes of the Soldiers," New York 
Age. Dec. 7, 28, 1918, p. 4.
72"Local Ministers Discuss Race Riots," Baltimore Afro- 
American. Aug. 8, 1919, p. 1.
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CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSION
Given the appropriate methods for framing, one may 
bring about fundamental changes even in another1s 
utterance accurately quoted. Any sly and ill-
disposed polemicist knows very well which
dialogizing backdrop he should bring to bear on the 
accurately quoted words of his opponent, in order 
to distort their sense.
- -M. M. Bakhtin73
During the period from the beginning of hostilities in 
Europe in 1914 to the establishment of peace in 1919, African- 
American writers and editors framed the words of America's 
leaders in ways that promoted black interests. At a time when 
minority groups were being charged with having divided 
loyalties, black writers used words like "loyalty," 
"preparedness," and "Americanization" to assert the devotion 
of black people to America and the war effort. At the same 
time, they used the words that America was using against 
enemies in Europe in the context of racial problems at home. 
They used President Wilson's talk of making the world "safe 
for democracy" in the context of the disfranchisement of 
blacks in the South and they spoke of the Central Powers'
73M. M. Bakhtin, The Dialogic Imagination, ed. Michael 
Holquist, trans. Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist (Austin: 
University of Texas Press, 1981), 340.
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atrocities against civilians in the context of the lynching of 
blacks in America.
To define the black press1 s acceptance and use of words 
like loyalty and Americanism as accommodation or its use of 
Wilson's democratic rhetoric against America as militant 
protest would be to misunderstand these strategies. Elements 
of accommodation and protest can be found in the black press1 s 
response to World War I. Individual newspapers may have 
leaned toward one approach or the other. But their 
orientations to both loyalty and democracy must be understood 
as growing out of their attempt to engage in dialogue with 
white Americans of the North, the South, the press, and the 
Federal government. In this dialogue, African Americans were 
compelled to take into account the consciousness, and what 
Bakhtin called the "apperceptive background," of white 
Americans and to speak in ways that might persuade them.
This dialogue had been underway since the birth of the 
black press in 1827. Many black editors of the antebellum 
period began writing their own newspapers only after they 
could not get a hearing in the white press. They had wanted 
to argue with whites in existing publications and but instead 
had to do so in their own journals. Like most of those who 
followed, these early editors publicized African Americans' 
worthiness of full citizenship and argued that racial equality 
was compatible with American ideals. In doing so, they 
juxtaposed the ideals of democracy and equality against the
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brutal realities of slavery and they put on display the proper 
behavior of middle class free blacks. We know white Americans 
paid some attention to black newspapers in the 19th century 
because white abolitionists helped support the black press 
before the Civil War and because white Southerners often 
responded to black newspapers violently after the Civil War. 
Ida Wells traveled North in the 1890s so she could continue 
her fight against lynching after she had been prevented from 
doing so by violent white readers in Tennessee. Her journey 
is symbolic of the shift of the vital center of black 
journalism back to the North around the turn of the century.
As lynchings multiplied in the South, black editors-- 
especially in the North--increasingly focused on this problem 
as the central one facing the race and America. Like Wells, 
they sought to show how lynching and other Southern practices, 
including segregation and the disfranchisement of black 
voters, contradicted what they took to be American ideals-- 
justice, humanism, and democracy. They argued against the 
racist rationalizations for lynching promoted by the Birth of 
a Nation, and published the gruesome details of the most 
brutal lynchings in an effort to make conscientious white 
Americans blush, as James Weldon Johnson put it, and to expose 
the South as un-American. In a real sense, the black press 
and the racist South were locked in a battle for the soul of 
the nation.
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With the advent of war in 1917, the black editors and 
writers faced new opportunities and found a new language for 
demanding equal rights. They also faced new dangers of 
persecution and oppression. They tried to avoid the dangers 
not simply through accommodation, but by appropriating for 
their own uses the words America's leaders were using to 
promote loyalty. They could not ignore the national discourse 
which denounced hyphenism and divided ethnic loyalties and 
held that "every interest" must be subordinated to the 
national interest. Rather than denouncing such notions as 
impractical, foolish, or at least inimical to their own 
interests--an approach which might have been suicidal--black 
editors used these notions to show blacks were loyal and 
worthy of citizenship. But in using them, they also framed 
them in new contexts, contrasting, for example, the 
enthusiastic support of the war by African Americans with the 
obstructionism of white Southerners. They could even use 
xenophobic phrases like "100 percent Americanism," which, 
though they sounded hollow and foreign in their mouths (to 
borrow Bakhtin's phrase), did help to demonstrate their 
commitment to national unity in a time of crisis. At the same 
time, the requirements of total loyalty made it more 
complicated for editors to advocate black interests. All 
demands for equality now had to be subordinated to national 
loyalty. This led to some contradictions. Editors who 
opposed the war backed America's entry and advocated African-
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American participation; advocates of militant protest de­
emphasized black rebelliousness during the war; and editors 
who saw the reasons for the Houston mutiny denounced the 
mutineers or even endorsed their punishment.
Ultimately, however, black journalists could not 
completely ignore their group interests. Instead, they sought 
to make them synonymous with the national interest. They 
argued that loyalty was not a matter of simply supporting the 
actions of the current government, but of being faithful to 
national ideals. President Wilson himself strengthened this 
case by defining the war as a crusade to uphold such ideals. 
Black writers gleefully seized these words from Wilson's lips 
and deployed them in the fight for black citizenship rights. 
Wilson's use of terms like self-determination, democracy, and 
human rights when talking about Europe had obvious 
implications when framed against the circumstances of African 
Americans back home. Surely a nation aroused to fight a war 
to make the world safe for democracy could be persuaded to do 
the same for blacks at home. The black press tried to 
persuade the nation to do so in part by pointing out the 
similarities between the nation's struggle in Europe and the 
struggles of African Americans in the South.
Embedded in their use of Wilson's idealistic rhetoric was 
a fundamental optimism about American ideals, the North, and 
the potential for racial equality. Despite evidence to the 
contrary, black writers saw the Nort-h as relatively free of
2 7 9
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racism and open to black advancement. Even Northern riots 
provided evidence of Southern rather than Northern racism. 
They hoped to define the war as a contest in which African 
Americans and liberal Northerners were united against 
barbarism and undemocratic institutions simultaneously at home 
and abroad. They believed it possible to defeat Southern 
"Prussianism" while defeating the Kaiser.
Influential and other white Americans did pay attention 
to these arguments. The Federal government received dozens of 
letters from white Southerners complaining about the black 
press, Federal agents wrote numerous memoranda to their 
superiors about black newspapers, the white press and Congress 
discussed the black press, and high Federal officials, 
including Secretary of War Newton Baker and President Wilson, 
corresponded with each other about black newspapers. It is 
impossible to know for sure what impact African-American 
newspapers had, and how successful their strategies turned out 
to be. Censors who read the papers were provoked, their 
racial assumptions challenged. They characterized black 
newspapers as loyal, bitter, "vile and nefarious." In 
reporting their findings, they distorted the sense of black 
editorials and articles by framing them against the need for 
national unity and loyalty. In the end, however, they could 
not make the case that black newspapers deserved to be 
censored in any kind of systematic way. The subtlety of the
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black press' s complaints and the strength of its proclamations 
of loyalty eliminated that option.
But the reports of the censors on the bitter tone of 
black newspapers reached the highest levels of government, 
where officials decided that if they could not be censored, 
something must be done or else African-American "unrest" could 
threaten the war effort. The government1s decision to call 
black editors to Washington to modify their tone by hearing 
and responding to their pleas was a tribute to these editors' 
skill in balancing protest with accommodation--or rather in 
balancing reassuring with challenging language. And it gave 
black editors a uniquely direct channel to power. President 
Wilson thought the proclamation issued by the June, 1918, 
editor's conference contained a "fine philosophy of 
democracy," and he admitted that their grievances deserved 
"frank and calm consideration." Shortly afterward, this 
Southern-bred president, who had at least implicitly endorsed 
the message of the Birth of a Nation, condemned lynching as 
contrary to America's democratic ideals and humanitarian war 
aims. The Federal government then began to address some of 
the editor's demands from their bill of fourteen particulars. 
It is impossible to know how many of the demands would have 
been met had the war not ended a few months later.
With the end of the war, an important dynamic changed. 
The government had less need for the cooperation of the black 
population, and thus less reason to placate its press or to
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listen to its demands. Accordingly, in 1919, black newspapers 
placed more emphasis on self-help and self-defense. Yet it 
continued to speak to white America. While they called on 
African Americans to defend themselves, black editors also 
warned white lynchers and rioters that the assertive New Negro 
would fight back against anyone who attacked them. Whites 
would think twice before attacking African Americans if they 
knew that they might be killed when they did so. At the same 
time, black newspapers publicized the positive war record and 
continued loyalty of black soldiers and citizens, portrayed 
the race as politicized and impatient for equality in the wake 
of the war, argued that only racism and oppression could drive 
African Americans to radicalism, and emphasized the purely 
defensive nature of black violence.
White America continued to listen to the black press, and 
to respond to its arguments. Though some, like Robert Kerlin, 
gave a sympathetic hearing, most respondents, like Rep. 
Byrnes, Gov. Brough, and the 500 Atlantans who signed a 
petition condemning the Chicago Defender and the Atlanta 
Independent. interpreted the black press's arguments as 
subversive trouble-making. White America's receptiveness to 
black arguments for racial justice, fostered by the nation's 
need for unity, had receded again. But the dialogue continued 
as ever, intensifying as the forces of reaction sought to roll 
back any wartime racial gains and the black press tried to 
preserve them. Black editors and writers continued to
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envision the North as the true seat of American democracy, 
opposed to the barbaric and undemocratic South. They kept on 
prodding the nation to live up to its values, expressing 
optimism that America could and would do so, and representing 
African Americans as the agent of America's redemption.
World War I did not mark a major step forward in the 
struggle for back equality. Historians have sometimes faulted 
leaders and the black press for advocating too much 
accommodation, for placing cooperation with the war effort 
ahead of advocacy of black rights. They have contrasted these 
failures with the successes of World War II, when blacks 
supposedly gained more by withholding their support of the war 
effort in exchange for greater action by the Federal 
government. Recent scholarship, however, suggests that 
African Americans displayed no greater militancy in World War 
II than they had in the first World War.74 Just as the black 
response to the second World War cannot be reduced to A. 
Philip Randolph's militant threat of a march on Washington, 
the response to World War I cannot be reduced to W. E. B. 
Du Bois's admonition to "close ranks." Neither event sums up 
the response of all blacks or even of the black press.
If blacks gained less from World War I it may have been 
because of the length or extent of America's participation in
74Harvard Sitkoff, "Black Militancy in World War II: 
Doubts and Reconsiderations," unpublished manuscript, n.d.
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the two wars, or with other circumstantial differences. In 
both wars, black editors had to be wary of the dangers as well 
as the opportunities presented by their situation. And each 
war presented different opportunities. In World War I the 
Wilsonian rhetoric of self-determination and democracy lent 
itself to black purposes. But World War II, a war against the 
ultimate racist doctrine, was even more adaptable to the cause 
of black equality. Thus, black success may have hinged less 
on the degree of African-American militancy than on the 
adaptability of each cause--and the language associated with 
it--to black purposes.
This conclusion does not diminish the importance of 
African-American agency. On the contrary, I have tried to 
show that black journalists, editors, and publishers worked 
strenuously to adapt the current discourse for their own ends 
and thereby to shape history. Humans do not make history just 
as they would like. They make it from the circumstances in 
which they find themselves. Black journalists from 1914 to 
1919 did their best to shape history in a situation only 
partly amenable to their purposes.
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